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Opaque contexts are characterised as those contexts in
which the logical inference rules, existential generalization
and substitutivity of identicals, are invalid. With some
exceptions, opaque constructions are sentences containing
sentential complements. All examples are ambiguous; they
have a transparent reading for which the inference rules
are valid as well as an opaque reading for which they are
not. These readings must be assigned different formal
representations.
The ambiguity of sentences containing indefinite noun
phrases in complement clauses (the specific/non-specific
ambiguity) is located neither in the noun phrase nor in
the context in which it appears, but in the semantic
relationship between the two. The formal representations
of the readings of such a sentence should therefore differ
in the position of some symbol(s) indicating the scope
of the noun phrase relative to the other constituents of
the sentence. There is some justification for employing
the existential quantifier of formal logic to indicate
this scope relationship. However, simplification of con-
junctions within opaque contexts must be blocked. Furthermore,
the existential implications of this quantifier make it
unsuitable; what is needed is an operator formally similar
to the existential quantifier but interpreted in terms of
the concept of individuation rather than existence.
Sentences containing definite noun phrases in
complement clauses are also ambiguous, in a way which is
formally, though not semantically, similar to the ambiguity
of sentences with indefinite noun phrases (the referential/
attributive ambiguity). The formal representations of the
readings of these sentences should be distinguished in
terms of the position of an operator formally similar to
the universal quantifier of logic, but interpreted as
generic rather than as strictly universal.
Both definite and indefinite noun phrases in opaque
contexts are ambiguous with respect to the semantic role
of the descriptions they contain. This ambiguity is usually
not distinguished from the ambiguities outlined above,
but it is in fact independent of them; a sentence may be
interpreted as simultaneously opaque with respect to one
ambiguity and non-opaque (transparent) with respect to
the other. The ambiguity of descriptive content is
also a matter of scope, but the scope relationships are
the inverse of those involved in the specific/non-specific
and referential/attributive ambiguities. Other types of
constituent, besides noun phrases, may be ambiguous with
respect to their descriptive content.
The distribution of opaque noun phrases can be defined
more generally over deep structures than over surface
structures. Whether or not a sentence has an opaque reading
can be determined from its deep structure, and unambiguous
sentences which differ in their readings with respect to
specificity have distinct deep structures. But the
different readings of a sentence which is ambiguous with
respect to opacity are distinguished only in the semantic
component, not at the level of deep structure.
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION.
Section 1. The definition of opacity.
The terms 'opaque context' or 'opaque construction'
are used of a certain general class of sentence forms with
characteristic logical properties. Two inference rules,
existential generalization and substitutivity of identicals,
which are otherwise valid, give rise to invalid arguments
when applied to opaque contexts.
A simple case of existential generalization is the
inference, obviously valid, from (1) to (2) or (3).
(1) My brother is a busdriver.
(2) Someone is a busdriver.
(3) There is someone (at least one person) who is a busdriver.
As a formal inference rule, existential generalization consists
of replacing a constant term in a formula by a variable not
already present in the formula, and prefacing the whole with
an existential quantifier binding that variable.
Now suppose we consider the sentence:
(4) Mary doesn't realise that my brother is a busdriver.
and formalize it partially as:
(5) Mary doesn't realise Fa.
Existential generalization of (5) yields:
(6) (3x) Mary doesn't realise Fx.
which corresponds to the English sentence:
(7) There is someone whom Mary doesn't realise is a busdriver.
This, however, does not constitute a valid inference from (4),
though at first sight it may seem to. Sentence (4) can be
construed in such a way that it is quite compatible with Mary's
knowing of my brother that he is a busdriver -- what she fails
to realise may be merely that the person whom she knows to be
a busdriver is my brother. If (4) is construed in this way it
does not entail that my brother is someone such that Mary
doesn't realise that he is a busdriver. And though (4), on
this interpretation, is compatible with (7), since there may of
course be someone else whom Mary doesn't realise is a busdriver,
it certainly does not entail (7).
There is an alternative way of construing (4), for
which (4) is true only if my brother is such that Mary doesn't
realise of him, under any description, that he is a busdriver.
On this interpretation, the inference from (4) to (7) is valid.
This does not alter the fact that the rule of existential
generalization must not be allowed to apply freely to sentences
like (4). What it does show is that the problem posed by
opaque contexts is to find a way of capturing valid inferences
like this one without simultaneously generating any invalid
arguments. We obviously cannot do this if the logical inference
rules are applied to the surface forms of sentences, for the
two readings of (4) that we have observed, which differ with
respect to the validity of existential generalization, can
both be expressed by one and the same surface structure. What
we must do, therefore, is to provide two formally distinct
representations of the sentence, one for each of these two
readings. The applicability of the rule of existential
generalization can then be made conditional upon some formal
property of representations of this kind, a property common
to the representation of one of the two readings of (4), and
the representations of other sentences, like (1) above, for
which existential generalization is generally valid.
Another problem about existence and opaque contexts
arises in connection with sentences where existential generali-
zation itself is not strictly at issue. Sentence (8) is
ambiguous.
(8) Mary believes that a friend of mine is a busdriver.
It contains no proper name or definite description, and it
would not be formalised with a constant, as in (5). There is
therefore no question here of whether or not it is valid to
substitute a bound variable for a constant. Instead sentence (8)
would be formalised directly by means of a bound variable, and
the question that arises is where to position the binding
quantifier. It is proper to represent (8) as:
(9) (3x) (x is a friend of mine and Mary believes x is a
busdriver).
Once again, the answer is that the sentence is ambiguous, and
what we should say about its logical form depends upon which
of its readings we are considering. Certainly sentence (8) can
be construed in such a way that (9), or the corresponding
-.- i j
4
English sentence:
(10) There is a friend of mine whom Mary believes to be a
busdriver.
captures its meaning correctly. But (8) is also, on another
reading, compatible with the falsity of (9) or (10), since Mary
might believe that there is a friend of mine who is a busdriver
without there being anyone in particular of whom it would be
true to say that Mary believes that he is a friend of mine and
a busdriver. This reading of (8) can apparently be paraphrased
as:
(11) Mary believes that there is a friend of mine who is a
busdriver.
which suggests formalizing it as:
(12) Mary believes (3x) (x is a friend of mine and x is a
busdriver).
in contrast to (9).
As with the earlier examples, we cannot afford to ignore
the ambiguity of sentences like (8), for certain kinds of
argument are valid or invalid depending on which reading is
concerned. A simple example is the inference from (8) to the
conclusion that there is a friend of mine, that is, that I
have at least one friend. This is a legitimate inference
from (8) on the first of the two readings that we considered, but
it is illegitimate on the second one. The problem once again
is therefore to provide distinct representations for each
5reading of an ambiguous sentence so that the inference rules can
apply differentially to the different readings.
Notice that in cases like (8) the ambiguous sentence
has two distinct natural language paraphrases, whose form
suggests one quite natural way of extending the standard system
of predicate calculus to provide the kind of formal representa-
tions that we need; the difference in position of the words
there is in the informal paraphrases (10) and (11) suggests
using difference of position of the existential quantifier, as
in (9) and (12), to mark the distinction in formal logical
representations of (8). There are undoubtedly other ways,
however, in which this distinction could be marked, and it is
with the consequences for the logical system in general of
adopting one way rather than another of marking it that much
of the philosophical literature on opacity is concerned. The
following chapters will be largely concerned with the analogous
question with respect to systems of linguistic description.
In addition to problems concerning existence, opaque
contexts pose a problem in connection with the substitution of
one name or description of an object for another. This can be
illustrated by means of sentence (4) again. The argument
from (13) and (14) to (15) is valid.
(13) My (only)brother is a busdriver.
(14) Tom is my (only) brother.
(15) Tom is a busdriver.
Within an opaque context, however, this kind of inference is
not valid. Thus (18) does not follow from (16) and (17).
(16) Mary doesn't realise that my (only) brother is a busdriver.
(17) Tom is my (only) brother.
(18) Mary doesn't realise that Tom is a busdriver.
In the light of the earlier discussion of sentence (4), the
reason why this argument is not valid should be obvious.
Sentence (16) can be construed in such a way that it is
compatible with Mary's knowing of someone that he is a bus-
driver, and even with her knowing of the person who is, in
fact, my brother, that he is a busdriver. For it may be that
what she fails to realise is just that this person whom she
knows to be a busdriver is my brother. But since it is quite
possible that Mary should realise that one person she knows to
be a busdriver is Tom, it follows that (18) might well be
false even though (16) and (17) were true. It is clear,
therefore, that (18) is not entailed by (16) and (17).
But sentence (16) is ambiguous and can be read as saying
that Mary does not realise of my brother Tom, under any
description at all, that he is a busdriver. On this reading
the argument from (16) and (17) to (18) is valid. Therefore,
just as for the inference rules governing existential inferences,
the proper move is not to block the substitutivity of identicals
in general, or even to block it for a sentence like (16). It
is rather to devise some way of distinguishing formally between
7the different readings of such sentences so that the inference
rule can be set up so as to apply to the sentence on one
reading but not on another.
The examples that I have used to illustrate the nature
of opacity have all been ambiguous. Each can be read in such
a way that existential generalization and the substitutivity
of identicals give rise to invalid arguments, but each has, in
addition, a reading for which these inference rules are valid.
This appears, in fact, to be a general truth about opaque
contexts. Although there are a great many sentences, for
example (1) above, which have no opaque reading at all, it
seems that any sentence which does have an opaque reading also
has a non-opaque ('transparent') reading, for which the usual
inference rules hold. The only obvious exception to this is
the case of quotation. Quine (Word and Object, p. 142) gives
the example:
(19) 'Tully was a Roman' is trochaic.
and there is surely no way of reading this sentence which
would permit one either to infer:
(2) There is someone such that 'he is a Roman' is trochaic.
or, given the extra premise:
(21) Tully is (was) Cicero.
to infer:
(22) 'Cicero was a Roman' is trochaic.
Examples involving the direct quotation of speech are similar,
for example:
(23) John said 'Tully was a Roman'.
Quine also gives the example (p. 153):
(24) Giorgione was so-called because of his size.
from which we cannot infer:
(25) There is someone who was so-called because of his size.
nor, even given the extra premise:
(26) Giorgione is (was) Barbarelli.
can we infer:
(27) Barbarelli was so-called because of his size.
since (27) is false though (24) is ture. However, the absence
of any transparent reading of (24) for which such arguments
are valid probably should not be regarded as violating the
general rule that all opaque contexts other than quotational
ones also have transparent readings. As Quine points out, (24)
can be paraphrased as:
(28) Giorgione was called 'Giorgione' because of his size.
and, if this paraphrase is taken as the proper analysis of the
sentence, then what we have is simply another example of
quotation.
An assumption which is at least implicit in almost all
discussions of opacity is that the two inference rules,
existential generalization and the substitutivity of identicals,
stand or fall together; that these two criteria pick out
exactly the same set of sentences. Indeed, in many cases it
seems that the implicit claim is that it is because of the
failure of one of these rules in certain contexts that the
other rule is also invalid. There are, however, examples
which suggest that this cannot be the case. Thus the
sentence:
(29) He recognised his long lost daughter.
appears to have no reading which does not permit existential
generalization, i.e. the inference of:
(30) There is someone that he recognised.
Yet with respect to the substitutivity of identicals (29) is
ambiguous. We can take it to mean that he recognised his
daughter as his daughter, that is, that he realised that she
was his daughter. In this case (29) is not logically
equivalent for example to (30):
(30) He recognised his usual waitress.
even if, in fact, his usual waitress was his long lost daughter.
On the other hand, if we take (29) to mean simply that he
recognised a certain person (a person who happened, as a matter
of fact, to be his long lost daughter) as someone familiar to
him in some way, with no implication that he realised that
this person was his daughter, then the substitutivity of
identicals is valid. Thus the context:
(31) He recognised.....
is apparently transparent by the criterion of existential
generalization but opaque by the criterion of substitutivity
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of identicals, and the two criteria therefore cannot be held
to be co-extensive. It should be admitted, however, that
examples of this kind are not common. Furthermore it is
arguable whether there are any examples which are opaque by
the criterion of existential generalization but transparent by
the criterion of substitutivity of identicals. If, therefore,
we deny that there is some necessary connection between the
validity of these two rules, we do at least owe some account
of the very extensive correlation between them.
It appears, however, that an even stronger version of
this claim is generally held to be true, that is, that any
reading of a sentence for which one of these two inference
rules is valid is a reading for which the other rule is also
valid. Thus if we interpret a sentence in such a way that we
are prepared to accept existential generalization of it, then,
it is claimed, we must also accept the substitution of co-
extensive descriptive phrases, and vice versa. It is this
point which Quine seems to be making in the following passage
(Word and Object, p. 148).
...see what urgent information the sentence 'There
is someone whom I believe to be a spy' imparts, in
contrast to 'I believe that someone is a spy' (in
the weak sense of 'I believe there are spies'). The
one corresponds to (2) [i.e. Someone is such that Tom
believes that he denounced Catilinej, the other to
(1) [i.e. Tom believes that someone (is such that he)
denounced Catilinej. Surely, therefore, the transparent
sense of belief is not to be lightly dismissed. Yet
let its urgency not blind us to its oddity. "Tully,"
Tom insists, "did not denounce Catiline. Cicero did."
Surely Tom must be acknowledged to believe, in every
sense, that Tully did denounce Catiline. The oddity
of the transparent sense of belief is that it has Tom
believing that Tully did and that he did not denounce
Catiline. This is not yet a contradiction on our part
or even on Tom's, for a distinction can be reserved
between (a) Tom's believing that Tully did and that
Tully did not denounce Catiline, and (b) Tom's believing
that Tully did and did not denounce Catiline. But the
oddity is there, and we have to accept it as the price
of saying such things as (2) or that there is someone
whom one believes to be a spy.
Quine talks of the transparent sense of belief, and it is clear
from this, and from the passage in general, that he does not
recognise the possibility of reading his examples in such a
way that they are transparent with respect to existential
generalization but opaque with respect to the substitutivity of
identicals or vice versa. The last sentence of this passage in
fact strongly suggests that he regards this as impossible.
Sentence (29) is sufficient to falsify the claim that a
reading of a sentence which is opaque by one of the two criteria
is necessarily a reading which is opaque by the other. But I
shall also argue, in Chapter IV, that this claim is in general
quite false and that the two criteria are in this sense
completely independent. And I hope to make it clear in the
course of this work that the failure to realise this has led to
considerable confusion about the nature of opacity, and,
inevitably, to confusion about how opaque readings of sentences
can be represented in a formal system of logic or linguistic
description.
In the light of these remarks, some comments on
terminology are probably in order at this point. Opaque
contexts are customarily defined as those for which the rules
of existential generalization and substitutivity of identicals
do not hold. We have already had occasion, however, to use
the term 'opaque' and the complementary term 'transparent' in
two quite distinct ways. A context may be called opaque if
it is open to at least one reading for which these rules of
inference do not hold, on the grounds that this one reading
is sufficient to invalidate the application of the inference
rules to that context. On the other hand, the systematic
ambiguity of the examples means that we shall be concerned
largely with distinguishing between the various readings of a
context which is opaque in this sense. Thus we shall want to
be able to refer to an opaque reading of a context, a reading
for which the inference rules are invalid, and to a transparent
reading of it, a reading for which the inference rules are
valid. I shall try always to make it clear whether I am
referring to an opaque context, where 'context' means something
that can be ambiguous, and where I am referring to an opaque
reading of a context. The latter will much more commonly be
the case.
In view of my claim that the two criteria for opacity
are logically independent, I shall also distinguish between a
reading of a sentence which is opaque or transparent with
respect to existential generalization, and a reading which
is opaque or transparent with respect to the substitutivity of
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identicals. The former kind of opacity is often referred to
in the linguistic literature as 'non-specificity', and the
latter kind as the opacity of descriptive content, and I shall
make use of these terms too. I shall also use the terms
'opaque' and 'transparent' somewhat indiscriminately to
characterise contexts in which noun phrases may occur, such
as Mary believes...is a busdriver, and also to characterise
complete sentences, such as Mary believes Tom is a busdriver,
though in this case it will usually be necessary to specify
which noun phrase in the sentence is under consideration. I
shall even, on occasion, characterise an instance of a noun
phrase as either opaque or transparent, for example the noun
phrase Tom in the sentence above. This usage is sloppy but it
is extremely convenient and not, as far as I can see, in any
dangerous way misleading. In all of these ways of talking, a
certain noun phrase in a sentence is singled out and is said
either to be subject to, or not to be subject to, either
existential generalization or substitutivity.
Section 2. Opacity and linguistic descriptions.
Any sentences of any natural language are of course
legitimate data for the linguist, but it should be clear from
the preceding section that opaque constructions are a class of
sentences of special interest. Their characteristic behavior
in connection with certain logical inference rules is simply
14
an indication that they have certain special semantic
characteristics, and a complete description of a language must
contain some account of these. It must also state which
sentences of a language have these characteristics. The
criteria for opacity given in the previous section were logical
(i.e. semantic) criteria, not syntactic ones, and in fact it
appears that there are no syntactic characteristics (at least
no superficial ones) which correlate exactly with the existence
of an opaque reading of a sentence and which could therefore
be used as a criterion for opacity. A rather striking partial
correlation between syntactic form and opacity does exist,
however, at least in English. With some exceptions on either
side, it is just those sentences which exhibit complement
structure that have opaque readings. Exceptions to this are
sentences containing modal verbs, for example:
(32) John should buy a raincoat.
(33) We may see an elephant.
and sentences containing certain verbs such as recognise, look
for, thus:
(34) He recognised his long lost daughter.
(35) I am looking for a telephone directory.
Each of these sentences has a reading which is opaque by at
least one of the two logical criteria. An exception of the
opposite kind is a complement construction where the main verb
is true:
(36) It is true that Bill trod on a snail.
(37) It is true that my brother is a busdriver.
Such sentences apparently have no opaque reading.
If we ignore these exceptional cases for the moment,
what we are dealing with when we study opaque contexts is one
case of what Katz and Fodor (The Structure of a Semantic
Theory, Language 1963) call 'the projection problem'. The
meaning of a sentence is a function of the particular lexical
items that it contains and the grammatical relations which hold
between these items. The grammar must contain rules which
state how the grammatical relations between the constituents
of any given sentence determine how the meanings of these
constituents interact to determine the meaning of the sentence
as a whole. In the case of opaque contexts, it appears that
we are dealing with the projection problem for sentoids
subordinated as complements to higher verbs. What we need is
a general set of rules which show how the meanings of the
constituents of a sentoid are affected by the presence of a
higher verb to which that sentoid is subordinated; in particu-
lar how and why the semantic properties of noun phrases in
such a sentoid differ from those which they exhibit when the
sentoid stands alone as an independent sentence. Thus the
task is to give a general semantic description of complement
constructions, and to state the rules which map formal
representations of the meanings of these constructions onto
16
representations of their superficial syntactic form.
A complete account of opacity would, ideally, also
provide an explanation, rather than a mere statement, of the
fact that every sentence which has an opaque reading also has
a transparent reading and of the fact that the converse does
not hold. It would also explain why just those sentences
which have an opaque interpretation have one, and why those
which do not do not. As far as I know, no explicit answer to
this latter question has been given, but there is a very
widespread implicit assumption in the literature on opacity
that the correlation between opacity and complement structure
is no accident. This assumption comes out in decisions as to
how the logical form of opaque contexts should be represented.
It is generally assumed that the natural state of affairs,
the 'unmarked case', is that a noun phrase within a complement
clause should be interpreted opaquely and a noun phrase not in
such a clause should be interpreted transparently. Thus in
order to represent a reading of a sentence for which a noun
phrase within a complement clause is interpreted as transparent,
it is usual to position this noun phrase, (or some representative
of it such as a quantifier binding it) in the main clause. To
represent the opaque interpretation of such a noun phrase, it
and any quantifier or other element related to it, is simply
left within the complement clause. We have in fact already
seen an example of this in the contrast between (9) and (12)
above. Furthermore, it is often suggested that sentences which
have an opaque reading but which do not contain overt complement
structure should be represented by means of formal structures
which do. Thus Quine (J. of Phil. 1956) suggests representing
the two readings of the sentence:
(38) I want a sloop.
in the following way:
(39) (3x) (x is a sloop and I wish that I have x).
(40) I wish that (3x) (x is a sloop and I have x).
where the verb want is replaced by the overt complement
construction wish that I have. Thus a whole system of formal
representation for opaque contexts has been considered which
is essentially tied to the concept of complement structure.
Some justification for this approach will be found in
the following chapters. It is worth pointing out here, however,
that if there is indeed something in the idea that there is an
inherent connection between opacity and complement structure,
then there is a very simple answer to our other question, viz.
why every sentence that has an opaque interpretation should
also have a transparent one though not vice versa. In a
sentence containing a complement clause, every constituent of
the complement clause is, ipso facto, a constituent of the
sentence as a whole. But not all constituents of a sentence
are constituents of a complement clause. Thus if being a
constituent of a complement clause is what is required for
having an opaque interpretation, and being a constituent of
something other than a complement clause is what is required
for having a transparent interpretation, then our observation
is explained.
Section 3. Linguistics and formal logic.
The syntactic properties of complement constructions in
English are, if not fully determined, at least as well under-
stood as those of most other aspects of English syntax. If
we were also in possession of an adequate semantic description
of these constructions, we would be able to concentrate on an
examination of the rules needed to define a mapping between
the syntactic and the semantic structures. The mapping would
be constrained at both ends, and it would thus be reasonable
to hope that conclusions about its formal properties would be
somewhat more secure than is often the case.
A great deal of attention has been directed recently to
the formal nature of this mapping, and it has become clear
that the problem is not so much that of devising a formal
system which will do the job, as of evaluating the many types
of system which are available in principle and of selecting
between them in some motivated way. The desire to impose
strong semantic constraints as well as surface syntactic ones
in order to limit this choice is surely much of the reason for
the growing trend amongst linguists to concentrate on those
semantic phenomena which have already been studied in detail
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by logicians. The idea, very roughly, seems to be that the
work of the logician will provide us with a precise and detailed
account of the semantic phenomena in question, embodied in a
system of formal representations of sentences, and that these
representations can be adopted as a model for semantic repre-
sentations in a linguistic description of the language. With
the semantic representations fixed, it should be possible to
draw some conclusions about the nature of the system required
to map them onto surface syntactic structures. Even if this
is in fact an exaggeration of the attitude of many linguists
to logic, it is worth considering briefly the nature of the
relationship between the two fields, so that when we do refer
to the work done in logic, we are aware of the status of any
claims we make on the basis of it. In particular, the present
study of opacity is heavily indebted to the work of logicians
and philosophers. Although it will become clear to some
extent in later chapters, I should give some account of my
own approach to this work and of why I have not, in fact, been
able to take over its conclusions, unrevised, as the foundation
for a grammar of this area of English.
There are two reasons for this. One is that the logic
of opaque contexts is not at present in any state to be taken
as the foundation for anything except further work. This is
not intended as criticism, for the problems in this area are
enormous. One is dealing almost entirely with ambiguous
20
sentences, sentences whose possible readings often differ in
such subtle ways that one is in doubt even as to how many
readings a given sentence should be assigned. A great deal
turns on whether certain sentences are or are not ambiguous in
certain ways, but independent corroboration of one's intuitions
is hard to come by, since the suspected ambiguities are often
apparent only upon very careful consideration and are overlooked
or misconstrued by the naive native speaker. Furthermore,
although there are certain logical-semantic characteristics
which are shared by the whole class of opaque constructions,
these tend to interact in complex ways with the semantic
properties of particular lexical items or classes of lexical
items. Certain very limited classes of opaque constructions,
such as those connected with the concepts of necessity and
possibility (cf. Hughes and Cresswell, 1968, for example), or
with belief and knowledge (cf. Hintikka, 1962), have been
studied in detail and at least a partial system of formal
representations and inference rules has been developed for
them. Even in these areas, most logicians would, I am sure,
be the first to agree that a great many unsolved problems
still exist. For other classes of opaque contexts there
exists little more than a body of informal remarks about the
properties that a formal system will eventually have to have.
Thus even a linguist who is in principle prepared to accept the
logicians' analyses as the basis for a grammar of opaque con-
texts will find that nothing like a complete system exists
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for him to borrow.
Even if there were such a complete system, however, it
is not obvious that it would be suitable for incorporation into
a linguistic description. It is true that both the linguist
and the logician are interested in providing formal representa-
tions of the semantic characteristics of the sentences of a
natural language. (There are, of course, whole areas of logic
which are not concerned with this at all, for example the
study of the foundations of mathematics.) It cannot simply be
assumed, however, that the types of formal representational
system they devise will necessarily be identical. The
interests of the linguist and the logician in the sentences of
a natural language differ in emphasis and priorities, even if
not in principle. For the logician the primary task is to
formulate a set of inference rules which, when applied to the
representations of sentences, determine their entailments and
thus the class of valid arguments into which they enter. The
job of formulating principles for assigning appropriate formal
representations to the sentences of the language is one which
the logician tends to acknowledge in principle but disregard
in practice, in favour of studying the properties of the formal
system itself: its axioms, inference rules, well-formedness
conditions, and general properties such as consistency and
completeness. It is obvious that, for the linguist, though
the set of inference rules is interesting inasmuch as it
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defines certain semantic relationships between sentences, the
primary task is to formulate the rules which relate semantic
representations to syntactic (and ultimately phonological)
representations.
In a formal system, whether of logic or linguistics,
the applicability of the rules of the system to its formulae
must be mechanically determinable -- whether or not a given
rule applies to a given formula must depend solely on the
configurations of symbols in the formula and in the formal
statement of the rule. Thus the rules of the system and the
nature of its formulae interact very closely and neither can
be decided upon independently. A decision about one affects,
and is affected by, decisions about the other. Semantic
representations will interact both with inference rules and
with rules which map them onto surface structures, and it is
quite possible that by concentrating on one of these sets of
rules rather than the other, we will be led to different
conclusions about the optimal form of semantic representations.
One might suspect that simplicity considerations, if nothing
else, would actually pull in opposite directions in the two
cases. The closer the semantic representations to surface
structures, the simpler the grammatical system could be, but,
in all likelihood, the definition of entailment relationships
over these structures would thereby be complicated. A system
of logic, developed with little or no reference to the task
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of correlating its formal representations with the surface
structures of sentences of a natural language, however adequate
it may be as a system of logic, may be far from optimal from
the point of view of a linguistic description of that language.
A well-developed logical system may be a helpful source
of semantic insights to the linguist, and also a source of
ideas as to how a certain semantic phenomenon could be formally
represented. That it cannot tell us how it should be represented
should be clear simply from the fact that there may well exist
two or more alternative logical systems which describe the
same set of phenomena. Unless these systems can be shown to
be 'mere notational variants' (and this is a concept which it
is not at all easy to define), we must at the very least
select between these alternative systems as models for a
linguistic description. And there is, of course, no guarantee
that some further system might not be developed which would
be preferable to any which is currently available. What we
should ultimately be seeking, obviously, is the optimal overall
system in which the different, and probably conflicting,
demands of syntactic and logical-semantic representation are
both satisfied as simply and generally as possible. Semantic
information will certainly serve to constrain the choice
between different possible types of mapping between syntactic
and semantic representations. But it is misleading to imply
that the semantic representations could be fully determined
independently. Rather they will, in their turn, be constrained
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by the requirements of the syntax.
Section 4. Organisation of the work.
It was my intention in beginning this work to use it to
illustrate the kind of general remarks of the preceding section
by treating it as an exercise in evaluating and modifying a
system of formal logic from the point of view of its suitability
as a model for linguistic descriptions. I soon found, however,
that there exists only a very incomplete and somewhat confused
logical analysis of opaque constructions in general, apart
from special areas such as modal logic and epistemic logic.
Although some broad suggestions have been made, many questions
remain concerning the details of both the formal representations
and the inference rules which would apply to them. What I
have in fact attempted to do, therefore, is to fill in the
answers to some of these questions and thus to develop a logic
of opacity, simultaneously keeping in mind the need to correlate
the semantic representations assigned to sentences with repre-
sentations of their surface structure.
The discussion is organised roughly around the two
criteria for opacity, the failure of existential generalization
and the failure of substitutivity of identicals, and other
semantic phenomena associated with each. Chapter II deals
with indefinite noun phrases in opaque contexts and the validity
of existential inferences from such sentences. In Chapter III
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some analogous phenomena associated with definite noun phrases
in opaque contexts are examined. In both cases I have attempted
first to determine the general nature of the semantic phenomena
under consideration, in order to delineate the minimal formal
characteristics of any system of semantic representation
adequate for capturing the meanings of opaque sentences. To
a large extent my conclusions on this question agree with the
assumptions to be found in the philosophical literature. A
second question then arises, which is what particular embodi-
ment of such a formal representational system we should adopt;
which particular semantic markers or operators with the
appropriate formal properties should actually appear in the
semantic representations. To answer this requires a detailed
examination of the entailments of the various readings of
opaque constructions, and of the semantic and logical relation-
ships among them, and between them and other sentences of
English. My observations and conclusions on this matter differ
in certain respects from those of the philosophical literature.
The failure of the substitutivity of identicals is the
topic of Chapter IV. I argue for the claim outlined in Section
1 above, that this phenomenon is independent of those related
to existential generalization. I then attempt to show that
the general nature of the phenomenon differs in significant
ways from that of the phenomena discussed in Chapters II and
III, and thus makes different demands on a representational
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system.
Finally, in Chapter V, I turn from a semantic analysis
of opaque constructions to a consideration of their syntactic
properties, and the nature of the system of grammatical rules
which provides a mapping between the two.
CHAPTER II. OPACITY AND INDEFINITE NOUN PHRASES.
Section 1. Opacity and scope.
It was observed in the previous chapter that the
sentence:
(1) Mary believes that a friend of mine is a busdriver.
has at least two possible readings. It has a transparent
reading, on which it means that there is some particular friend
of mine such that Mary believes he is a busdriver, and it has
an opaque reading, on which it means simply that Mary believes
that there is a friend of mine who is a busdriver, though she
may not know, or may not be concerned with, which particular
friend it is. In the linguistic literature, the first reading
is usually characterised as one on which the noun phrase a
friend of mine is specific, and the second as one on which the
noun phrase a friend of mine is non-specific.
Though perhaps not intentionally, these two different
kinds of terminology hint at two different approaches to the
problem of characterising the nature of the ambiguity of a
sentence like (1). Talk of specific and non-specific noun
phrases suggests that the ambiguity is located in the noun
phrase, thus that in (1) it is the phrase a friend of mine
which has two possible readings. Talk of transparent and opaque
contexts suggests that it is the rest of the sentence, the
context in which the noun phrase appears, which is ambiguous.
In particular, since it is apparently the main verb of the
28
sentence which determines whether there is an opaque reading
or not, we might suppose that the ambiguity is located in this
verb. One does in fact find references in the philosophical
literature to 'the transparent sense of belief' (or 'of
believes') and 'the opaque sense of belief' (or'of believes').
What I shall attempt to show is that neither of these accounts
of the ambiguity is correct; the ambiguity of (1) consists
neither in the ambiguity of believe nor in the ambiguity of
a friend of mine. There are, in fact, no constituents in this
sentence which are in themselves ambiguous, and we cannot
account for the ambiguity by providing two distinct dictionary
entries for any lexical item(s). The ambiguity is a relational
one, much more like that of the phrase old men and women than
like that of light coat or colourful ball.
It can easily be demonstrated that marking the verb as
ambiguous is inadequate. A sentence which has two indefinite
noun phrases in a complement clause has four possible readings
of the relevant kind. Thus the sentence:
(2) Mary believes that a friend of mine swallowed a dime.
can be taken to mean (a) there is a particular friend of mine
and a particular dime such that Mary believes that the one
swallowed the other, (b) there is a particular friend of mine
such that Mary believes that he swallowed some dime or other,(c)
there is a particular dime such that Mary believes that some
friend or other of mine swallowed it, (d) Mary believes that
some friend or other of mine swallowed some dime or other. A
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similar sentence with three indefinite noun phrases in its
complement has eight possible readings, with four indefinite
noun phrases there are sixteen possible readings, and so on.
In other words, the specificity of any one noun phrase in the
complement varies independently of that of any others. The
important point is that there are readings on which one noun
phrase is specific and another is non-specific. If we locate
the ambiguity in the verb, we should have to say, for such a
reading, that the verb simultaneously has both of its possible
readings, and this is absurd. Notice that what is ruled out
is any kind of analysis which ascribes the ambiguity of
sentences like (1) and (2) to there being alternative dictionary
entries for believe. It makes no difference what form these
dictionary entries take, whether, for example, they are sets
of semantic markers, or whether they are complex semantic
markers containing open positions into which semantic material
from other designated constituents of the sentence is to be
inserted. The latter device does make possible the characteri-
zation of certain relational ambiguities, but it cannot, at
least without serious modification, cope with examples where
the number of possible readings depends upon the number of
constituents of a certain kind in the sentence, where the
number is in principle unlimited.
The dependence of the number of possible readings on
the number of noun phrases in the complement clause shows that
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it is not the matrix verb which is the locus of the ambiguity.
We can also show that the noun phrases are not the locus of the
ambiguity by showing that the number of possible readings
depends upon the number of matrix verbs in the sentence, i.e.
upon the degree of embedding. If we add an extra matrix
clause to sentence (1), for example:
(3) I hope that Mary believes that a friend of mine is a
busdriver.
we find that the resulting sentence has three possible readings
with respect to specificity. Sentence (3) can be taken to
mean (a) there is a certain friend of mine such that I hope
that Mary believes that he is a busdriver, (b) I hope that
there is some friend of mine such that Mary believes that he
is a busdriver, (c) I hope that Mary believes that there is a
friend of mine who is a busdriver. Embedding sentence (3) as
the complement to yet another matrix verb would produce a
sentence with four possible readings. Though the ability to
keep track of the various readings diminishes rapidly beyond
this point, it should be clear that every time we add an
extra matrix clause we increase the number of possible readings
of the sentence by one.
The terms 'specific' and 'non-specific', with their
implicit suggestion that the distinction is a binary one,
are therefore misleading. There are, roughly, as many ways of
reading a sentence as there are clauses in which the noun
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phrase in question appears.FN This is already sufficient
to show that a simple feature system, of the kind that is often
used in linguistic descriptions for marking syntactic or
semantic distinctions, will not be adequate for distinguishing
the possible readings of opaque constructions. Since there
is no limit to the number of complement clauses that a sentence
may contain, there would be no limit to the number of values
that a feature would have to be able to assume in order to
represent the full range of possible readings. Even if some
upper bound were to be fixed arbitrarily, it is clear that
a multi-valued feature would be inappropriate for it would be
too rich a representational device for simpler sentences.
That is, for many sentences it would predict more degrees of
ambiguity than they in fact exhibit. Thus at best we would
need a variable-valued feature, with the number of values it
FN. Clauses below that in which the noun phrase directly
appears, at least in deep structure, do not contribute possible
readings. Furthermore, it is in general only unbroken sequences
of mutually embedded complement clauses for which this numerical
correlation between number of readings and number of clauses
holds. Embedding a sentence as a relative clause, or as an
adverbial, does not increase its number of readings, though
adding an adverbial to the sentence does in some cases do so.
See Chapter V for further details of this. Sentences with
verbs like look for are also, of course, exceptions to the
numerical generalization, since they have a non-specific as
well as a specific reading even when they are not embedded as
complements to higher clauses. These cases will also be
discussed in Chapter V. Meanwhile, I shall restrict my dis-
cussion of opacity to those cases in which it is associated
with complement structure.
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could assume for any given sentence determined somehow by the
number of clauses in the sentence. This begins to sound quite
bizarre, and in any case it can be seen to be inadequate for
another reason.
Although in many cases it is insufficient to designate
a noun phrase as simply specific or non-specific, the idea of
a scale of specificity values is not appropriate either, in
view of the kinds of paraphrase we have to supply to distinguish
between the various possible readings. It is not just the
number of readings that varies with the number of clauses in
the sentence; the nature of these readings is also essentially
connected with which clauses are present. The noun phrase a
friend of mine in our examples is not in itself ambiguous --
there appears to be no way of paraphrasing just that phrase
in order to capture the possible readings of the sentences.
(Notice that to paraphrase it as a certain friend of mine as
opposed to some friend or other of mine would be insufficient
in just the same way as using a binary abstract feature would
be insufficient. Neither permits sufficient distinctions to
be made.) In order to bring out the different readings, we
have to paraphrase not just the noun phrase in question, but
the whole sentence. What we have to mark is not a degree of
specificity, like a degree of rounding in a vowel. It is with
respect to which of the clauses of the sentence the noun phrase
is specific or non-specific. Thus what we need is not a
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variable-valued feature, but a variable number of binary feature
specifications. We must mark each noun phrase as either
specific or non-specific with respect to each of the clauses
in the sentence. (Alternatively we could mark each of the
clauses as plus or minus some feature (the inverse of specifi-
city) with respect to each noun phrase that it contains.) This
begins to bring out more clearly the relational nature of the
ambiguity.
Even this system of representation is inadequate,
however, for it predicts too many possible readings for sen-
tences. Assuming that the proposed feature specifications for
a given sentence are all independent of each other, there
should be 2- readings for a sentence with one indefinite noun
phrase in the lowest of n clauses. In considering sentences (1)
and (3) earlier, however, we came to the conclusion that there
are only n possible readings for such a sentence (with the
exceptions noted in the footnote to p.31). There must there-
fore be some correlation among the set of feature specifications
for a sentence, which cuts down the number of possible readings.
Two restrictions appear to hold in fact. One is that, if we
confine ourselves to cases where opacity is associated with
complement structure, a noun phrase is always interpreted as
specific with respect to the lowest clause in the structure
in which it appears. The other is that if a noun phrase is
interpreted as specific with respect to a given clause then it
must also be interpreted as specific, on that reading of the
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sentence, with respect to all lower clauses.
The first of these restrictions can be illustrated as
follows. In sentences (1) and (3), the lowest clause is
a friend of mine is a busdriver. There is no way of inter-
preting this, standing alone as an independent sentence, as
non-specific. If it is true then it is true because there is
some particular friend of mine who is a busdriver, and it is
ture of that particular friend. Though it is certainly possible
for someone to utter this sentence without having any particular
friend actually in mind, it makes absolutely no sense at all to
suppose that it could be the case that some non-specific
friend of mine is a busdriver, that is, that it could be true
that a friend of mine is a busdriver without its being true of
any particular friend of mine that he is a busdriver. And
equally it makes no sense to suppose that Mary might believe
this to be the case. (Even if Mary did go around saying some
such thing, we would hesitate to say of her that she believed
it, for it would be unclear what belief we would be attributing
to her if we did. We would be better advised, in such circum-
stances, to say that it just wasn't clear what Mary believed.)
Thus it appears that the noun phrase a friend of mine, which is
necessarily specific with respect to the clause a friend of mine
is a busdriver, must also be taken as specific with respect to
that clause even in the context Mary believes.... In general,
a clause which, standing alone, allows of no non-specific
interpretation for a noun phrase that it contains, equally
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allows of no interpretation of that noun phrase as non-specific
with respect to that clause even when that clause is sub-
ordinated to some higher verb.
The second restriction which operates to reduce the
number of predicted readings for a sentence is that if a noun
phrase is interpreted as specific with respect to a given
clause in the sentence, then it must also be interpreted as
specific, on that reading, with respect to all lower clauses.
For sentence (3), this restriction excludes the possibility
that the noun phrase a friend of mine is taken simultaneously
as specific with respect to the highest, I hope...., clause,
and as non-specific with respect to the middle, Mary believes....,
clause. Such a reading would amount to saying that there is a
certain friend of mine of whom I hope that Mary believes that
some friend or other of mine is a busdriver, and this is
obviously nonsense. Exactly analogous observations with
respect to sentences containing four or more clauses establishes
the general validity of this restriction.
To the extent to which any claim based on speakers'
intuitions about shades of meaning can be firmly established,
it seems that these two restrictions on possible arrays of
feature specifications for a sentence do correspond with the
facts. Between them, the restrictions reduce the predicted
number of readings from 21 to n for a sentence with n clauses.
(This is, of course, to consider only one indefinite noun
phrase. If there are more, we must take the product of the
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number predicted for each.) To see this, we need only imagine
the feature specifications for a sentence arrayed as a linear
sequence of pluses and minuses, with left-to-right order
corresponding to the 'height' of the clause in the sentence.
Then the restrictions operate to ensure that all possible
sequences consist of a sequence (possibly null) of minuses,
followed by a sequence (non-null) of pluses. Simple arith-
metic shows that there are n such sequences of n specifications.
The importance of this observation is that it suggests
a very much simpler and more appropriate representational
device than an array of feature specifications subject to
restrictions which are, from a formal point of view, completely
arbitrary. This simpler device would be just a line drawn
across the structural representation of the reading of a
sentence, to be interpreted by a convention to mean that the
noun phrase in question is non-specific with respect to all
clauses above (to the left of) the line, and is specific with
respect to all clauses below (to the right of) the line.
There would, of course, have to be one such line for each
indefinite noun phrase in a complement clause, and these lines
would therefore presumably have to be subscripted or marked
in some other way to indicate which noun phrases they were
associated with. Such a system of subscripted lines would
capture simply and non-redundantly both the number and the
nature of the possible readings of sentences with indefinite
noun phrases.
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It is worth observing at this point that logical
representations in which the scope of the existential quanti-
fier is used to indicate specificity (cf. examples (9) and (12)
of the previous chapter) constitute a system of just this kind.
Formally, a quantifier is no different from a line subscripted
for a particular noun phrase in a sentence, and just like our
subscripted line, it can appear in any one of the 'clauses' of a
logical formula. Although I shall argue later in this chapter
that using the existential quantifier in the role of specificity
indicator leads to some incorrect predictions about the meanings
of opaque constructions, it is clear that such an analysis is
of the appropriate kind at least as far as its general formal
characteristics are concerned.
I would point out in conclusion that an argument against
a semantic analysis of specificity based on differences in the
semantic feature representations of particular constituents,
and in favour of an analysis in terms of the scope relation-
ships between constituents, would be much more secure against
the background of a general theory of scope phenomena, that is,
a general account of just what it is about a semantic contrast
which makes variation in the scope of a symbol, rather than
different choices of symbols, an appropriate representational
device. Unfortunately, logicians give definitions of the scope
of particular symbols or types of symbol without ever, as far
as I know, having given an explication of scope in general.
I cannot pretend to have giveA a general account of it either,
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but I do think that the kinds of observation made here about
specificity would be central to such an account. What I have
attempted to establish is that the ambiguity of sentences with
an indefinite noun phrase in an opaque context does not consist
in the ambiguity of the noun phrase itself, nor in the ambi-
guity of the context in which it appears, but is a matter of
the semantic relationship between the noun phrase and the rest
of the sentence. This conclusion will be important when we
come to consider the nature of the system of rules which
relate semantic representations to syntactic ones, for what it
says is that the syntactic relationships between the constitu-
ents of a sentence do not mirror the semantic relationships
between them. (At least for one of the readings of an ambi-
guous sentence this must be so.) The semantic representations
therefore cannot be a mere fleshing out of the syntactic ones
with semantic markers, but must differ from them configura-
tionally as well.FN
Section 2. Specificity and the existential quantifier.
The purpose of the preceding section was to establish
what are the minimal formal requirements on a system of repre-
sentation which is to capture ambiguities of specificity. A
number of substantive proposals can be generated by identifying
the 'subscripted line' of that discussion with some already
recognised constituent of linguistic or logical representations.
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FN. The whole of this section is simply an elaboration
of a point made by Bach (Nouns and Noun Phrases, p. 107).
In a comment on an example of the specific/non-specific
ambiguity, Bach says: 'I do not believe it is possible to
explain such ambiguities except by means of the notion of
scope, because we find a systematic relationship between
the number of interpretations and the number of embedded
sentences (of the proper type)'. I had read Bach's paper
when I wrote the passage above, but had overlooked this
remark. Had I not done so, an earlier paper of mine on
the topic of non-specificity (Non-specific Noun Phrases
in English, 1968) might also have been improved.
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The point of this would be not just to avoid adding to one's
theoretical apparatus a wholly new primitive symbol just for
the purpose of representing specificity. More importantly, it
would enable us to capture directly in the representational
system some of the entailments of sentences containing in-
definite noun phrases. So far we have considered only how to
ensure that there will be formally distinct representations
for distinct readings of a sentence. Although an adequate
semantic system will have to do at least this, we can also
require of the system that it should make some positive claims
about the meanings of the sentences concerned -- that it should
define the semantic relationships between the various readings
of a given sentence, and between each of these and the readings
of other sentences in the language. By identifying the speci-
ficity indicator with some independently significant descriptive
element, we would thereby ascribe to the sentences so represented
the whole body of entailments normally associated with that
element. The particular embodiment that we choose for the
specificity operator will therefore commit us to certain
positive claims about the meanings of opaque constructions.
There are a number of immediately obvious candidates
that we might consider. We might identify the specificity
operator with a duplicate of the noun phrase in question,
allowing this duplicate to appear in any clause of the structure
and taking its position to define scope. This proposal is
suggested by the existence of sentences like:
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(4) Mary believes of a friend of mine that he is a busdriver.
which paraphrases the specific reading of the sentence:
(5) Mary believes that a friend of mine is a busdriver.
The presence of the noun phrase a friend of mine, co-referential
with the subject of the complement but itself within the matrix
clause, is apparently sufficient to determine specificity.
There are actually variants of this proposal, depending on
whether we regard the pronoun he of (4) as derived from an
underlying phrase a friend of mine, so that the relationship
between (4) and (5) is a matter of deleting the noun phrase in
the matrix clause, or whether we treat the he just as a
variable or place-holder, and the relationship between (4)
and (5) as involving the movement of lexical material from the
matrix to the complement clause.
An alternative suggestion would be to use not the whole
noun phrase but just its determiner as the scope indicator.
Yet another would be to use the phrase there is...., or what-
ever underlies it, in different positions to mark different
readings. This suggestion is based on the existence of the
paraphrases:
(6) There is a friend of mine that Mary thinks is a busdriver.
(7) Mary thinks that there is a friend of mine who is a
busdriver.
for the specific and non-specific readings respectively of
sentence (5). Since the existential quantifier of formal
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logic is often read as 'there is a...', 'there is at least
one...', 'there is something which...', etc., this latter
suggestion is a natural linguistic counterpart to the use of
the existential quantifier to mark specificity in logical
representations. Unless the phrase there is... is actually to
be derived from an underlying symbol formally indistinguishable
from the existential quantifier of logic, an analysis based on
there is... and one based on a quantifier would differ with
respect to the grammatical rules relating semantic to surface
syntactic representations, but as far as their semantic impli-
cations are concerned they would obviously have a great deal
in common. Questions concerning syntax will be discussed in
Chapter V, and the rest of the present chapter will be devoted
to the semantic implications of such an analysis.
In view of the problems with this analysis which we
shall consider shortly, it is worth considering what the
motivation in favour of using the existential quantifier to
indicate specificity in logical formulae might be. If the
specificity operator is to be identified with any device
already at hand in the logical system, then a quantifier is
a natural choice since, as we have already observed, the general
formal characteristics of quantifiers are just those that any
device for representing specificity must have. The existential
quantifier will be preferred to the universal quantifier since
specificity is associated with indefinite noun phrases and,
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except when such noun phrases are interpreted as generic, they
are normally represented in logical formulae by means of an
existential quantifier. The strongest form of this argument
is the claim that there is no significant difference between
the specific interpretation of a noun phrase in an opaque
context, and the normal interpretation of noun phrases in non-
opaque contexts, and that the former should therefore be
represented in exactly the same way as the latter, viz. by
means of an existential quantifier at the far left of the
formula.
This argument, together with the fact that we want to
be able to use just one symbol, in different positions, to
indicate non-specific as well as specific readings, obviously
suggests that we should use the existential quantifier in
representing non-specific readings too, though it must, of
course, appear somewhere other than at the left of the formula
in this case. There is actually some independent motivation
for the same conclusion. There are valid inferences on the
pattern of:
(8) Mary believes that a friend of mine is a busdriver.
Mary's belief is correct.
Therefore a friend of mine is a busdriver.
(9) John wanted to catch a fish.
John got what he wanted. (John's want was satisfied.)
Therefore John caught a fish.
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The conclusions of these arguments have only a specific
interpretation, but the arguments are valid even if the first
premise is interpreted as non-specific. If the non-specific
reading of the first premise is represented with an existential
quantifier within the complement clause, for example:
(10) Mary believes (3x) (x is a friend of mine and x is a
busdriver).
then this permits a very simple and intuitive account of the
form of such arguments, for the conclusion of the argument (8)
is precisely what follows Mary believes in the representation
of the first premise. Given the additional premise that Mary's
belief is correct, we can simply strip off the Mary believes
to obtain the conclusion. There is little prospect of being
able to formalise such arguments completely, since what is
required as the second premise depends upon the particular
verb in the first premise, and the relationship between the
two is something that we are far from having a formal account
of at present. Nevertheless, this way of representing the
non-specific readings of sentences does contribute to revealing
the character of such arguments.
It is important to bear in mind that there are arguments
in favour of using the existential quantifier to mark specifi-
city, for there are certainly some arguments against doing so.
Quine, for example, has argued at length (J. of Phil,, 1956)
that formulae such as:
(11) (.x) (x is a friend of mine and Mary believes that x
is a busdriver).
should not be permitted since they lead to incorrect and even
bizarre inferences. Quine's arguments crucially involve
definite descriptions, and the substitutivity of identicals,
which are the topics of the next two chapters, and I shall
therefore postpone a detailed discussion of his arguments until
later. They are by no means the only reason for being dubious
about identifying the specificity indicator with the existen-
tial quantifier.
It was pointed out in Chapter I that the problem
that opaque contexts pose for the logician is that certain
patterns of argument which are generally valid elsewhere are
not valid within opaque contexts. Any logical operator within
the context of a verb like believes, wants, expects, etc., is
inferentially almost inert. To see this one has only to
select from an introductory text book of logic any reasonably
complex example of a valid formalised argument, and preface
each premise and the conclusion with the phrase John believes
that.... The resulting argument is clearly invalid. (Of
course, the premises and the conclusion might be, as a matter
of fact, true of some person called John, but this is far
from establishing that the conclusion can properly be inferred
from the premises.) This point is often made by saying that
people are by and large not fully rational; they are quite
capable of believing things that are logically incompatible.
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From the point of view of the mechanics of the formal system,
what is important about this is that if we do assign the
same representations to sentences within opaque contexts as we
would assign to them when they stand alone, then the usual
inference rules must not be allowed to apply to the symbols
within the opaque context. If they were allowed to do so,
they would generate invalid arguments. But then one might
reasonably ask why, if some symbol in a logical representation
is non-functional from the point of view of generating valid
arguments, there is any reason for supposing that the symbol
should be present in the representation at all. One might
ask, in particular, why the existential quantifier is preferable
to any other logical symbol, or to none at all, in a repre-
sentation such as (10), if no consequences follow from its
presence.
The existence of arguments like (8) and (9) above, which
involve inferences from an opaquely interpreted premise to a
transparent conclusion, is part of the answer to this objection.
It is also maintained by many philosophers that certain
inference rules, albeit the most trivial ones, do apply within
opaque contexts, and that the argument from irrationality is
not as powerful as it looks at first sight. This is the
doctrine of 'immediate inference', and it can be illustrated
as follows. Suppose we know that Jane believes there is a
mouse in her kitchen. Then surely it is legitimate to infer
that Jane believes that it is false that there is no mouse in
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her kitchen. The reason this inference is legitimate is not,
as might be thought, that the move from 'There is a mouse in
my kitchen' to 'It is false that there is no mouse in my
kitchen' is so obvious that we can rely on Jane's making the
inference, however muddle-headed a person she may be. The
validity of the argument depends upon the fact that if Jane
were to maintain, apparently sincerely, that she did not believe
the second of these propositions, then this would be sufficient
grounds for denying that she believed the first, however
vehemently she might claim to. To believe there is a mouse in
one's kitchen just is, in some sense, to believe that it is
false that there is no mouse in one's kitchen. To claim to
believe the one but not the other is thus scarcely different
from claiming to believe there is a mouse in one's kitchen
and then denying that one believed it. And since the latter
situation would not count as evidence that one really did
believe that there was a mouse in one's kitchen and no mouse
in one's kitchen, then nor should the former.
A similar account can be given for some other familiar
inference rules, for example the interchange of existential
and universal quantifiers under negation, as in the argument:
Jane believes that not all men are self-centred, therefore
Jane believes that there is at least one man who is not self-
centred. Just as above, Jane could not be said to believe the
one but not the other, since to credit her with the one belief
just is to credit her with the other. If the doctrine of
... ............
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immediate inference is correct (and it is less convincing
for some verbs, e.g. realise, than it is for believe), then it
does provide some justification for assigning logical structure
to material within opaque contexts. It is clear, however,
that not all of the usual inference rules apply within opaque
contexts, and that the logical symbols appearing within such
contexts are, if not quite inert, at least emasculated.
Therefore if we accept formulae in which the existential
quantifier, or other logical symbols, appear within opaque
contexts, in order to capture those inferences which are
valid, then we must impose some constraints on at least some
inference rules in order to avoid predicting inferences which
are not. A large part of the task of characterising the
logical and semantic properties of opaque constructions thus
consists of investigating which in particular of the usual
inferences are valid and which of them are not. In the next
section I shall examine in detail one way in which using the
scope of the existential quantifier to indicate specificity
apparently leads to wrong predictions about the logical and
semantic properties of the non-specific reading of noun
phrases.
Section 3. Non-specific noun phrases and existence.
The hypothesis to be examined is that the non-specific
reading of a sentence such as:
(12) John hopes that he will catch a fish.
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should be represented formally as something like:
(13) John hopes (3x) (x is a fish and John will catch x).
The most natural rendering of this in English is:
(14) John hopes that there is a fish and he will catch it.
There are obviously problems here about tense, for it is
compatible with (12) that John's hope should be satisfied by
his catching a fish that does not exist now, but only at some
future time. Thus we should need, either instead of (14) or
in addition to it, the paraphrase:
(15) John hopes that there will be a fish and he will catch it.
Logical representations which do not indicate time relation-
ships are obviously not rich enough to do justice to a sentence
such as (12). In what follows, however, I shall ignore any
complications due to tense; nothing in my argument will turn
upon it, and it will simplify the discussion to consider only
paraphrases like (14) rather than (15).
Quite apart from questions of tense and time, (14) is
misleading as a paraphrase of (12), for it suggests that there
are two things that John hopes -- he hopes that a fish (at
least one) exists, and he hopes to catch it. This might
perhaps be the case, but it is also possible that John knows
perfectly well that fish exist. He might even be completely
indifferent to the fact that they exist. This would be quite
compatible with the truth of (12) as long as, on the belief
that fish exist, John hopes to catch one. By putting the
existential quantifier within the scope of the main verb in
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a representation such as (13), we seem to commit ourselves to
the false claim that a proposition about the existence of fish
is part of the content of John's hope.
It is probably true that John's views about the existence
of fish are not entirely irrelevant to the truth of (12). We
would certainly be reluctant to say that (12) was true if we
knew that John positively hoped that fish did not exist (at
least until such time as he had caught one), and even perhaps
if we knew that he was convinced that fish did not exist.
Some reference to the relationship between John and the
proposition that fish exist might not be out of place, there-
fore, in the semantic representation of (12). It should be
observed, however, that John's views about the existence of
fish have as much bearing on the truth of the specific reading
of (12) as they do on the non-specific reading. In the kind
of system we are considering, the specific reading of (12)
would be represented as:
(16) (3x) (x is a fish and John hopes John will catch x).
and this does not carry any implication about John's views
about the existence of fish. If his views should be indicated
in the representation of the non-specific reading then they
should surely also be indicated in the representation of the
specific reading. Thus even if it could be argued that (13)
is not a misleading representation, it would follow that (16)
is.
Complicating the problem further is that different
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verbs differ with respect to the appropriateness of the existence
clause in the representation of the non-specific reading. For
verbs of knowing, believing, thinking, assuming, and so on,
the implication that the subject 'verbs' the existence of fish (of
whatever it is that the noun phrase in question designates),
is not unwelcome at all. For example, the sentence:
(17) Mary believes that John caught a fish.
interpreted non-specifically, does seem to entail that Mary
believes that at least one fish exists, just as the repre-
sentation:
(18) Mary believes (3x) (x is a fish and John caught x).
suggests. On the other hand there are cases where the claim
that the subject 'verbs' the existence clause amounts to sheer
nonsense. If, for example, we represent the sentence:
(19) John ordered Mary to shoot a squirrel.
as:
(20) John ordered Mary (3x) (x is a squirrel and Mary shoot x).
this would seem to imply that John ordered Mary that there be
a squirrel. Even if some sense can be given to this, it is
clearly no part of the meaning of (19). For quite different
reasons we run into nonsense in connection with a sentence
such as:
(21) I want to eat one of those apples.
This sentence has a perfectly acceptable non-specific reading
(e.g. I don't mind which of those apples I eat as long as I
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get one of them), but it surely cannot entail that I want one
of those apples to exist.
It appears that in these cases where the subject cannot
be said to 'verb' the existence of objects of the kind in
question, he must at least be of the opinion that they exist.
Furthermore, we have already seen that even where it does make
sense to say that he 'verbs' their existence, as for sentence (12),
it is also compatible with the truth of the sentence that he
does not, in fact, 'verb' that they exist but is merely of the
opinion that they do. The solution to our problem might
therefore be to say that what is entailed is that the subject
either 'verbs' or believes (in some weak sense of believe)
that things of the kind in question exist. We would then need
only to define some special principles at work in examples
like (19) or (21) which have the effect of excluding one of
these alternatives. Cases like (17) would easily be explained
on the basis of the virtual identity of the two alternatives.
The problem with this suggestion is a formal one. What
is proposed is that we represent the non-specific reading
of (12), for example, not as (13) but as:
(22) (John hopes (3x) (x is a fish and John will catch x)) or
(John believes (3x) x is a fish and John hopes
John will catch x).
There are some brackets missing from the second disjunct of
this representation, and it is here that the problem lies.
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If we bracket the second disjunct as:
(23) John believes (x) (x is a fish and John hopes John
will catch x).
then this represents John as believing that he hopes something,
which is not what (12) means at all. If, on the other hand, we
take the second conjunct of (22) to be:
(24) (John believes (3x) x is a fish) and (John hopes John
will catch x).
then, though we no longer have John believing that he hopes
something, we do have an unbound variable in the second
conjunct. We have taken the John hopes... clause out of the
scope of the John believes..., but we have thereby taken it
out of the scope of the existential quantifier. The variable
in the John hopes... clause therefore cannot be regarded as
bound by that quantifier. And this means that the representa-
tion does not indicate, as we want it to, that what John
hopes that he will catch is a fish.
Inserting another quantifier into the representation,
in order to bind the second variable, does not help. Either
we would get:
(25) (John believes (3x) x is a fish) and ((3y) (John hopes
John will catch y)).
which is unacceptable, since the quantifier is to the left of
the verb hopes, and thus represents a specific rather than a
non-specific hope. Or else we would have:
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(26) (John believes (3x) x is a fish) and (John hopes (3y)
John will catch y).
which still fails to indicate that what John hopes to catch is
a fish. If we remedy this, by inserting a y is a fish clause,
(27) (John believes (Ox) x is a fish) and(John hopes (3y) (y
is a fish and John will catch y)).
then this has John once again hoping that fish exist. It
therefore does not provide the kind of alternative we need
as the second disjunct of (22), since the whole point of the
second disjunct was to avoid the implication that John hopes
that fish exist.
To reject the hypothesis that lies behind the proposed
representation (22), simply on the grounds that (22) is not, by
the conventions of standard logic, well-formed, might be too
glib a move, for there are apparently acceptable sentences of
English which seem to demand such a representation. For
example, it is hard to see how else to represent the sentence:
(28) John believes there is a fish in the pond and he wants
to catch it.
other than as:
(29) John believes (3x) x is a fish and x is in the pond and
John wants John catch x.
and yet (29) suffers from the same kinds of technical defects
as (22). (See also the examples due to Baker and Karttunen,
quoted by Lakoff in 'Counterparts, or the Problem of Reference
in Transformational Grammar', 1968.) I shall examine examples
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such as these in more detail later in this chapter and con-
sider there the possibility that it is the formal system that
needs to be revised, not our intuitions about what such
sentences mean. In particular, the general constraint in
standard logical systems that scope relationships should be
transitive, may have to be dropped, since it is this which
excludes any way of bracketing a formula such as (22) or (29)
which is simultaneously both formally and semantically
appropriate.
However, even if we suppose that such a move should be
made, the problem with the proposed analysis of sentences
like (12) is actually a more general one than has been suggested
so far. The non-specific reading of the sentence:
(30) John hopes that he will catch a purple fish.
would be represented as:
(31) John hopes (3 x) (x is a fish and x is purple and John
will catch x).
and this apparently implies not only that John hopes there are
fish but also that he hopes there are purple things. It also
implies (and this, though not mentioned above, is also true
of (13)), that John hopes that he will catch something. Now
it is very likely, and is certainly compatible with the truth
of (30), that John knows quite well that fish exist and that
purple things exist. It is even compatible with the truth
of (30) that he should be quite indifferent to the existence
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of fish or of purple things except insofar as, on the
assumption that they exist, he has conceived a desire to catch
a purple fish. It is also possible that John is quite con-
vinced that he will catch something, even if only an old boot
or a tin can, and he might even be indifferent to the idea of
catching something even though, on the assumption that he will,
he would like it to be a purple fish rather than anything
else. What all of this means is that it is not only the first
clause within the scope of the quantifier in (31) that John
might believe rather than hope to be true; the same holds for
any of the clauses within the opaque context, and indeed for
any pair of them simultaneously. In fact if we assume, as
seems natural, that John's believing something is not incom-
patible with his hoping it too, then it is compatible with (30)
that John should believe the truth of the proposition within
the opaque context, that he should believe that he will catch
a purple fish. Of course it is not compatible with (30) that
he should merely believe this -- at least part of the propo-
sition that he will catch a purple fish must be something that
he hopes will be true. It should also be remembered that John
might not believe any or all of what is involved in the
proposition that he will catch a fish; he can certainly hope
for something that he does not believe will come true.
The situation we have arrived at is the following. We
cannot represent a sentence such as (12) by means of (13),
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for (13) suggests that John is not indifferent to the existence
of fish and that he is not indifferent to the possibility that
he will catch something, and either of these claims might be
false. If, to avoid these implications, we devise some way of
including in the formal representations the possibility that
he might merely believe, rather than hope, either that fish
exist or that he will catch something, then (12) must be
assigned a number of different formal representations, each
one corresponding to one of the possible combinations of hope
and belief with respect to each of the clauses of the propo-
sition within the opaque context. And the implication of this,
viz. that sentence (12) is many ways ambiguous, seems
intuitively to be just false. In fact, intuitively, sen-
tence (12) does not say anything at all about what John
beleives. The truth of certain propositions about what he
believes may be necessary conditions on the truth of (12), and
the truth of (12) will in that case entail the truth of those
propositions. But this is not to say that these propositions
are part of what (12) means.
It is a reasonable requirement on formal semantic
representations that they should symbolize what a sentence
means rather than all of the things that it entails. Quite
apart from any other considerations, a sentence may have an
infinite number of entailments whereas a formal semantic
representation must be finite. The (possibly infinite) set of
58
entailments can then be generated from the representation of
meaning by means of inference rules. If we attempt to apply
this in principle to sentences such as (12) or (30), then it
seems intuitively correct to exclude from the semantic repre-
sentations any representation of John's beliefs. In fact it
was only because representations like (13) threaten to commit
us to incorrect entailments, such as that John must hope that
fish exist, that we were led to the idea of including his
beliefs in the formal representations at all.
I shall presently suggest a solution to this problem
which does not involve mentioning John's beliefs at all, but
first I should consider the possibility that it might be
maintained that sentences like (12) really are ambiguous, at
least under emphatic stress. With stress on the word purple,
the sentence:
(32) John hopes he will catch a purple fish.
is certainly more likely to suggest that John believes that he
will catch a fish and hopes it will be purple, than is the
same sentence with stress on the word fish. The latter is more
likely to suggest that John believes he will catch something
purple and hopes that it will be a fish. How strong this
suggestion is, whether it should be regarded as a matter of
conversational implicatur, presupposition, entailment, or even,
in some stronger sense, part of the meaning of the sentence
when so stressed, is another question and a much more difficult
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one. Furthermore, it is not even clear that the emphatic
stress is to be taken as indicating a contrast between what
John hopes and what he merely believes. Sentence (32) with
stress on purple seems to me quite compatible with John's
not really believing that he will catch a fish at all; the
stress might be read as suggesting that while John would like
to catch a purple fish he would simply hate to catch a fish of
any other colour. More important than these points, however,
is that even if it were true that such a sentence is ambiguous,
and has distinct readings which do contain, as part of their
meaning, distinct claims about John's beliefs, it seems un-
deniable that there is also a reading which is completely
neutral and does not say anything at all about what John
believes.
This situation is reminiscent of that for negation. It
has been maintained that a sentence such as for example:
(33) John did not catch a purple fish.
is ambiguous, at least under emphatic stress. It has been
suggested that this sentence can be taken to mean or entail
or presuppose, or perhaps something even weaker still, that
John did catch a fish, and to assert that the fish was not
purple. Alternatively, it is claimed, the sentence can be
taken to mean, entail, etc., that John caught something purple
and to assert that this thing was not a fish, and so on.
However, even if all this is true, there also seems to be a
quite neutral reading of this sentence, on which it means
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simply that it is false that John caught a purple fish. This
reading would standardly be represented as:
(34) NOT (3x) (x is a fish and x is purple and John caught x).
What is important about this reading is that the sentence so
interpreted might be true because John did not catch anything,
because what he caught was not purple, because it was not a
fish or for any combination of these reasons. Thus we cannot
infer from (33) on this reading that John did not catch any-
thing, we cannot infer that there are no fish, and we cannot
infer that there are no purple things. From the negation of
a complex proposition, that is to say, we cannot in general
infer the falsity of any one of the component propositions.
This corresponds exactly to our observations about opaque
contexts. From the fact that John hopes that a complex
proposition will turn out to be true, we cannot infer that he
hopes that any one of its component propositions will turn out
to be true.
This parallel with negation puts our worries about
opaque contexts into a new light, for there simply is no
corresponding problem about negation. It is not valid to infer,
from a negated conjunction, the negation of any individual
conjunct. And because it is not valid, systems of logic do
not contain any inference rule or rules which would generate
such an inference. It is true that standard systems do contain
a rule which permits the simplification of conjunctions, that
is, the inference from a conjunctive proposition of each of its
------ -----
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conjuncts. But this rule is formulated in such a way that it
is not applicable to a conjunction within the scope of a
negation operator. Why, then, should we ever have supposed in
the first place that this rule would be applicable within the
scope of an opaque operator? It was this assumption, and only
this, which gave rise to the worries about representing a
non-specific noun phrase by means of an existential quantifier
within the scope of an opaque verb. If we ensure that the
rule for simplifying conjunctions does not apply within the
scope of an opaque verb, any more than it does within the
scope of a negation operator, then these worries simply dis-
appear. We can no longer infer that John hopes that fish
exist from the formal representation of the statement that
John hopes to catch a fish.
There are other precedents besides negation for restric-
ting the domain of the rule which simplifies conjunctions.
The argument:
(35) If (p and q) then r.
Therefore: If p then r.
is obviously invalid, showing that conjunctions cannot be
simplified within the antecedent of a conditional either.
Nevertheless, despite such precedents, the assumption that
conjunctions can be simplified within opaque contexts can
certainly be found in the literature on opacity. Linsky,
for example, ('Referring', p. 67ff.) discusses the analysis of
the sentence:
(36) George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of
Waverley.
as:
(37) George IV wished to know whether one, and only one,
individual both wrote Waverley and was identical
with Scott.
Linsky remarks (pp. 71-2): 'Asked whether he wants to know
whether one, and only one, individual both wrote Waverley and
is identical with Scott, George IV might answer that this is
not what he wishes to know, since he already knows that one,
and only one, individual wrote Waverley;what he does not know
is whether the author of Waverley is Scott.' Linsky concludes
on the basis of this that (37) is not an appropriate analysis
of (36), since (37) might be false even though (36) is true.
The argument, however, clearly turns upon simplifying the
conjunction within the opaque context wished to know whether
in (37). Having accepted this as a valid move, it is clear
that we should have to reject the proposed analysis since,
as Linsky rightly points out, it is probably false that George IV
wished to know whether the first of the two conjuncts was true.
If, on the other hand, we block the simplification of con-
junction within opaque contexts, then this observation is not
a reason for rejecting (37) as the analysis of (36).
I suspect that the reason why Linsky and others have
assumed the validity of simplification within opaque contexts
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without questioning it, is that for the two kinds of opaque
operator that have been studied most fully by logicians,
simplification creates no problems; it is valid even within
the scope of these operators. In the usual systems of modal
logic, (38) and (39) are theorems:
(38) Necessarily (p and q) -(necessarily p) and (necessarily q).
(39) Possibly (p and q)E(possibly p) and (possibly q).
The conjunction on the right hand side of each of these
equivalences can be simplified, so that from 'necessarily
(p and q)' we can infer, for example 'necessarily p'. An
example involving the existential quantifier is the argument:
(40) Necessarily there is an odd number greater than five
which is prime.
Therefore: Necessarily there is an odd number.
Represented formally this argument is:
(41) Necessarily (3x) (x is a number and x is odd and x is
greater than five and x is prime.
Therefore: Necessarily (3x) (x is a number and x is odd).
In epistemic logic, the logic of verbs like know and
believe, simplification presents no problems either, though
for a rather different reason. The problem with a verb like
hope was that the subject of the verb might not hope but might
rather believe or even know, that one of the conjuncts of the
proposition within the opaque context was true. Now if the
opaque verb concerned is itself believe or know, then these
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two possibilities are one and the same. Thus for a sentence
such as:
(42) John believes he will catch a fish.
represented as:
(43) John believes (2x) (x is a fish and John will catch x).
there is no point in going through the intermediate stage of
inferring that John either believes that fish exist or believes
that fish exist. As long as one's logical system is restricted
to such verbs, and is not extended to verbs such as want, hope,
etc., then one can afford to ignore the complications that we
have been considering, and permit a direct inference from (43)
to:
(44) John believes (3x) (x is a fish).
by allowing the rule which simplifies conjunctions to apply
within opaque contexts.
Considering the precedents of negative and conditional
statements, it seemed quite extraordinary that simplification
should ever have been imagined to be a general rule, applicable
in all contexts and thus in opaque contexts in particular. Now
we see that there are also precedents for accepting it as a
valid rule, and precedents which are closer to home since they
themselves concern opaque contexts, even if only of a very
restricted class. However, it seems clear that in a logical
system designed to deal with opaque contexts in general,
simplification must be blocked with opaque contexts. Even the
slightest deviation from the narrow range of the verbs know
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and believe can lead to problems. For example, although (45)
is a valid argument, (46) is not.
(45) John knows that Mary caught a fish.
Therefore John knows that there are fish.
(46) John doubts that Mary caught a fish.
Therefore John doubts that there are fish.
Of course, in this case, it is plausible to ascribe the
failure of the inference to the negative aspect of the meaning
of doubts, since we already know that simplification is invalid
in negative contexts. It is less obvious that we should
analyse surprise as containing a negative element in order to
account for the invalidity of the argument:
(47) It is surprising that Mary caught a fish.
Therefore it is surprising that there are fish.
There is also Linsky's argument, which fails, presumably,
because there the verb know is within the scope of another
opaque verb, the verb wish, which does not permit simplification.
Section 4. The conjunctive analysis of noun phrases.
It was pointed out in Section 2 of this chapter that if
all the usual inference rules must be prevented from applying to
a logical symbol within an opaque context, this throws some
doubt on the assumption that that symbol does actually appear in
those contexts. It is important, therefore, to observe that it
is not the presence of the existential quantifier within opaque
contexts which is thrown into doubt by the conclusion that
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simplification is not valid. In a representation such as:
(48) John hopes (3x) (x is a fish and John will catch x).
it is the conjunctive structure of the proposition within the
opaque context, not the existential quantifier itself, which
is the source of the trouble. And it is an inference rule
that applies to conjunctions, not a rule specially concerned
with the existential quantifier, that must be prevented from
applying to (48).
In fact, no disastrous consequences appear to follow
from assuming that the existential quantifier occurs within
the opaque context in (48). If we take (48) to be equivalent
to the English sentence:
(49) John hopes there is a fish that he will catch.
or, with allowance for tense:
(50) John hopes that there will be a fish that he catches.
and if we take care to avoid the temptation to simplify, then
it appears that the analysis is at least logically equivalent
to the original sentence:
(51) John hopes that he will catch a fish.
if not synonymous with it. As an analysis, therefore, it is
unobjectionable. Perhaps it can be critised on the grounds of
the inapplicability of some other inference rule. For example,
it is not obvious that (51) entails:
(52) John hopes that not everything is not a fish that he
will catch.
67
but then it is not obvious that (51) does not entail this
either. Intuitions about such inferences just seem to be too
insecure to support a strong argument in either direction.
If it is the case that it is not the existential impli-
cation of the analysis (48) that causes the trouble, but rather
the conjunctive structure of the proposition within the opaque
context, this is an important fact, for it suggests an alter-
native to accepting the analysis (48) and then blocking the
simplification of conjunction. The conclusion of Section 1
was that in order to represent specificity, we need to employ
some formal device with the effect of a line drawn across a
structural representation at some level of embedding, that is,
some symbol, subscripted for a particular noun phrase, and
capable of appearing in any one of the clauses of a complement
construction. If, for typographic convenience, we use the
arbitrary symbol (Sx) instead of an actual line, then the
general form of the representations of the specific and non-
specific readings of sentence (51) must be:
(53) (Sx) John hopes John will catch (a fish) .
(54) John hopes (Sx) John will catch (a fish) .
Now even if we decide, on semantic grounds, that the
existential quantifier should be used in place of this
arbitrary (Sx) symbol, we cannot simply substitute (3x) for
(Sx) in these representations. In standard quantificational
logic there are other constraints on the formal representation
of noun phrases. In particular, the lexical material within
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a noun phrase is not permitted to co-exist alongside the bound
variable as it does in (53) and (54). It must instead be
spelled out as a separate 'clause', as in the structures:
(55) (3x) x is a fish and John hopes John will catch x.
(56) John hopes (3x) x is a fish and John will catch x.
It is this move which is responsible for there being a con-
joined proposition within the opaque context in representations
of the non-specific readings of sentences, and it is therefore
this move which requires that a special restriction be placed
on the inference rule that simplifies conjunctions. But this
move was no part of what was argued for in Section 1 on the
basis of the general properties of the phenomenon of non-
specificity. We should therefore consider the possibility of
not making it. We are not bound to take over the structures of
any system of logic, in all their details, as the semantic
representations of our grammar, and if it would simplify the
system to depart from the conventions of standard quantifica-
tional logic, and assume that the existential quantifier may
FN
appear in structures like (53) and (54), then we should
FN. There are systems of logic ('many-sorted logics') in which
different types of quantifier are recognised, each ranging over
different classes of variables. For example, there might be a
quantifier restricted to range over just fish, and in this case
there would obviously be no need of a clause x is a fish in the
representation of our example (51). I believe it has been
suggested informally by McCawley that quantifiers in semantic
representations should be subscripted to indicate their range.
Thus we might write fish under the existential quantifier in (55)
and (56) and omit the x is a fish clause. This proposal differs
from the proposal to employ structures like (53) and (54) rather
than (55) and (56) only, as far as I can see, in that it would
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obviously do so. Linguistic arguments have been put forward
in favour of a conjunctive analysis, as in (55) and (56), of
the lexical content of noun phrases, and I shall consider
these arguments shortly. First, however, let us consider
what advantages would follow from rejecting such an analysis.
If we assume that the semantic representations for the
specific and non-specific readings of sentence (51) are to be
just like (53) and (54) except for containing the existential
quantifier, thus:
(57) (3x) John hopes John will catch (a fish) .
(58) John hopes (3x) John will catch (a fish .
x
rather than (55) and (56), then the advantages that would
appear to follow from this assumption are of two kinds. First,
we would no longer need a special restriction to block
simplification of conjunctions in opaque contexts, because no
conjunction is present in a structure like (58). Secondly,
since (57) and (58) are obviously more similar structurally
to the surface structure (51) to which they correspond than
are (55) and (56), the system of grammatical rules which
correlates semantic representations with surface structures
should be simplified. As it turns out, however, both of these
apparent advantages are illusory.
When a sentence such as:
run into appalling problems in connection with selection
restrictions between verbs and noun phrases, and would also
require more complex rules for mapping semantic representations
onto surface structures.
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(59) John will catch a fish.
is not embedded within an opaque context, simplification does
lead to valid arguments. Thus, ignoring questions about tense,
sentence (59) does entail both that there is a fish, and that
John will catch something. On a conjunctive analysis, as in
logic, (59) will be represented as:
(60) (x) x is a fish and John will catch x.
and the entailments of (59) can be generated from this repre-
sentation by simplifying the conjunction. If, on the other
hand, (59) is represented simply as:
(61) (3x) John will catch (a fish) .
then, since there is no conjunction here to simplify, we must
devise some other appropriate inference rule to generate these
entailments. On the assumption that (61) could be mapped onto
the surface structure (59) by a simpler set of grammatical
rules than would be needed for (60), it looks as though we are
weighing this new inference rule on one side against the
inference rule for simplifying conjunctions plus some grammati-
cal rules on the other side.
This is not in fact the case, however, for even in a
system containing (61) rather than (60), we should still need
a rule for simplifying conjunctions. This is quite obvious
from examples which contain an explicit conjunction in surface
structure. For example, the sentence:
(62) John will catch a fish and Mary will catch a frog.
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quite clearly entails both (63) and (64):
(63) John will catch a fish.
(64) Mary will catch a frog.
and the system must therefore contain an inference rule which
generates these entailments. Thus the balance is actually
between two inference rules on one side and an inference
rule plus some grammatical rules on the other. A decision
between these two alternatives obviously cannot be made at
this level of generality.
What, then of the advantage of dropping the special
restriction on the rule that simplifies conjunctions? This too
is an illusion. It is true that the problems connected with
the simplification of conjunctions within opaque contexts
would no longer arise in connection with the representation of
non-specific readings of sentences, for noun phrases would no
longer appear as conjoined clauses in formal representations.
Once again, however, there are other sentences in the language
which have overt conjunctive structure and which pose exactly
the same problems about simplification. Consider, for example,
the sentence:
(65) Mary hopes that the souffle will rise and the sauce
won't curdle.
If the sauce is intended for the souffl6, and neither would be
good to eat alone, then it is possible that though Mary hopes
that they will both turn out well, she really wouldn't care
one way or the other about the sauce if the souffle failed to
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rise, or about the souffl'e if the sauce curdled. And this
situation appears to be perfectly compatible with the truth
of (65). This example is simply another illustration of the
fact that a person may have a certain attitude towards a
composite situation without having that attitude to each
aspect of the situation. This is the factual counterpart of
the formal restriction on simplifying conjunctions, and we
must therefore recognise that simplification is not valid as
applied to sentence (65).
It may be felt that this conclusion is too strong, and
that there is a reading of (65) from which we can infer both
(66) and (67):
(66) Mary hopes that the souffle will rise.
(67) Mary hopes that the sauce won't curdle.
It is therefore worth pointing out in passing that almost any
familiar version of the grammar of English will predict that
a sentence such as (65) is ambiguous, unless it is constrained
in some way for which there is no apparent independent motiva-
tion. Such a sentence could be generated either from a deep
structure in which the complement to the matrix verb is a
conjoined sentence, or from a deep structure consisting of the
conjunction of two clauses, each one containing a complement
clause. The two sources for (65) would be something like (68)
and (69) respectively:
(68) Mary hopes ((the souffle will rise) and (the sauce won't
curdle)).
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(69) (Mary hopes (the souffle will rise)) and (Mary hopes
(the sauce won't curdle)).
The first of these will give the surface structure (65) almost
directly, the second as the result of conjunction reduction.
Now (69) represents simply the conjunction of two
propositions, and since conjunctions can in general be
simplified, we should regard (69) as representing the second
reading of (65), the reading on which it does entail both (66)
and (67). On the other hand, since (68) represents a con-
joined proposition within an opaque context, we can take this
to represent the first of our two readings of (65), the
reading on which it is invalid to infer (66) and (67). Thus
the situation is not, as might have been feared, that certain
genuine entailments are lost if simplification is outlawed in
opaque contexts, but rather that the grammar is sufficiently
rich that it provides an alternative source from which these
entailments can be derived. (It should also be noted that
examples such as these show that opacity involves much more
than just the failure of existential generalization and the
substitutivity of identicals.)
So far it has been shown that if we consider the in-
ference rules as well as the grammatical rules of the system,
there would be no obvious gain from giving up the conjunctive
analysis of noun phrases. As far as the facts about non-
specificity and existence are concerned, it seems to make
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little difference whether we employ structures like (57)
and (58) or structures like (55) and (56). In both cases we
shall need an inference rule that simplifies conjunctions,
and in both cases this rule must be prevented from applying
within opaque contexts. The entailments of noun phrases in
non-opaque contexts can either be captured by assigning them
conjunctive representations such as (60) and then simplifying
the conjunctions, or else by applying a special inference rule to
a representation such as (61). The similarities between the
lexical content of noun phrases and conjoined clauses are brought
out in the first case in the body of rules that maps surface
structures onto semantic representations, and in the second
case in the body of inference rules that generates entail-
ments from semantic representations.
If there is syntactic motivation for deriving noun
phrases from conjoined clauses in underlying structures, then
the first of these alternatives will obviously be preferable.
I shall therefore turn now to the arguments that have been
presented in favour of this analysis. The proposal actually
consists of two parts. One is to analyse all noun phrases as
derived from predicate nominals, that is to derive a sentence
such as:
(70) I saw a cow.
from a structure like that which underlies the sentence:
(71) I saw something which was a cow.
The other part of the proposal is to treat the relative clause
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containing this predicate nominal as a conjoined clause rather
than as a clause subordinated to an NP node, that is, to de-
rive (71) in turn from a structure like that which underlies
the sentence:
(72) I saw something and it was a cow.
Bach (Nouns and Noun Phrases, 1968) presents a number of
arguments for the first part of the analysis; Postal
(Restrictive Relatives, 1967) has a number of arguments for
the second. Postal also argues that pronouns like the
something and the it in (72) should be represented simply
as referential indices, and Bach that they should be repre-
sented as variables bound by quantifier-like operators in
underlying structures. Taken together, these ideas amount to
deriving a sentence like (70) from a structure virtually
identical with the standard logical formula:
(73) (3x) (I saw x and x is a cow).
I shall not discuss all of Bach's arguments for the
predicative analysis of noun phrases. The strongest of them
all consist of the observation that some phenomenon normally
associated with clausal structures may also be associated with
noun phrases. There is the familiar case of negation. Bach
argues that analysing out the noun phrases in the sentence:
(74) The professors signed a petition.
in the fashion:
(75) The ones who were professors signed something which was
a petition.
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would permit the correct prediction not only of the number,
but also of the nature, of all the possible negations of
sentence (74), viz.
(76) The professors DIDN'T sign a petition.
Neg the ones who were professors signed something which
was a petition.
(77) The PROFESSORS didn't sign a petition.
The ones Neg who were professors signed something which
was a petition.
(78) The professors didn't sign a PETITION.
The ones who were professors signed something Neg which
was a petition.
There has been considerable discussion of constituent negation
in the linguistic literature but I shall make only two comments
here. First, a general account of negation, applicable to all
types of constituent, is presumably to be preferred to one
that deals only with noun phrases, but it is not at all obvious
that this type of clausal account of noun phrase negation
could be extended to other types of constituent that can be
negated, such as adverbs.
Secondly, Bach's argument conflicts with some of his own
assumptions. The sentence:
(79) He didn't sign a petition.
is ambiguous in exactly the same way as it is the negation of (74).
One of its readings parallels (77) above, viz:
(80) HE didn't sign a petition.
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and to explain this, Bach would have to analyse (80) as:
(81) The one Neg who was him signed something which was a
petition.
But, if I have understood him correctly, Bach intends that his
clausal analysis should not apply to pronouns, such as the he
in (79). Just as in the logical system on which this
syntactic analysis is modelled, this pronoun would be repre-
sented as a bound variable. To extend the analysis of
constituent negation to pronouns would be possible, but it
would lead to other unwelcome consequences. Bach suggests that
there will be a definiteness operator in underlying structures;
if we represent this as (Dx), and ignore temporarily the
analysis of the phrase a petition, then the analysis of (79)
that we can construct on the basis of Bach's discussion should
be something like:
(82) (Dx) (x sign a petition)
with a Neg element to be inserted in some appropriate position.
Now it is, of course, quite possible to provide a formula along
these lines into which Neg can be inserted in accordance with
Bach's theory of constituent negation, thus:
(83) (Dx) (Dy) (Neg (x is y) and x sign a petition)
This formula, with its negated identity clause, is very similar
to the paraphrase (81), and thus provides an analysis of (80)
parallel to the one Bach gives for (77). However, if we do
extend Bach's analysis to pronouns in this way, consistency
will require that an identity clause is present also in the
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representation of the affirmative sentence:
(84) He signed a petition.
This sentence would thus have to be analysed as something like:
(85) (Dx) (Dy) (x is y and x sign a petition).
As long as infinite regress can be avoided, there is probably
nothing that would positively rule this out as a possible deep
structure, but the necessity for such identity clauses under-
lying all pronouns detracts seriously from the idea of using
variables and quantifier elements in deep structure, since the
major advantage of this idea is the simplification it permits
in the representation of pronominal cross-reference. To a
large extent this is lost if, on the basis of Bach's argument
about negation, we are forced to derive pronouns, as well as
noun phrases with lexical content, from underlying clauses.
Another of Bach's observations is that noun phrases are
interpreted in relation to tense. For example, the noun phrase
the President in the sentence:
(86) Several years ago I met the President in Baltimore.
can be taken to refer either to the person who was President at
the time of meeting, or to the person who is President now.
Bach suggests treating this ambiguity of reference as an
ambiguity of meaning, and deriving the phrase the President
from either the one who was President, or the one who is
President, i.e. from underlying clauses in which tense is
explicitly marked. Although a great many noun phrases are ambig-
uous in this way, Bach maintains that the range of possible
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interpretations is always predictable -- the clause underlying
the noun phrase always has either present tense or 'narrative'
tense (roughly, the same tense as the main verb of the sentence).
Some general conditions on the tense element in underlying
clauses that are reduced to noun phrases in surface structure
will therefore give the right results.
One can cite examples which are apparently exceptions to
Bach's generalization. Thus the sentence:
(87) Tomorrow I shall make a kite.
obviously lacks a reading with present tense reference for
a kite, and the sentence:
(88) Yesterday I ate a pork pie.
lacks a reading with present tense reference for a pork pie.
It should be noticed also that even though (87) can perhaps be
paraphrased as:
(89) Tomorrow I shall make something which will be a kite.
the temporal references of the two clauses are not strictly
identical, since something will be a kite only after I have
made it so. However, 'creative' verbs like make, and
'destructive' verbs like eat are exceptional precisely in their
special implications about the past, present or future
existence of their objects. The fact that a general theory of
tense and reference does not, without special modification,
account for these exceptional cases is therefore hardly an
objection to the theory.
More interesting is the possibility of an alternative
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explanation of Bach's observations. Bach's analysis does pro-
vide an explanation, and not merely a representation, of these
facts, for he points out that if there were no conditions on
the tense element in a relative clause that is reduced, the
reduction transformation would violate the principle that
deletions should be recoverable. On Bach's proposal, relative
clause reduction goes through only if the tense element is
identical to that of the main clause, or if it is the present
tense. Thus recoverability (up to ambiguity) is secured, and
the semantic facts are simultaneously predicted. On the other
hand, the semantic facts might be taken as evidence for a
scope analysis of tense relationships. Tenses and time adverbs
interact very closely, and the notion of the scope of an
adverb is a familiar one. For example, a sentence like:
(90) We decided to leave on Tuesday.
is ambiguous; it has different readings depending on how the
scope of the time adverb on Tuesday is taken. What is being
suggested is that a general account of this kind might be
developed to deal with the tenses of verbs as well as with
time adverbs. A noun phrase might be interpreted as either
inside or outside the scope of the time indicator of the
sentence in which it occurred. If inside, the referent ofthe
noun phrase would be whatever the descriptive content of the
noun phrase is, was, or will be, true of at the time indicated
in the sentence; if outside, the noun phrase would refer
simply to whatever it was true of at the time of utterance.
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Composite tenses would be handled quite naturally within such
a system; the time relevant to the referent of a phrase would
be determined by the interaction of any tense elements con-
tained within it, with any tense elements in whose scope it
occurred. In order to account for Bach's observations, relative
clause reduction would be permitted only when tense within the
relative clause was unmarked.
I cannot pretend to have the details of such a system
worked out, but there are some indications that this is the
correct approach to tense. Sentences with the verb will con-
form to Bach's generalization about the interpretation of noun
phrases only for a non-specific reading of the noun phrase.
For example, the noun phrase a beautiful girl in the sentence:
(91) John will marry a beautiful girl.
may be taken to refer to a girl who is now beautiful, or to
refer to a girl who will be beautiful at the time John marries
her, though she may be plain, or even not have been born, at
the time of utterance. This noun phrase may also be inter-
preted either as specific or as non-specific; the sentence
may be used to make a prediction about a particular beautiful
girl, or to make the much weaker prediction that whoever John
marries will be beautiful. The specific reading, however,
requires a present tense interpretation of the noun phrase --
the noun phrase must be taken to refer to a girl who is now
beautiful. People certainly can be referred to in terms of
their future properties as well as their present ones, and
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someone might well believe that John will marry a certain girl
who, though plain now, will be beautiful by the time she is
married. But if this is the sense intended, then (91) will
not do; the proper form in such a case is (92):
(92) John will marry a (certain) girl who will be beautiful.
For the specific reading, that is, if a future reference is
intended it must be explicitly marked.
The interest of this is that the specific/non-specific
contrast is a matter of scope. If the noun phrase is within
the scope of the opaque verb, it is non-specific; if it is
outside the scope of that verb then it is specific. Given a
scope analysis of tense, we would therefore actually predict
that on the specific reading, a noun phrase cannot pick up
a temporal reference from the verb of a sentence in which it
appears. For on this reading, the noun phrase will be outside
the scope of that verb. The interaction of specificity and
time reference would be explained on the assumption that both
are a matter of the relative scope of a noun phrase and a
verb.
Another observation of the same kind is that demonstrative
noun phrases also lack one of the interpretations that Bach's
generalization predicts. The sentence:
(93) I used to sit by the statue of Napoleon.
is ambiguous between reference to a presently existing statue
and one which used to exist. Because of the latter possibility,
the sentence:
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(94) I used to sit by the statue of Napoleon before it was
melted down.
makes sense. By contrast, the sentence:
(95) I used to sit by that statue.
with a demonstrative noun phrase, can be taken to refer only to
a presently existing statue, and the sentence:
(96) I used to sit by that statue before it was melted down.
is correspondingly anomalous. These facts can also be accounted
for if we assume that the time reference of a noun phrase is a
matter of its scope with respect to the main verb of the
sentence. It is a general fact about demonstrative noun phrases
(though I shall not attempt to establish it here) that they
are never interpreted as within the scope of other elements in
the sentences in which they occur. The hypothesis that tense
in a noun phrase is a matter of scope, together with the fact
that the scope of a demonstrative phrase is always maximal,
automatically predicts that a demonstrative phrase will not
pick up its time reference from the tense of the sentence
in which it occurs. Thus the phrase that statue in (95) and (96)
must be taken to refer to a presently existing statue, not to
one that used to exist.
A scope analysis of tense, if the details can be worked
out satisfactorily, would therefore appear to account not only
for the facts observed by Bach, but also for cases which would
be exceptions to his generalization. The reason for considering
this alternative to Bach's analysis is that it does not require
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that noun phrases be derived from underlying clauses. Deriva-
tion from underlying clauses is needed only if it is supposed
that tense must be explicitly marked in noun phrases, for then
a verb must be supplied to carry this tense marking. On the
scope analysis of tense, however, only the scope of the noun
phrase with respect to the rest of the sentence need be
indicated. The time reference of the phrase would follow auto-
matically from this (together with the tense of the sentence),
and there would be no need for an explicit indication of tense
in the noun phrase.
Another of Bach's arguments to the effect that clausal
structure underlies simple noun phrases is the familiar observa-
tion that phrases like heavy smoker, early riser, former
president, etc., cannot be paraphrased as smoker who is heavy,
riser who is early, president who is former. The only natural
way of indicating the role of the adjective in these phrases
is by means of a paraphrase containing an adverb, thus
someone who smokes heavily, someone who rises early, the
person who formerly was president. There are also ambiguous
examples such as graceful dancer, good cook, which have one
reading which is naturally captured by the simple paraphrase
dancer who is graceful, cook who is good, but also another
reading for which this is not sufficient. Unless we assume,
counter-intuitively, that the words graceful and good are
themselves ambiguous, the difference between the two readings
of these phrases must be treated as a difference in the
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grammatical role of the adjective. An analysis based on the
paraphrases dancer who is graceful, someone who dances grace-
fully, does exactly this and it is difficult to think of a
more natural way of doing it. And this analysis does require
that, at least for one of the readings of the phrase, the word
dancer is derived from the clausal structure someone who dances.
This analysis is not without its problems. In a foot-
note (p. 103) Bach mentions a comment of Langendoen's to the
effect that this analysis "explains neatly the ambiguity of
phrases like a good czar as (1) 'a czar who is good' and (2)
'one who"czars" well' ('good as a czar')". How seriously we
are supposed to take the suggested paraphrase 'one who "czars"
well' is not clear. Chomsky has emphasized (personal communica-
tion) that while the idea of deriving a good dancer from one
who dances well might perhaps be extended to the derivation of
a good doctor from one who doctors well, the suggestion is
extremely implausible for other nominals, e.g. a good Under
Secretary of State. If deriving the adjective from an under-
lying adverb means deriving the noun from an underlying verb,
we shall have to posit an enormous number of abstract verb
forms whose function is solely to be obligatorily converted
into such nouns. This criticism, however, does not constitute
an argument against the hypothesis that clausal structure
underlies simple noun phrases. Some alternative analysis,
such as one who is good as a czar, one who is good as an
86
Under Secretary of State, is still needed, and there appears
to be no plausible proposal for such an analysis that does not
involve the derivation of noun phrases from underlying relative
clauses.
Even if there are alternatives in the case of Bach's
other arguments for the derivation of noun phrases from
underlying relative clauses, this latter argument does appear
to hold. I shall therefore turn now to the second part of the
proposal under examination, which is that these relative
clauses should in turn be derived from conjoined clauses.
Bach gives much less attention to this part of the proposal,
but he does assume it in his proposed representations for the
sentence:
(97) She wants to marry a man with a big bank account.
The specific and non-specific readings of this sentence are
to be represented respectively as:
(98) Some x [gx has a big bank account and she wants to
marry x].
(99) She wants [,"some x [?ax has a big bank account and she
marry xl].
Both of these representations contain conjunctions, though
there is none in the surface structure (97), and the repre-
sentations are structurally very similar to those which
would be assigned by a system of quantificational logic.
As pointed out earlier, however, this conjunctive analysis
is not a necessary correlate of the employment of a
- ~-
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specificity operator resembling the existential quantifier,
but should be argued for independently.
Postal's arguments for the conjunctive analysis of
relative clauses fall into three groups. The first are
based on Bach and Peters' observations about pronominaliza-
tion. He points out quite rightly that those observations
make nonsense of a rather strong identity condition on noun
phrases which he himself had previously proposed, viz:
(100) If two disjoint noun phrases have the same heads, i.e.
heads identical in meaning and reference index, then
all their other structure, in particular, modifiers,
must be identical, or the deep structure in which
they lie enters the garbage component rather than the
surface structure assignment (transformational) component.
This condition was designed to prevent the pronominalization
transformation from operating on such structures as:
(101) knight52 axed (knight52 (knight52 was in a plight)).
(102) (knight52 (knight52 in a plight)) axed (knight52
(knight52 not in a plight)).
Since it is the modifiers, the relative clauses, which
create the problems in these cases, and since condition (100)
cannot after all be used to avoid these problems, Postal
concludes that relative clauses should not be present in
noun phrases at the stage at which pronominalization takes
place. He argues later that they should be present in
underlying structures as clauses conjoined to the main
sentence, presumably to be moved into their eventual positions
in surface structure by some transformation applying after
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the pronominalization transformation.
Postal's observations, however, do not support any-
thing like so strong a conclusion, for there are other, less
radical, cures for the puzzles about pronominalization. We
might, for example, simply weaken the identity condition
on pronominalization to an inclusion relationship between
the 'antecedent' noun phrase and the one to be pronominalised.
This would avoid the Bach-Peters paradox and also prevent
pronominalization in (101) and (102) above. But this move
does not require the analysis of relative clauses as con-
junctions.
The second set of arguments in Postal's paper concern
opaque contexts, in particular the substitutivity of identicals
in opaque contexts. Since this is the topic of Chapter IV,
I shall postpone discussion of these arguments until then.
They do not, as far as I can see, support the conjunctive
analysis of relative clauses.
The third kind of argument that Postal employs consists
of observations such that the sentence:
(103) The boy who smiled smiled.
is redundant in much the same way as the sentences:
(104) The boy, who smiled, smiled.
(105) The boy smiled and the boy smiled.
Postal also refers to Lakoff's observation that the phrase:
(106) the boy who is big who is big
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is not only redundant, but is also in danger of being trans-
formed into the non-synonymous phrase:
(107) the big big boy
These observations seem to indicate at most that the content
of relative clauses constitute entailments of the sentences
in which they occur. The redundancy of the examples simply
illustrates this fact in a rather effective way. Certain
significant details of this claim must be spelled out more
precisely, to account, for example, for the differences in
interpretation of the definite article in (103) and (105).
But even if such discrepancies could be overcome, it certain-
ly does not follow that a sentence transformed into a relative
clause must be coordinated rather than subordinated to the
main clause in the underlying structure. This conclusion
follows only on the incorrect assumption that the underlying
representation of a sentence must consist of a conjunction
of all propositions that the sentence entails.
The only other point that I can find in Postal's paper
that is relevant to this analysis of relative clauses, and
it is a point that Bach makes too, is that non-restrictive
relative clauses are very similar in certain ways to con-
joined clauses, and that restrictive relative clauses are
similar in certain ways to non-restrictive relative clauses.
For example, both restrictive and non-restrictive relative
clauses can be reduced to give preposed adjectival construc-
tions; this accounts for the ambiguity of a phrase such as:
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(108) the friendly Americans
However, as Postal notes, using this similarity as an argu-
ment for analysing restrictive relative clauses as conjoined
clauses leaves one with the problem of giving an account of
what it is that distinguishes restrictive and non-restrictive
relatives, for one can no longer treat this distinction as
a contrast between subordinate and coordinate clauses in
underlying structure.
All that really comes out of these arguments, then,
is the claim that a sentence entails the propositions
embodied in the sentences which underlie its relative clauses.
Properly stated (with due allowance for determiner differences,
and, probably, reference to presupposition rather than
straightforward entailment) there is certainly some truth in
this claim, but it does not force us to accept the analysis.
As was pointed out at the beginning of this section, an
inference rule operating on structures with subordinated
relative clauses would be just as effective in generating
such entailments. The proposal that noun phrases should be
represented as predicate nominals in underlying restrictive
relative clauses does have some support, but there appears
to be little or no motivation for the claim that these
relative clauses are coordinate rather than subordinate.
Section 5. Specific noun phrases and existence.
In Section 3 we considered a problem that arises in
connection with non-specific noun phrases if the specificity
operator is identified with the existential quantifier. In
Section 4 it was observed that this problem was not essentially
connected with the existential quantifier but was a consequence
of adopting the conjunctive analysis of noun phrases which
is standardly associated with the existential quantifier in
formal logical representations. I shall now consider the
implications of using the existential quantifier in repre-
sentations of the specific reading of noun phrases. A problem
arises here which is not simply a matter of the formal
apparatus associated with the existential quantifier but is
due to the interpretation of the existential quantifier
itself.
In giving some reasons, in Section 2, for identifying
the specificity operator with the existential quantifier,
it was suggested that a noun phrase interpreted as specific
though within an opaque context does not differ significantly
in interpretation from a noun phrase in a non-opaque con-
text. In particular, since a sentence containing an in-
definite noun phrase normally entails that something of the
kind described by that noun phrase exists, it might be
assumed that the same is true of a sentence containing a
specifically interpreted noun phrase in an opaque context.
Only this could justify representing such a sentence by
means of an existentially quantified formula. It appears,
however, that this assumption is false.
A sentence such as:
(109) John has caught a unicorn.
must be false because unicorns do not exist. But it appears
that many speakers of English are prepared to accept that
a sentence such as:
(110) John wants to catch a unicorn.
could be true, even on a specific interpretation of a unicorn,
despite the non-existence of unicorns. Certainly, if John
believes that unicorns exist, and believes that a certain
unicorn answering some description exists, then what goes
on in John's mind could be just the same whether unicorns
really existed or not. The question is whether, given that
unicorns do not exist, it is possible to describe what goes
on in John's mind in the words of (110). If it is, then
this would argue against representing (110) as:
(111) (2x) (x is a unicorn and John wants John catch x).
for the rules of the logical system permit us to infer from
this:
(112) (3x) (x is a unicorn).
that is, unicorns exist. Even if, in view of the remarks
of the previous section of this chapter, we give up the
conjunctive aspect of the logical representation, and
represent (110) instead as:
(113) (9x) John wants John catch (a unicorn) 
.
the conclusion that unicorns exist should surely follow.
- U - - - -- -~
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These observations suggest that the existential
quantifier should not be used to represent specificity. The
same is not true, however, of the English phrase there is...
which is often taken to be the counterpart of the existential
quantifier, for those speakers who do not find the non-
existence of unicorns incompatible with the truth of (110)
also apparently do not find it incompatible with the truth
of:
(114) There is a unicorn that John wants to catch.
Apparently there is... can be used non-existentially. Before
accepting this conclusion, however, we might consider the
possibility of reconciling representations such as (111),
which are existentially quantified, with the absence of an
existential entailment. Worries about the use of the
existential quantifier in connection with sentences about
unicorns and other mythical or fictional beings such as
Pegasus, Santa Claus, etc., have been examined at some
length by philosophers. The problem can be illustrated
by means of the sentence:
(115) A tiger visited Winnie the Pooh.
If this sentence is represented as:
(116) (3x) (x is a tiger and x visited Winnie the Pooh).
then it would appear that we can infer:
(117) (3x) (x is a tiger).
that is, that at least one tiger exists. But (115) cannot
__ 
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entail the existence of tigers since the tiger who visited
Winnie the Pooh was Tigger, and Tigger does not exist.
Therefore (115), which is true, would still be true even if
tigers did not exist. If, on the other hand, (115) is not
to be represented as (116), then how is it to be represented?
This is, after all, the way in which analogous sentences,
such as:
(118) A social worker visited Mrs. Smith.
are standardly represented, and if (118) and (115) have to
be treated as having quite different logical forms, this
would mean that we could never decide on the logical form
of a sentence until we knew whether it was intended to
describe a real or merely a fictional state of affairs.
It has been proposed as a solution to this puzzle
that (116) can be retained as the representation of (115),
without our being forced to accept that it entails that
tigers exist, if we regard (115) and (116) as being within
the scope of some reality-conceding phrase such as 'According
to the familiar story...'. This removes the worry about
the existential entailment of (115), because within the
familiar story, this entailment does hold -- it is quite
true that according to the familiar story there exists at
least one tiger, viz. Tigger.
Could not a similar account be given of sentence (110)
above, to explain why (110) can be held to be true in the
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face of the non-existence of unicorns? We would not, of
course, want to preface (110) with the phrase 'According to
the familiar story...', but some other phrase might be found
which would be suitable. A natural candidate would
be 'According to John's beliefs...', thus:
(119) According to John's beliefs, John wants to catch a
(certain) unicorn.
or, more naturally,
(120) John thinks he wants to catch a (certain) unicorn.
This sentence can be represented in such a way that there
is no temptation to say that it entails the existence of
unicorns, even though its representation does contain the
existential quantifier. Thus:
(121) John thinks (ax) (x is a unicorn and John wants John
catch x).
The want here is represented as specific, since the
quantifier is to the left of the phrase John wants..., but
because the quantifier is to the right of John thinks...,
we are committed only to John's thinking that unicorns
exist and not to their actual existence. The representation
corresponds roughly to the sentence:
(122) John thinks there is a unicorn he wants to catch.
The trouble with this is that it does not properly
capture the meaning of (110), for according to (110) John
does want something, and yet (120) and (122) say only that
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he thinks he does. The scope relationships between the
quantifier and the opaque verbs in (121) are correct, but
the scope relationship between the two opaque verbs them-
selves is incorrect, for the verb wants is within the scope
of the verb thinks. By analogy with similar constructions,
such as:
(123) Bill thinks John wants to catch a unicorn.
the sentence (120) should be interpreted as saying, roughly,
that one of John's thoughts is a thought about one of his
wants. Of course John might have such a thought, but the
sense of (110) that we are trying to capture has nothing to
do with that possibility. If we are going to bring John's
thoughts into the analysis at all, the most we should want
to say is that John thinks there is a unicorn and he wants
to catch it, not (120) or (122). In fact, unless we are
prepared to make what John thinks part of the analysis of
a sentence such as:
(124) John wants to catch a (certain) fish.
then we should probably not make it part of the analysis
of (110), for the mental state of John's that we are con-
cerned with in (110) is precisely similar to the one involved
in (124) except for the difference between unicorns and
fish.
It should be noted, however, that there is a precedent
for paraphrases such as (120) or (122). The sentence:
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(125) John thinks he knows who lives next door.
might, by analogy with:
(126) Bill thinks John knows who lives next door.
be interpreted as saying that John has a certain opinion,
to the effect that he knows who lives next door. But a much
more common interpretation of (125) is simply that John has
an opinion about who lives next door. This is really very
similar to the situation for sentence (110). As far as
John's mental state is concerned, no significant difference
is implied by saying that John knows som.ething rather than
that he thinks it. The difference between the two has to
do with how things actually are in the real world, with
whether what John thinks is the case really is or not. When
we want to avoid the implication that John is right, we use
think rather than know -- except, that is, with a WH-complement.
For whatever reason, sentences like:
(127) *John thinks who lives next door.
are ungrammatical in English. And it is this gap which the
sentence (125) fills; it is taken to mean exactly what (127)
would mean if it were grammatical. In other words, to
describe the situation in which John 'knows' something
except that he is wrong about it, we embed the John knows...
sentence within John thinks....
The paraphrase (120) of sentence (110) is exactly
parallel to this. In order to describe the situation in
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which John wants to catch something except that it does not
exist, we have embedded the John wants... sentence within
John thinks.... Despite this very close parallel, however,
I think (120) does not, after all, serve as a useful analysis
of the sentence (110). For one thing, even in spite of
the analogy, my intuitions say that (120), unlike (125), can
only be taken literally, i.e. as saying that John has a thought
about a want, and that it therefore does not have the meaning
necessary to serve as a paraphrase for (110). Even if it
did, the structure of (120), just like the structure of (125),
does not illuminate that interpretation. Rather, (120)
and (125) themselves stand in need of explication, and so
very little would be gained by taking them as the model for
the analysis of (110). The treatment which works for
sentences like (115), which are to be taken wholly within
the context of a fiction of some kind, is not, it seems,
adequate for sentences like (110) which combine references
to the real world with reference to imaginary entities.
Rather than placing the whole of sentence (110)
within the context of a reality-conceding phrase, it looks
as if it is just the noun phrase a unicorn which, lacking
the usual existential entailment, should be treated in this
way. We might therefore consider, instead of (120), the
paraphrase:
(128) John wants to catch something that he thinks is a
unicorn.
-E - --
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corresponding to the representation:
(129) (x) (John thinks x is a unicorn and John wants John
catch x).
This, however, will not do, for it makes John's belief that
a unicorn exists a matter of his believing, wrongly, of
something that does exist, that it is a unicorn. This is
certainly a possible source for John's belief, but it is
not the only one. Furthermore, if this is the case, then
it is arguable that sentence (110) is false for then (110)
says that something which, ex hypothesi, is not a unicorn,
is a unicorn. This will be discussed in more detail in
Chapter IV, since it concerns the description under which
something is referred to. I shall simply assume, for the
moment, that what is needed in connection with sentence (110)
is not John's believing of something that exists that it is
a unicorn, but his believing of a unicorn that it exists.
Notice, however, that if we try to express this
latter situation, either by:
(130) John believes a unicorn exists and he wants to catch it.
or by:
(131) John wants to catch a unicorn that he believes exists.
then we simply have to give up the existential interpretation
of indefinite noun phrases, at least in these contexts. Up
to this point, we responded to the threat that a sentence
like (110) poses for the representation of specificity
- I -
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with the existential quantifier, by continuing to assume
that specificity entails existence and thus that the exis-
tential analysis is correct, and by trying to explain away
sentence (110) as elliptical for some other sentence that
does not entail the existence of unicorns. In working out
the details of this move, however, we seem to have rejected
all alternatives except the one we set out to avoid, i.e.
that specific noun phrases simply do not entail existence.
And, as it happens, there is some rather strong evidence in
support of this conclusion. Sentences such as:
(132) I have to write a paper.
(133) I would like you to make a telephone call.
can be interpreted specifically or non-specifically. I
might, for example, want you to call my Aunt Alice and tell
her I shall be late for supper, or I might simply want you
to make sure the telephone is in order, in which case I
wouldn't care what call you made. The specific interpreta-
tions of these sentences can be paraphrased as:
(134) There is a (certain) paper I have to write.
(135) There is a (certain) telephone call I want you to
make.
These are perfectly acceptable English sentences, not
deviant or odd in any way. Yet they definitely do not
entail existence.
With verbs such as write or make, which we might
call 'creative' verbs, we have to be careful about existence
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entailments in any case, not just in opaque contexts. The
sentence:
(136) John is writing a paper.
does not mean, or even entail:
(137) There is a paper and John is writing it.
in the way that the sentence:
(138) John is copying a paper.
means, or at least entails:
(139) There is a paper and John is copying it.
for the paper that John is writing does not really exist
until he has written a great deal, perhaps all, of it.
But notice that the claim that (132) and (134) do not entail
the existence of a paper does not rest simply on this. It
is not just that the paper I have to write does not now
exist. It is quite compatible with the truth of (132)
and (134) that it should never exist at all, since, as is
so often the case, I might never write the paper I have to
write. Thus these sentences do not entail either (140)
or (141):
(140) There is a paper.
(141) There will be a paper.
and they thus constitute strong evidence for the claim that
the specific/non-specific contrast is not to be analysed in
terms of existence entailments.
Paraphrasing specific and non-specific noun phrases
with there is... tends to suggest an analysis in terms of
-U
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existence entailments, but there are other ways of para-
phrasing them which bring out other semantic aspects of
the contrast and might therefore be a better guide to the
correct analysis. We have said, for example, that the
specific reading of the sentence:
(142) John wants to catch a fish.
means that John has a certain fish in mind, while the non-
specific reading is compatible with his having no particular
fish in mind. The sentence:
(143) John has a certain fish in mind.
might itself be taken to entail the existence of fish, for
it might be taken to be equivalent to :
(144) There is a fish and John is thinking of it.
but there is also another sense, in which one can have a
certain fish in mind without its actually having to exist.
All that this sense involves is imagining to oneself a fish
with some individuating characteristics. I do not want to
go into the detailed phenomenology of this, and questions
such as whether one can imagine to oneself a fish-in-general,
without any particular characteristics, are questions that
I shall deliberately avoid. All I wish to suggest is that
an essential difference between the specific and non-specific
readings of a sentence like (142) is whether or not John is
able or prepared to ascribe some particular characteristics
to the fish he wants to catch, characteristics which distinguish
-U
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it from other fish. The contrast, that is to say, is not
a matter of whether a fish exists, but of whether a fish can
be individuated.
Another way of expressing this is to say that the
specific reading of sentence (142) says that some fish
(whether or not it exists in the real world) has the property
being-wanted-to-be-caught-by-John. This is what Quine calls
the'relational' interpretation; the sentence says that John
and some fish stand in the relation wants-to-catch. The
non-specific reading, on the other hand, though it does
ascribe a property to John, does not ascribe a property to
any fish. Now if it makes sense to say that a certain fish
has a certain property, it must be possible, at least in
principle if not in practice, to say which fish has that
property, i.e. to individuate the fish in question. That
individuation is at the heart of the specific/non-specific
contrast is supported by the contrast between sentences (132)
and (133) and the sentence:
(145) I would like you to make me a cup of tea.
The specific reading of this sentence, and its paraphrase:
(146) There is a cup of tea that I would like you to make.
are extremely unnatural. The only explanation for this
that I can think of is that cups of tea, unlike papers and
telephone calls, are not the kind of thing we normally
individuate, or could imagine how to individuate, independently
-U-----
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of their spatio-temporal and physical properties, i.e.
independently of their real physical existence. Where such
individuation is problematic, the specific readings of sen-
tences are bizarre.
Talk of individuation, though it is obviously more
appropriate than talk of existence entailments, is only the
beginning of an answer of course, for it is not itself a
completely clear notion. There are serious problems con-
cerning the principles of individuation for things that do
not exist. If, for example, I am hallucinating a pink
elephant, and John is hallucinating a pink elephant, does
it even make sense to ask whether they are the same pink
elephant or different ones? (See Geach, J. of Phil., 1967,
for further discussion of such puzzles.) Nevertheless, the
way we use our language strongly suggests that we do operate
with some such principles, however difficult they are to
state and however unreliable. Even for things that do exist,
just how much characterization is necessary to count as
having picked out some individual is a very difficult
question to answer. We might in principle demand some
description of the individual which is true of no other
individual, but this is a much stronger requirement than
we actually impose in practice. To back up my claim that
there is a certain fish that I want to catch I certainly
do not have to be able to describe the fish in question in
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such a way that there is no possibility that you, or even
I, might mistake some other fish for it. On the other hand,
blue fish, you would have some reason to doubt that I do
have a particular fish in mind.
Since almost exactly the same problems arise when one
attempts to say what counts as a sufficiently individuating
description to warrant the use of the definite article, one
might suspect that a necessary condition on the truth of
the specific reading of a sentence like:
(147) John wants to catch a fish.
is that there should be some true sentence of the form:
(148) John wants to catch the such-and-such fish.
where 'such-and-such' is replaced by some descriptive phrase.
The non-specific reading of (147), by contrast, would not
entail any such sentence. However, this is too strong a
condition. It says that if it is true that:
(149) I have to write a (certain) paper.
then there must be some true sentence of the form:
(150) I have to write the such-and-such paper.
There do exist sentences of this form, for example:
(151) I have to write the paper that I forgot to write
last term.
but they are not very common, and in fact a sentence
like (149) seems to be justified on the basis of something
much weaker than a definite description, for example by:
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(152) I have to write a paper on the relation between
marihuana use and arthritis.
It is interesting that the which-question criterion for
specificity also fails in these same cases. Normally one
can distinguish the specific from the non-specific reading
of a sentence such as (147) for example, by asking whether
the question:
(153) Which fish does John want to catch?
is an appropriate question to ask. For the non-specific
reading of (147), there is no possible answer to such a
question, but for the specific reading there must in
principle be an answer to it, even if no-one actually knows
the answer. For the specific reading of (149), however, it
seems that there does not necessarily have to be an answer
to the question:
(154) Which paper do you have to write?
The most that can be demanded is that there should be an
answer to the question:
(155) What paper do you have to write?
What-questions are odd things; they are in many cases only
marginally acceptable, for example:
(156) What pencil did you buy?
A detailed study of them might perhaps shed some light on
the notion of individuation.
The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is
that the specific reading of a sentence containing an
-I
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indefinite noun phrase in an opaque context should not be
represented by an existentially quantified formula. The
specificity operator is to be defined in terms of some
notion of individuation, not in terms of existence. Curiously,
however, this seems to be too weak an analysis for the non-
specific reading. Many of the problems about the non-specific
reading discussed in Section 3 are dissolved away if we
analyse the non-specific reading of, for example:
(157) John wants to catch a fish.
as something like:
(158) John wants that some fish should have the property
that he catches it.
rather than as:
(159) John wants that there should be a fish that he catches.
The analysis in terms of individuation and properties, applied
to the non-specific reading, does therefore seem to have
advantages over the analysis in terms of existence. But on
the other hand it is surely not true that John would be
satisfied if some merely fictional or imaginary fish should
have the property in question. In fact, since one cannot
catch fish that do not exist, it does not even make sense
to suppose that this is what John wants to do. (Of course,
John could want it to be true, within some story, that he
caught a fish.) We are in danger, therefore, of having to
give up one of our basic principles, viz. that specific and
-U---- - -~
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non-specific readings should be distinguished by differences
in scope of one and the same symbol. The non-specific reading
seems to require an operator with existential import, and
the specific reading to require an operator without it.
One way out of this conclusion would be to say that
indefinite noun phrases are never to be analysed in terms of
of existence. Sentences containing indefinite noun phrases
do very often have existential entailments. For example,
the sentence:
(160) I read some books today.
entails:
(161) Some books that I read today exist.
(ignoring, once again, the tense of the existential
proposition). But it certainly seems odd to say that (160)
means (161). Since (160) and (161) are logically equivalent,
it is possible to represent the former along the lines ofthe
latter without running the risk of generating any incorrect
entailments. Instead of devising distinct representations
for (160) and (161), and setting up the inference rules to
capture the fact that they entail each other, we can simply
use a representation appropriate for one to do service for
both, and thus incidentally get by without needing inference
rules to relate them. But we have just been examining examples
in which an indefinite noun phrase carries no existential
entailment and for which a representation in terms of
existence is therefore incorrect. These examples, together
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with the non-synonymy of pairs like (160) and (161), suggest
that sentences which contain indefinite noun phrases but
which are not explicitly existential sentence,, should always
be assigned a representation which is neutral with respect
to existential entailments. Inference rules could then be
set up to generate existential entailments in just those
cases for which they exist. It appears, in fact, that it
is the property that the sentence predicates of the referent
of the noun phrase which determines whether or not that
referent must exist in the real world. If the property is
wanted-to-be-caught-by-John, real existence is not required.
If the property is having-been-caught-by-John, on the other
hand, or being-read-by-me-today, then real existence is
required. This will explain the difference between the
specific and non-specific reading of sentence (157) that
was noted above. The property that is ascribed to a fish
on the specific reading is wanted-to-be-caught-by-John, which
does not entail the real existence of the fish. The property
that, on the non-specific reading, John wants some fish to
have is being-caught-by-John, which does entail the real
existence of any fish having this property.
Of course, distinguishing those properties which can
hold only of really existing individuals from those which
can hold of non-existent ones, might appear to be just our
original task of distinguishing transparent contexts from
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opaque ones. But those noun phrases whose referents need
not really exist and those which exhibit the specific/non-
specific ambiguity are not exactly the same, though the
classes do overlap to a considerable extent. Verbs that
tolerate non-existent referents for their object noun phrases
but not non-specific ones are write to, talk to, address,
pray to, etc.. For example, the sentence:
(162) John wrote to someone.
is not ambiguous with respect to specificity. It has no
non-specific reading; one cannot write to no-one in particular
in the way that one can, for example, look for a pencil but
no particular pencil. (John might, of course, have written:
'To whom it may concern...', but this does not establish
that there is a non-specific reading of (162) for we can
still say that John wrote to the person(s) who were concerned.)
On the other hand, sentence (162) would still be true if the
person John wrote to was Santa Claus or even some less public
fictional individual whom John mistakenly believes to
exist.
A verb of the opposite type, which takes a noun phrase
which may be read as non-specific but which does entail
existence, is manage. The sentence:
(163) John managed to catch a fish.
is ambiguous. It may be taken to describe the situation
in which John's intention was simply not to return from his
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day by the river fishless, i.e. to catch some fish or other,
and he succeeded in this. On the other hand it may be taken
to say that John intended to catch a particular fish and
succeeded in this. The phrase:
(164) The fish that John managed to catch...
is, strictly, appropriate only given the truth of the specific
reading of (163), though admittedly this distinction is a
fine one and much less striking than for a phrase like:
(165) The fish John wanted to catch...
However, sentence (163) could not be true, on either reading,
if fish did not really exist. The sentence:
(166) John managed to catch a unicorn.
for example, is bound to be false given the non-existence of
unicorns (unless, of course, it is taken as a whole as within
the context of a story).
In view of these observations, it is clear that at
least two different things may be meant by the claim that
existential generalization fails for a given sentence.
Existential generalization may fail because the sentence is
being read non-specifically and thus is not being taken to
ascribe any property to any individual (really existent or
otherwise). On the other hand, and quite independently of
this, existential generalization may fail in the sense that
it is not valid to infer the real existence of an object of
the kind described. Also, as pointed out in Chapter I,
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existential generalization may be said to fail because of
considerations connected with the description under which
something is referred to. These three cases do not coincide
exactly. Which one we take as a defining criterion for the
class of opaque contexts is a terminological question which
is of little importance compared with the importance of
recognising that there are these distinctions to be made.
In fact, in many discussions of opacity it looks as though
talk of the failure of existential generalization involves
the confusion of these different cases.
What I have been arguing for is that existential
generalization in the sense in which it is relevant to the
specific/non-specific contrast is not concerned with real
existence. The notion of existential generalization in the
sense which has to do with individuation rather than real
existence is obviously central to the explication of the
specific/non-specific contrast, and it is also this sense
which correlates with the use of there is... in English.
Though there is more to be said on the subject than I have
been able to say here, there therefore appear to be obvious
advantages to using an existence-neutral operator (such as
our (Sx)) in the formal representation of all sentences
with indefinite noun phrases. The function of this operator
will be simply to indicate the scope relationships between
the noun phrase and other parts of the sentence, that is,
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to indicate which properties are being ascribed to which
individuals. Inference rules operating on such representations
must then be used to generate entailments concerning real
existence when and where these inferences are valid.FN It
appears, from the observations presented above, that these
inference rules will have to be sensitive to particular
lexical items, or, at least, to certain semantically defined
classes of lexical items. Perhaps in the characterization
of these classes, though I have none to offer here, the
answer will be found to the important outstanding question,
which is why the correlation between contexts which are
ambiguous with respect to existential generalization in the
sense of individuation, and contexts for which existential
generalization in the sense of real existence fails, though
not a perfect correlation, is as strong as it is.
Section 6. Logical relationships between the readings.
The non-specific reading of a sentence such as:
FN. I have suggested that the validity of such inferences
will depend on what property the sentence predicates of the
individual in question. However this treatment also allows
for some flexibility about inferring real existence depending
on the type of entity the noun phrase refers to. It has
often been observed that there is something odd about inferring
from a sentence like: There is an aspect of the problem that
I don't understand that there exist aspects, or aspects of
problems. The same kind of bizarreness attends, to a greater
or lesser degree, statements about the existence of, for
example, consequences, considerations, numbers, facts, climates,
hairstyles, etc. etc..
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(167) John wants to catch a fish.
has been characterised so far mostly in a negative fashion.
By contrast with the specific reading of the same sentence,
the non-specific reading does not imply that John has a
particular fish in mind. The specific reading thus seems to
be the 'stronger' of the two, to 'say more' than the non-
specific reading. We may therefore consider the hypothesis
that its meaning includes that of the non-specific reading,
i.e. that it entails the non-specific reading of the
sentence, though not vice versa.
The truth of this claim might be questioned on a
number of grounds, but these do not all stand up to scrutiny.
It is conceivable, for example, that John, asked if he wants
to catch a fish, says 'no', but then asked if he wants to
catch the fish that is eating his tadpoles says 'yes'. But
this obviously does not establish that the specific reading
might be true and the non-specific reading simultaneously
false. As pointed out earlier, the fact that someone will,
apparently quite sincerely, make two statements that contra-
dict each other does not always count as evidence even that
he believes both, yet alone that both are true. John might
be confused. Or he might have forgotten about his desire to
catch a fish until reminded of the existence of the one that
eats his tadpoles. Notice in the latter case, however,
that once he has remembered his desire to catch that fish,
----------
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he will presumably now answer 'yes' to the question whether
he wants to catch a fish. There is a dispositional sense
of want, in which one can be said to want something even if
one is not consciously aware at the time, for whatever reason,
that one does. It is this that is involved in the situation
we have just described, but since it is equally applicable
to the specific and the non-specific readings of the
sentence, it cannot be used to pull them apart and show that
the former does not entail the latter.
Another possibility that one might consider is that
John does want to catch a particular fish, will point to it
and announce his desire to catch it, but will deny that he
wants to catch a fish because he does not realise that the
fish he wants to catch is a fish. This, however, is clearly
a matter of the description under which something is referred
to. A particularly interesting case of this is where there
are, for example, fifty-seven fish that John wants to catch
but, because he has not counted them, or has miscounted
them, he denies that he wants to catch fifty-seven fish.
The description under which something is referred to obviously
does affect the validity of inferences from opaque con-
structions but, as will be argued in Chapter IV, it affects
inferences on both the specific and non-specific readings.
Moving from a transparent interpretation of the description
on the specific reading, to an opaque interpretation of it
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on the non-specific reading, or vice versa, and then
exhibiting the inferences as invalid, clearly should not
be taken as evidence that the specific reading does not
entail the non-specific.
A more substantial argument to the effect that the
specific reading does not entail the non-specific is based
on the claim that the non-specific reading can be para-
phrased with the word any, for example that the non-specific
reading of (167) above can be paraphrased as:
(168) John wants to catch any fish.
The claim, then, is that not only is the non-specific reading
compatible with John's not having decided on a particular
fish, but this reading actually entails or means that he has
not done so. In fact it goes further, for it says that the
non-specific reading entails that he has not even decided
which kind of fish he wants to catch. Perhaps no-one would
actually claim that the sentence (168) with any is logically
equivalent to the non-specific reading of (167), for pre-
sumably allowance has to be made for defective or atypical
specimens of fish. We should therefore take the claim to
be, roughly, that the non-specific reading of (167) entails
that John would be happy to catch any characteristic or normal
fish, whatever that means precisely. Now if this is so, the
non-specific reading will have a positive aspect to its
meaning that the specific reading lacks; it will entail that
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John is indifferent between different fish that he might catch,
which is clearly not the case for the specific reading. Hence
the specific reading would not entail the non-specific one.
This account of the non-specific reading seems to me
to be too strong, however. It would mean that we could never
report a non-specific want, belief, intention, expectation,
etc., correctly unless we knew everything relevant to it. It
would not be proper to use a sentence like (167) unless one
were sure that the colour, size, breed, etc., of fish were
completely irrelevant to John's want. It would not be proper
to use a sentence such as:
(169) John believes an elephant is in the garden.
if one suspected that John also had an opinion about the size
and colour of the elephant. For the description contained
in the non-specific noun phrase must, it is being claimed,
provide a complete specification of the kind of thing that
would satisfy John's want, or the kind of thing he believes
is in the garden. Notice that this would also mean that if
a sentence such as:
(170) John wants to catch a green fish.
is true on its non-specific reading, then sentence (167)
would be false (unless, of course, John had two separate
desires, one to catch any fish, and another to catch any green
fish, i.e. he wants to catch two fish). Now, if the remarks
of Section 3 about simplification in opaque contexts are
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correct, it is certainly the case that (170) does not en-
tail (167). But to say that it is incompatible with (167)
seems to go much too far. Thus this attempt to establish
that the specific reading does not entail the non-specific
reading also breaks down.
Nevertheless it is true that the specific reading
does not entail the non-specific, and the reason for this
does have to do with simplification. Sentence (170) does
not, we have said, entail (167) because John might be com-
pletely indifferent to catching a fish except insofar as he
wants to catch a green one. Sentence (167) is, for example,
compatible with John's believing he will catch a fish, not
caring much about this either way, but, on the assumption
that he will catch one, wanting the one he catches to be
green. Now in exactly the same way, the specific reading
of (167) does not entail the non-specific reading, for there
might be a particular fish that John wants to catch and yet
he might be completely indifferent to the idea of catching a
fish in general. He might, that is, want to catch a fish
only if it is that particular one, just as he might want
to catch a fish only if it is a green one; he might, assuming
he is going to catch a fish, want it to be that one, just as,
assuming he is going to catch a fish, he might it to be a
green one. Thus, just as (170), though not incompatible
with (167), does not entail it, so the specific
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reading of (167), though not, of course, incompatible with
the non-specific reading, does not entail it.
On the other hand, this conclusion does not show that
the specific reading does not, in some sense, 'include' the
non-specific reading. We can, in fact, provide a representa-
tion of the specific reading that differs from the representa-
tion of the non-specific reading just in that it contains
an extra clause. The reason that this does not force us to
say that the specific reading entails the non-specific, is
that this clause is within the opaque context, and simplifi-
cation within opaque contexts is not valid. Thus we might
regard the specific reading of (167) as saying that there is
a particular fish such that John wants that he should catch
a fish and that it be that particular fish, and we could
therefore say that the specific reading of (167) can be
represented as:
(171) John wants (Sx) (x = a & John catch x).
for some individual constant a which designates a particular
fish, just as the non-specific reading of (170) can be
represented as:
(172) John wants (Sx)(x is a fish and x is green and John
catch x).
Of course, since (167) does not tell us which individual
fish it is that John wants to catch, but only that there
is one, we should not really use an individual constant in
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the representation; all that is justified is something like:
(173) (Sy) (y is a fish & John wants (Sx)(x = y & John
catch x)).
This doubly quantified formula is unwieldy, and I am not
seriously suggesting it as the standard representation of
the specific reading of (167). If, however, we wish the
logical relationship between the specific and non-specific
readings to be captured by our system, then we shall need to
have inference rules that allow us to derive something
like (173) from the standard representation of the specific
reading of sentence (167).
The claim that the specific reading does not entail
the non-specific for reasons connected with the simplification
of conjunctions within opaque contexts suggests two hypotheses,
both of which appear to be true. One is that for the limited
class of opaque contexts in which simplification is valid,
it should also be valid to infer the non-specific reading
from the specific. It was pointed out in Section 3 that
for epistemic verbs, such as know and believe, simplification
is valid even within the opaque context. For example, the
argument:
(174) Mary believes there is a green fish in the pond.
Therefore Mary believes there is a fish in the pond.
is valid (at least, given a theory of immediate inference,
and ignoring possible complications due to the opacity of
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the descriptive content of noun phrases). And, as predicted,
the argument:
(175) There is a fish that Mary believes is in the pond.
Therefore Mary believes there is a fish in the pond.
is also valid. The same point can be made for the adjective
possible; both of the following arguments are valid.
(176) It is possible that there is a green fish in the pond.
Therefore it is possible that there is a fish in the pond.
(177) There is a fish such that it is possible that it is
in the pond.
Therefore it is possible that there is a fish in the pond.
Curiously, though simplification is valid also for necessary,
thus:
(178) It is necessary that there is a green fish in the pond.
Therefore it is necessary that there is a fish in the pond.
the argument from specific to non-specific seems dubious:
(179) There is a fish such that necessarily it is in the pond.
Necessarily there is a fish in the pond.
However this argument is valid within standard systems of modal
logic (see Hughes and Cresswell, 1968, p. 144). I cannot go
into a detailed discussion of modal logic here, but I would
point out that for necessary, the specific reading must be
defined with care, since the sentences:
(180) There is a fish such that necessarily it is in the pond.
(181) Necessarily there is a certain fish in the pond.
are apparently not equivalent, and the argument with (181)
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as premise rather than (180), viz:
(182) Necessarily there is a certain fish in the pond.
Therefore necessarily there is a fish in the pond.
does appear to be valid.
The second hypothesis about the inference from specific
to non-specific is that in negative contexts, where simplifica-
tion is clearly not valid but the inverse of it is, we
should find that the relationship between specific and non-
specific readings is reversed, i.e. that there is some
temptation to infer the specific reading from the non-specific,
though no temptation to infer the non-specific from the specific.
Before going into details I should make clear what I do not
mean by this. Since in general if p entails q, then (not q)
entails (not p), where the specific reading does entail the
non-specific, the negation of the non-specific reading should
entail the negation of the specific. Thus since the argument (175)
is valid, then the argument:
(183) It is false that Mary believes there is a fish in the
pond.
Therefore it is false that there is a fish that Mary
believes is in the pond.
is also valid. Since the argument:
(184) There is a fish that John wants to catch.
Therefore John wants there to be a fish that he catches.
is not valid, we should not expect the argument:
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(185) It is false that John wants there to be a fish that
he catches.
Therefore it is false that there is a fish that John
wants to catch.
to be valid either. This is a straightforward fact about the
truth conditions on conditional statements, and is not
especially connected with opaque contexts.
The hypothesis that I wish to consider is based on the
fact that while simplification within negative contexts is
invalid, i.e. the argument:
(186) Not (p & q).
Therefore not p.
is invalid, the converse argument:
(187) Not p.
Therefore not (p & q).
is valid. We should therefore expect the argument:
(188) John believes that not (p & q).
Therefore John believes that not p.
to be invalid, but the argument:
(189) John believes that not p.
Therefore John believes that not (p & q).
might conceivably be valid. Similarly for the 'negative'
verb doubts, it is clear that the argument:
(190) John doubts that (p & q).
Therefore John doubts that p.
is invalid, but there is some plausibility to the converse
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argument:
(191) John doubts that p.
Therefore John doubts that (p & q).
Analogous examples for the specific/non-specific
contrast rather than overt conjunctions are:
(192) John doubts that he killed a spider.
which has the readings:
(193) There is a spider that John doubts that he killed.
(194) John doubts that there is a spider that he killed.
and here too, the argument from (193) to (194) is quite
obviously invalid while the argument from (194) to (193) has
some plausibility. With negative verbs, that is to say, if
either reading entails the other, it is the non-specific that
entails the specific. I think it can be argued, however,
that just as the specific reading does not really entail the
non-specific in positive contexts, though it might appear
to, so the non-specific reading does not really entail the
specific in negative contexts, though it might appear to.
For example, the argument from (194) to (193) is not really
valid, since to doubt p means to believe (or suspect, etc.)
that not p, and not simply not to believe that p. And John
might have no opinions about any particular spider at all,
thus (193) might be false, even though (194) is true.
Though the predicted inversion of the relationship
between specific and non-specific readings thus does appear
to hold for negative opaque verbs, there are enormous
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complexities in the interpretation of sentences containing
a negative element as well as an indefinite noun phrase in
an opaque context that I can only begin to touch on here.
There are scope ambiguities in sentences with negation
and indefinite noun phrases, even in transparent contexts.
Thus the sentence:
(195) John did not kill a spider. (It is false that John
killed a spider.)
can be taken to mean either that there is a spider that
John did not kill, or that it is false that there is a spider
that John killed. (This contrast is very like, if not identi-
cal to, the specific/non-specific contrast in opaque
contexts, but I shall not attempt here to give a general
account of indefinite noun phrases in negative contexts or to
define this connection.) There are also scope ambiguities
in sentences with both negation and certain opaque verbs,
even without indefinite noun phrases. Thus the sentence:
(196) John does not believe that p.
may be taken to mean either that John believes that it is
false that p, or else that it is false that John believes
that p. (See Klima, Negation in English, for further discussion.)
Putting these ambiguities together with the familiar specific/
non-specific ambiguity of indefinite noun phrases in opaque
contexts, we would predict that the sentence:
(197) John does not believe that he killed a spider.
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has the six readings:
(198) a. There is a spider such that it is false that John
believes he killed it.
b. It is false that there is a spider that John believes
he killed.
c. It is false that John believes there is a spider
that he killed.
d. There is a spider that John believes he did not kill.
e. John believes it is false that there is a spider
that he killed.
f. John believes that there is a spider that he did
not kill.
The reader may satisfy himself that the sentence has all of
these readings except the last. The absence of this reading
shows that 'Neg-hopping' cannot operate across a specificity
operator; the string:
(199) John believes (Sx) Neg Fx.
cannot be converted into:
(200) John doesn't believe (Sx) Fx.
although for a string in which the specificity operator does
not intervene between the verb and the Neg, for example:
(201) (Sx) John believes Neg Fx.
'Neg-hopping' does apply, to give:
(202) (Sx) John doesn't believe Fx.
I also point out in passing that there are interactions
between the specificity operator and 'negative' verbs such as
-It
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doubt. It has already been remarked that doubt p means
something like believe not p (or perhaps suspect not p, etc.)
rather than not believe that p. The negation, that is to say,
is interpreted as internal to the opaque context. The
sentence:
(203) John doubts that he killed a spider.
therefore should only have three of the readings of (198),
in particular the readings d, e and f. However, there is a
further constraint that excludes the last of these. The
specificity operator cannot be interpreted as intervening
between the believe and the negation element that are combined
in the word doubt. There is no reading, that is, which
corresponds to:
(204) John believes (Sx) Neg Fx.
It has just been observed that for negative opaque
verbs, the usual relationship between specific and non-
specific readings is reversed. There is another type of
example for which the non-specific reading appears, at
least at first sight, to entail the specific. This is the
case of factive opaque verbs, but here we also find the
usual temptation to infer the non-specific reading from
the specific. In this case, therefore, it is not that the
usual logical relationship is reversed, but that the two
readings virtually fall together, since there is a temptation
to infer each from the other. The sentence:
128
(205) John regrets having killed a spider.
for example, is ambiguous with respect to specificity. There may
be a particular spider that John regrets having killed -- your
pet tarantula, perhaps. Or it may be thit John regrets the fact
that there is a spider that he killed. But the ambiguity
of this sentence is apparently harder for speakers to detect
than the ambiguity of a sentence like:
(206) John wants to kill a spider.
and even when one has observed that it is ambiguous, the two
readings seem much less distinct.
The argument from non-specific to specific in a case
like (205) rests on the fact that both readings presuppose:
(207) John killed a spider.
This sentence does not contain an opaque context, and is not
ambiguous with respect to specificity. If John killed a spider
then there is a spider that John killed. But if John regrets
having killed a spider, and his having killed a spider
is his having killed a certain spider, then it seems to
follow that John regrets having killed a certain spider. This
argument, however, is not valid and for much the same reasons as
simplification in opaque contexts is not valid. For John might
regret having killed a spider and yet, having done so, be quite
indifferent to which particular spider he killed; he regrets
having killed that spider only inasmuch as it involves having
killed a spider, and he might in fact be quite relieved that,
having killed a spider, it was that one that he killed. Notice'
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that there are differences among factive verbs as to the extent
to which the readings tend to fall together. The difference
between the two readings of:
(208) John knows that he killed a spider.
or of:
(209) John admitted having killed a spider.
is much more apparent than for (205), and the temptation to
infer the specific reading from the non-specific is much
less. This difference will be discussed in more detail
at the end of Chapter III, in connection with the relationship
between definite noun phrases and indefinite ones, particularly
the relationship between a sentence such as (205) and the
sentence:
(210) John regrets having killed the spider that he killed.
-U
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CHAPTER III. OPACITY AND DEFINITE NOUN PHRASES.
Section 1. The referential/attributive ambiguity.
Since indefinite noun phrases are ambiguous in opaque
contexts, and since there obviously exist syntactic and
semantic connections between indefinite and definite noun
phrases, it is natural to ask whether definite noun phrases
exhibit a similar kind of scope ambiguity in opaque contexts.
And it is possible, in fact, to distinguish (at least) two
readings of a sentence such as:
(1) John wants to talk to the boy who failed the exam.
This sentence can be taken to mean that John wants to meet a
certain boy, a boy who happens, as a matter of fact, to be
the one boy who failed the exam. The sentence can also be
taken to describe the situation in which there is no-one
independently specifiable that John wants to talk to --
he simply wants to talk to whichever boy it was who failed
the exam.
This ambiguity is much less striking than the specific/
non-specific ambiguity of indefinite noun phrases; the
difference between the two readings is not so great. It was
pointed out in the previous chapter that a question such as:
(2) Which boy does John want to talk to?
can be answered only if the specific reading of the corre-
sponding assertion:
(3) John wants to talk to a boy.
is true. If sentence (3) is true only when read as
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non-specific, then the question (2) is unanswerable. But
this question is both appropriate and answerable given the
truth of either of the readings of sentence (1) that we are
interested in, and so the which-question criterion fails to
distinguish them. It is also true that the phrase:
(4) The boy John wants to talk to...
can be used properly only if sentence (3) is true on its
specific interpretation; if (3) is true only when interpreted
as non-specific then there is no-one to whom the phrase (4)
refers. Once again, however, this criterion fails to
distinguish the different readings of definite noun phrases.
The phrase (4) will have a referent if sentence (1) is true
on egther of the readings in question.
The ambiguity of definite noun phrases in opaque
contexts is therefore not identical to the specific/non-
specific ambiguity. In fact, both readings of (1) apparently
entail the specific reading of the sentence:
(5) John wants to talk to a boy.
that is:
(6) There is a boy that John wants to talk to.
(Note: It is possible to have some reservations about this
claim, and I shall discuss it again in more detail in
Section 8.) The notion of John's having a particular boy
in mind, however, which we used in the previous chapter to
distinguish between specific and non-specific readings,
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does serve to clarify the ambiguity of definite noun phrases.
According to one of the readings of sentence (1), which I
shall call the 'attributive' reading, John does not have any
particular boy in mind, but simply wants to talk to whoever
failed the exam. On the other reading, the 'referential'
reading, John does have a particular boy in mind as the boy
he wants to talk to, and the boy he has in mind is the boy
who failed the exam. However, if we are more precise, we
shall see that this notion of having someone in mind is being
used in a slightly different way in connection with definite
noun phrases than in connection with indefinite ones. The
specific reading of the sentence:
(7) John wants to talk to a boy who failed the exam.
implies that John has a certain boy in mind as the boy he
wants to talk to--he has decided which boy he wants to talk
to. The non-specific reading of (7), by contrast, does not
imply this. But both the referential and the attributive
reading of sentence (1) imply that John has a particular
boy in mind as the boy he wants to talk to. After all, as
pointed out above, for both readings there is an answer to
the question:
(8) Which boy does John want to talk to?
The difference between the referential and attributive readings
of sentence (1) is a matter of whether or not John has any
particular boy in mind as the boy who failed the exam. The
-U
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non-specific reading of (7) implies that there is no boy in
particular that John wants to talk to, that John has not
decided which boy who failed the exam he wants to talk to.
The attributive reading of (1), on the other hand, implies
that there is only one boy who failed the exam, and there
can therefore be no question of John's deciding which boy
who failed the exam he wants to talk to, but only of John's
knowing or not knowing which boy failed the exam. We must
therefore not conclude that the referential/attributive
ambiguity and the specific/non-specific ambiguity are the
same, simply on the grounds that the notion of having someone
particular in mind can be used in characterising both kinds
of ambiguity.
There is a relationship between the two ambiguities,
however, though it is an indirect one, and before I can
discuss it, I must try to distinguish the referential/attributive
ambiguity from the other ambiguity mentioned in Chapter I,
the ambiguity of the descriptive content of noun phrases.
Even if John does have a particular boy in mind as a boy he
wants to talk to, and this boy is, in fact, the boy who
failed the exam, it can still be maintained that the sentence:
(9) John wants to talk to the boy who failed the exam.
is false, if John does not realise that the boy he has in
mind is the boy who failed the exam, that is, if he does not
recognise the description 'the boy who failed the exam' as
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a description of the boy he has in mind. This question,
the question of whether the description used in the sentence
is one which John does or does not recognise as a description
of the person (or thing) in question, is the topic of the
next chapter and, although it will not be easy, I want to
avoid any further discussion of it in the present chapter.
I shall therefore assume, throughout this chapter, that the
descriptive content of the ambiguous noun phrase is true of
someone or something, that John (in general, the subject of
the opaque verb) knows that it is true of someone or some-
thing, and that if either he or the speaker is supposed to
have an opinion as to who it is true of, then his opinion
is correct. That is, as far as the present chapter is con-
cerned, I shall disregard the dependence of the truth value
of a sentence on the particular description under which
something is referred to. It should be clear that the
referential/attributive ambiguity is still present in a
sentence such as (9), even when the ambiguity of descriptive
content is thus factored out.
Bearing this in mind, we can now say that the
referential and attributive readings of sentence (9) differ
with respect to whether John is supposed to have an opinion
as to which boy failed the exam. The attributive reading
implies only that John knows that a boy did fail the exam;
the referential reading implies that he knows of some boy
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that he failed the exam. Thus the attributive reading
requires the truth of the non-specific reading of:
(10) John knows that a boy failed the exam.
that is, the truth of:
(11) John knows that there is a boy who failed the exam.
But the referential reading requires the truth of the specific
reading of (10), that is, the truth of:
(12) There is a boy whom John knows failed the exam.
Hintikka (Knowledge and Belief, Chapter 6) relates the
distinction between pairs like (11) and (12) to the notion
of 'knowing who'. The truth of (12) warrants the claim
that John knows who (which boy) failed the exam, but the
truth of (11) does not. The concept of 'knowing who' will be
discussed in more detail in Section 6 of this chapter. It
may be noted here, however, that there is another kind of
paraphrase which also apparently picks up the same distinction.
The specific reading of an indefinite noun phrase is some-
times distinguished from the non-specific reading by para-
phrasing it with an of phrase, thus:
(13) John knows of a boy that he failed the exam.
picks out the specific reading of sentence (10). The same
kind of paraphrase can also be used to distinguish the
referential from the attributive reading of a definite noun
phrase. Thus:
(14) John wants of the boy who failed the exam to talk to him.
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though it is not very elegant English, apparently picks out
the referential reading of sentence (9) at the expense of
the attributive reading. (With verbs such as believes, hopes,
expects, rather than wants, the of NP paraphrase is often a
perfectly grammatical sentence.)
Section 2. The referential/attributive distinction as a
scope phenomenon.
Although the referential/attributive distinction is,
semantically, a different distinction from the specific/
non-specific one, the general formal properties of the two
phenomena are apparently the same. If there are two or more
definite noun phrases in a complement clause, their inter-
pretations with respect to the referential/attributive
distinction are independent. Thus the sentence:
(15) John thinks that the boy who failed the exam kicked
the examiner.
can be read in any one of four ways, depending on whether
John is supposed to have a particular boy in mind as the
boy who failed the exam and whether he is supposed to have
a particular person in mind as the examiner. The number
of possible readings of a sentence also depends on the
number of embedded complement clauses. For example, the
sentence:
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(16) Mary thinks John wants to talk to the boy who failed
the exam.
can be taken to mean (a) Mary has in mind the boy who failed
the exam and she thinks that John wants to talk to him, (b)
Mary thinks that whichever boy failed the exam is such that
John wants to talk to him, or (c) Mary thinks that John
simply wants to talk to whichever boy failed the exam. Just
as for the specific/non-specific distinction, there appears
to be no fourth reading of the kind that a feature analysis
of the phenomenon would predict, viz. that Mary has a particu-
lar boy in mind as the boy who failed the exam, and she
thinks that John does not have any particular boy in mind
but simply wants to talk to whichever boy failed the exam.
Hence the oddity of:
(17) Mary thinks of the boy who failed the exam that John wants
to talk to whichever boy failed the exam.
Arguments analogous to those of Section 1 of Chapter II
for indefinite noun phrases can therefore be given to estab-
lish that the referential/attributive distinction is a matter
of scope relationships, and that the readings should be
distinguished formally in terms of the position of some
operator which defines the scope of the noun phrase. Using
the arbitrary symbol (Tx) temporarily in the role of the
referentiality operator, sentence (16) will thus have the
three possible representations:
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(18) (Tx) Mary thinks John wants John talk to (the boy who
failed the exam) .
(19) Mary thinks (Tx) John wants John talk to (the boy who
failed the exam) .
(20) Mary thinks John wants (Tx) John talk to (the boy who
failed the exam) .
The terms 'referential' and 'attributive' are therefore
misleading in just the same way as the terms 'specific' and
'non-specific', for they suggest, incorrectly, that there is
just a two-way distinction to be made. In fact, since the
degree of ambiguity depends on the degree of embedding, we
shall want to talk of a noun phrase being referential or
attributive with respect to certain of the clauses of a
sentence and not with respect to others.
I have taken over the terms 'referential' and
'attributive' from Donnellan (Reference and Definite
Descriptions, Phil.Review, 1966), and to avoid possible
confusions, I should make it clear that the distinction I
have drawn between referential and attributive readings of
definite noun phrases in opaque contexts is not in fact the
same distinction as Donnellan draws in his paper, though it
is very closely related to it. Donnellan discusses the
sentence:
(21) Smith's murderer is insane.
(Note: The phrase Smith's murderer does not contain the
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definite article, but it is reasonable to call it a definite
description since it is synonymous with the phrase the person
who murdered Smith, and is, in any case, definite according
to all the usual syntactic criteria.) Donnellan describes
two ways in which this phrase, and thus the sentence (21),
can be used. He says (pp.285-6):
Suppose first that we come upon poor Smith foully
murdered. From the brutal manner of the killing
and the fact that Smith was the most lovable
person in the world, we might exclaim, "Smith's
murderer is insane." I will assume, to make it a
simpler case, that in a quite ordinary sense we
do not know who murdered Smith (though this is not
in the end essential to the case). This, I shall
say, is an attributive use of the definite
description.
The contrast with such a use of the sentence
is one of those situations in which we expect
and intend our audience to realize whom we have in
mind when we speak of Smith's murderer and, most
importantly, to know that it is this person about
whom we are going to say something.
For example, suppose that Jones has been
charged with Smith's murder and has been placed
on trial. Imagine that there is a discussion of
Jones's odd behavior at his trial. We might sum
up our impression of his behavior by saying,
"Smith's murderer is insane." If someone asks to
whom we are referring, by using this description,
the answer here is "Jones." This, I shall say, is
a referential use of the definite description.
To distinguish the referential use from the attributive use,
Donnellan also talks of the speaker having some particular
person in mind, or of meaning someone in particular. Thus
Donnellan's distinction is very similar to the distinction
we made above in connection with the sentence:
(22) John wants to talk to the boy who failed the exam.
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when we said that this sentence either might or might not
be taken to mean that John has a particular boy in mind.
Notice, however, that Donnellan's example, sentence (21),
does not contain an opaque context. The existence of two
distinct ways of using a definite noun phrase is not supposed
to be tied to opaque contexts but to be a feature of definite
noun phrases in general. Furthermore, Donnellan explicitly
says that he does not regard sentence (21) as an ambiguous
sentence, but as an unambiguous sentence that can be used
in two different ways (to make two different statements,
which may differ in truth value). By contrast, the examples
that we discussed above all involved opaque contexts, and
the referential/attributive distinction drawn there was
intended to be a distinction between possible readings of
these sentences, that is, the sentences were claimed to be
ambiguous.
The relationship between Donnellan's distinction,
and the distinction between referential and attributive
readings of a definite noun phrase in an opaque context.,
can be brought out as follows. Suppose that John utters
the sentence (21), viz:
(23) Smith's murderer is insane.
Now since John could, according to Donnellan, have been using
this sentence in two different ways, to make either of two
different statements, then there are presumably two different
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things that John might have been thinking, and the sentence:
(24) John thinks that Smith's murderer is insane.
will be ambiguous, since it can be taken to report either
of these distinct thoughts. Thus what appears as a
distinction between uses of a phrase in a transparent con-
text, such as (23), and is a matter of whether or not the
speaker has any particular person in mind, appears as a
distinction between possible readings of a phrase in an
opaque context, such as (24), and is a matter of whether
or not the subject of the opaque verb is supposed to have
a particular person in mind.
Of course, since the sentence (24) itself contains
the phrase Smith's murderer, we should expect the distinction
between referential and attributive uses to show up here
too, as well as the referential/attributive ambiguity. And
this is in fact the case, at least for the referential
reading of (24). On this reading, I, the speaker, mean to
convey that John has a particular person in mind as the
person who murdered Smith, but it can still be asked whether
I have any particular person in mind, that is, whether I
am using the phrase referentially or attributively in
Donnellan's sense. Those linguists who maintain that a
'performative clause' sits atop the underlying representation
of any sentence have a natural way of distinguishing all
of these possibilities. The sentence (24) is supposed to
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be equivalent to:
(25) I say to you that John thinks that Smith's murderer
is insane.
and in representations based on (25) there will be three
possible positions for the referentiality operator (Tx).
Thus:
(26) (Tx) I say to you that John thinks that (Smith's
murderer) is insane.
(27) I say to you (Tx) John thinks that (Smith's murderer)
x
is insane.
(28) I say to you that John thinks (Tx) (Smith's murderer)x
is insane.
The difference between (26) and (27) is Donnellan's
distinction between the two ways in which the speaker might
use the phrase Smith's murderer; the difference between (27)
and (28) is the difference between the referential and
attributive readings of the phrase Smith's murderer in an
opaque context. The 'performative clause' analysis is
useful here in illustrating the continuity between these
two distinctions, but it seems to me to be a weakness of
this analysis that it does not permit a distinction to be
drawn between differences of use and differences of meaning,
but assimilates the former to the latter.
Donnellan goes into the distinction between referential
and attributive uses of definite noun phrases in considerable
-.
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detail in his paper, and I hope that his exposition will
clarify, at second hand, the nature of the distinction
between referential and attributive readings of definite noun
phrases in opaque contexts. It is the latter, however,
which we shall be primarily concerned with in this chapter.
The task, just as in the previous chapter, is to provide
formal representations of the different readings. We have
already established that the general form of these repre-
sentations must be like (18)-(20), with a scope operator to
indicate referentiality. I shall now consider the possibility
of identifying this abstract scope operator with some more
familiar constituent of semantic representations.
Section 3. Definite noun phrases and the universal quantifier.
In the previous chapter, we considered identifying
the arbitrary specificity operator (Sx) with the existential
quantifier of formal logic, or with its linguistic counter-
part. This was a natural hypothesis to explore because the
existential quantifier is used in formalising sentences with
indefinite noun phrases in non-opaque contexts. We may
consider identifying the abstract referentiality operator,
then, with whatever device is used for formalising sentences
containing definite noun phrases in non-opaque contexts.
This is not such a straightforward matter as for
indefinite noun phrases, however, for even in formal logic,
144
yet alone in linguistics, there is some disagreement as to
how definite noun phrases should be formally represented.
Russell (On Denoting, Mind 1905) maintained that a sentence
like:
(29) The present king of France is bald.
should be regarded as of a form which I shall render roughly
as:
(30) (2x) (x is presently king of France & (y) (either y is
presently king of France or y = x) & x is bald).
This is even more roughly rendered in English as:
(31) There is someone who is presently king of France and
no-one else is presently king of France (i.e. everyone
either is that person or else is not the king of France),
and the person in question is bald.
Thus the analysis contains an explicit existential clause
to the effect that there is a present king of France, and
an explicit uniqueness clause to the effect that there is
only one king of France. If either of these conditions is
not met, then the sentence (29) must be regarded, on this
analysis, as false. Thus if there is no king of France or
if there is more than one king of France, then it is false
that the king of France is bald.
Strawson (On Referring, Mind 1950) maintains that
this is incorrect, and that although indeed sentence (29)
is not true if there is no king of France or more than one,
it is not false either. Strawson introduced the notion of
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a presupposition of a statement, a presupposition being a
proposition that must be true in order that the statement
should be either true or false. Thus we can regard the
existence and uniqueness conditions of Russell's analysis
as the presuppositions of (29), that is, as necessary condi-
tions for either the truth or falsity of (29). The 'baldness'
clause in the analysis of (29) will represent what (29)
actually asserts, and is thus a necessary condition for the
truth, though not the falsity, of (29). On this analysis, (29)
is true if and only if there is one and only one king of
France and he is bald, and it is false if and only if there is
one ai only one king of France and he is not bald. If there
is no king of France or more than one, (29) is assigned no
truth value at all.
It is not at all clear from the philosophical litera-
ture on presuppositions what their status is supposed to be
with respect to representations of logical form. Should they
be explicitly represented in formulae? If so, then they
must presumably be marked in some way as presuppositions
rather than as straightforward entailments, since their
contribution to the truth value of the proposition is different
from the contribution of straightforward entailments. Even
if they are so marked, notice that the formula expressing
the conditions for the truth of a statement will not be
simply the negation of the formula expressing the conditions
- - ~-~-----
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for its falsity, or the conditions for the truth of its
contradiction. Only those parts of the formula which
correspond to straighforward entailments rather than to
presuppositions, must be negated in order to derive the
conditions for the falsity of the statement. The necessary
conditions for the truth of a statement and the necessary
conditions for the truth of its contradiction overlap, since
the presuppositions of the statement are necessary conditions
for both. Therefore if the presuppositions are included in
the representations of logical form, we lose the usual simple
relationship between negation and contradiction. If, on the
other hand, it is assumed that the presuppositions of a
statement are not to be included in the formula representing
its logical form, then, since the presuppositions are rele-
vant to its truth value, and to what can be inferred from it,
either it must be possible to apply certain rules to the
representation of logical form to generate the presuppositions,
or else the presuppositions must be explicitly stated else-
where in some fashion or other.
To deal with this topic satisfactorily would require
a thesis to itself and I shall not spend any more time on
it here. Some decision has to be made if we are to proceed
any further, however, and since, as I shall show shortly,
it seems possible in the case of definite noun phrases to
predict their presuppositions on the basis of formal
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representations which do not express them explicitly, I
shall assume that they are not to be included directly in
our semantic representations. Thus (30) is not the kind of
representation we need for (29); the existence and uniqueness
clauses of (30) have to be dropped. There is no way of
simply dropping them out of (30) and retaining what is left,
but we can get the same effect if we observe that (30) is
logically equivalent to:
(32) (3x) (x is presently king of france & (y) (either y is
presently king of France or y = x)) & (z)(z is
presently king of France3z is bald)
which can be read into English as roughly: There is someone
who is presently king of France and no-one else is presently
king of France, and anyone who is presently king of France
is bald. Thus the 'baldness' clause has been taken out of
the scope of the existential quantifier and expressed as a
conditional statement universally quantified. We can now
omit the whole of the existentially quantified expression
from (32). It expresses the presupposition of sentence (29),
and what is left is:
(33) (z) (z is presently king of France:3 z is bald)
which is a plausible representation of what (29) is supposed
actually to assert rather than presuppose.
Taking (33) as our representation of (29), we can
actually predict the existence presupposition of (29),
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because the universal quantifier is also claimed to presuppose
existence. Strawson (Introduction to Logical Theory, p.173ff.)
considers a situation in which someone says:
(34) All John's children are asleep.
and he comments: "Obviously he will not normally, or properly,
say this, unless he believes that John has children (who are
asleep). But suppose he is mistaken. Suppose John has no
children. Then is it true or false that all John's children
are asleep? Either answer would seem to be misleading. But
we are not compelled to give either answer. We can, and
normally should, say that, since John has no children, the
question does not arise." That there should exist children
of John's is thus to be regarded as a presupposition of (34),
and of any statement involving the phrase all John's children.
If (34) is represented as:
(35) (x) (x is a child of John's 2" x is asleep).
then we can express the presupposition as that the ante-
cedent of the conditional should not be vacuous. And by
analogy with this, we can state that a presupposition of
the statement represented by (33) is that someone should
be presently king of France.
Although I have quoted this example of Strawson's,
I think some comment is needed. The phrase John's children
seems to be equivalent to the children of John, and thus
itself to be definite. If this is true, that is, if (34)
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can also be expressed as:
(36) All of the children of John are asleep.
then the presupposition of existence might be due to the
presence of the definite article in (36), rather than to the
presence of the word all. In other words, representing
definite descriptions by means of the universal quantifier
might not allow us to predict the existence presupposition
after all, because Strawson's illustration of the existence
presupposition of the universal quantifier might not in fact
demonstrate that the universal quantifier carries a pre-
supposition of existence, but only that a universal quantifier
together with a definite description carries a presupposition
of existence. What we need is an example with a universal
quantifier but no definite description (and nothing equivalent
to one) and then we can ask whether the universal quantifier
does indeed, all on its own, carry a presupposition of
existence. Thus we might consider the example:
(37) All children like ice-cream.
represented as:
(38) (x) (x is a child M x likes ice-cream).
As normally used, sentence (37) does suggest that there are
children, and it would be an odd thing for someone to say
if he thought that no children existed. We must be careful,
for the formula (38) is usually assumed also to be readable
as: Anything which is a child likes ice-cream, if anything
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is a child then it likes ice-cream, and so on, and it is not
quite so clear that these sentences presuppose the existence
of children. There can be some doubt, therefore, as to the
validity of the claim that statements of the form All x is y
invariably presuppose the existence of some x's. If this
claim is correct, however, then whatever decision we make as
to how to represent this presupposition of the universal
quantifier, using the universal quantifier to represent
definite noun phrases will predict the existence presupposi-
tion of definite noun phrases.
The other presupposition of (29), the presupposition
of uniqueness, will also, I think, turn out to be predictable
from our semantic representations, though it is not predictable
within standard systems of logic. In logic no singular/
plural distinction is made. Even the existential quantifier
is to be read as'there is at least one...', rather than as
'there is exactly one...'. If it is required to represent a
statement to the effect that there is exactly one thing that
is F, then an explicit uniqueness clause is required, as
in (30), which says that nothing other than that thing is F.
If we want to epxress the fact that there are exactly two
things that are F, then we must use two existential quantifiers
together with a clause saying that nothing else is F. The
singular/plural distinction (or a singular/dual/plural
distinction) is, on the other hand, one of the most common
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and fundamental of distinctions found in natural languages,
and an adequate system of semantic representation for natural
languages will surely employ such a distinction. If so,
then the uniqueness presupposition of a singular definite
description such as the present king of France will follow
automatically from the fact that the noun phrase is singular
and yet is to be read as universally quantified. The present
king of France will be rendered as something like all one king
of France, and though there is no such surface form in English,
it is exactly parallel to the grammatical phrases: all three
kings of France, all four kings of France, all ninety-seven
kings of France, etc.. (Note that if there are two kings of
France we would use the word both rather than all, which
suggests that even in English there is a trace of a dual
category.) This will bring the presupposition of uniqueness
of the singular definite noun phrase into line with the
numerical presuppositions of the three kings of France, the
four kings of France, etc., and also with the many kings of
France, etc.. (The simple plural definite noun phrase the
kings of France, with no quantity expression, carries a
presupposition of existence but none of uniqueness or of any
other number; if we spell out its presuppositions, analogous-
ly to the singular phrase, as: there are people who are
kings of France and no-one else is, it is clear that the
'and no-one else is' here is doing no work.)
INM
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The hypothesis that we are considering, that the
should be represented by means of the universal quantifier,
like all and every, is a plausible one even disregarding
the philosophical literature on definite descriptions, for
the actual surface forms of English suggest it. We found it
helpful earlier to paraphrase definite noun phrases by means
of whoever... or whichever.... Thus the attributive reading
of our original example is brought out by the paraphrase:
(39) John wants to talk to whoever (whichever boy) failed
the exam.
Though I shall not argue for it in detail here, the most
plausible derivational source for these words is everyone
who..., everything which..., every N which.... Thus the
conclusion reached on the basis of the logical behaviour of
definite phrases looks as if it will also provide a
satisfactory syntactic analysis.
In the previous chapter we considered the identifica-
tion of the specificity operator for indefinite noun phrases
with the existential quantifier. We are now considering the
identification of the referentiality operator for definite
noun phrases with the universal quantifier, and we have just
seen some reasons for regarding this identification as an
attractive one. However, the universal quantifier is usually
assumed to correspond to words like all, every, each, any,
in English, and not to the definite article. We must
-- in- -
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therefore examine the behaviour of these words in opaque
contexts, to make sure that the idea of representing definite
noun phrases with the universal quantifier does not conflict
with anything we need to say about all, etc..
Section 4. All, every, each, and opaque contexts.
The sentence:
(40) John wants to talk to every boy in the room.
is ambiguous in very much the way that sentence (1) above is
ambiguous. It can be taken as saying that there are certain
boys whom John wants to talk to and that these boys are (or
at least include) every boy in the room. Or it can be taken
as saying that, assuming there are boys in the room, John
wants it to be true that he has talked to every one of them.
This ambiguity, however, co-exists in (40) with another
ambiguity which is characteristic of the word every even in
transparent contexts. This is the collective/distributive
ambiguity. Unambiguous examples can be constructed, such
as:
(41) Every boy in the room saw John.
which is distributive and can be paraphrased as:
(42) Each boy in the room saw John.
and:
(43) John was surrounded by every boy in the room.
which is collective and does not entail:
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(44) John was surrounded by each boy in the room.
There are also ambiguous examples, with verbs which represent
actions which can be undertaken either individually or
collectively, such as:
(45) Every boy in the room sang the national anthem.
but in such a case, both the collective and the distributive
readings entail:
(46) Each boy in the room sang the national anthem.
and the difference is simply a matter of whether or not they
sang it together.FN Sentence (40) can similarly be taken
as meaning that John wants to talk to each boy in the room
individually, or as meaning that he wants to talk to all
the boys together. I think it is clear that both of these
readings are still ambiguous with respect to whether John
has any particular boys in mind or whether he simply wants
to talk to whichever boys are in the room.
Since we wish to represent this latter ambiguity
(which I shall call a referential/attributive ambiguity,
FN. It appears that some speakers deny that the collective
reading of (45) entails (46). This is similar to the situ-
ation for examples like John and Mary went to the store
which can be taken to mean either that they went together
or that each went separately. There are speakers who main-
tain that the 'together' reading does not entail John went to
the store, although the 'separately' reading obviously does.
To my mind both readings quite clearly do have this entail-
ment, and the example thus differs from John and Mary met,
since John met is ungrammatical. This difference between
what one might call 'necessarily collective' and 'contingently
collective' examples is not, however, central to my
discussion.
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just as for noun phrases with the definite article) by means
of the scope of the universal quantifier, it would be as
well to make sure that the collective/distributive ambiguity
is not going to require the same kind of formal representa-
tion, for since the ambiguities are distinct we obviously
cannot represent both in the same way. The sentence:
(47) John showed all of the boys a picture.
can be represented in the two following ways, with differing
scope relations, (b = boys, p = picture)
(48) (b) (Ep) (John showed p to b).
(49) (Ep) (b) (John showed p to b).
The collective reading of (47) clearly cannot be represented
by means of (48), for (48) is consistent with John's having
shown each boy a different picture. If either formula is
to be used for the collective reading, then, it must be (47),
and (48) must be reserved for the reading: each boy is such
that there is a picture that John showed him. However,
there is another possible reading of (47), the reading:
there is a picture such that John showed it to each boy
individually. This is a distributive reading but involves
only one picture. The formula (48) obviously does not capture
this reading, and so we are left with (49) for both the
collective and distributive readings when only one picture
is involved. The conclusion must be that quantifier position
does not capture the collective/distributive contrast. It
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is in fact fairly clear that it is the collective reading
which this type of representation fails to capture. Although
the collective reading of (47) seems to entail that there
is a picture that John showed to each of the boys, the
collective reading of (50):
(50) John gave all of the boys a picture.
does not entail that there is a picture that John gave to
each of the boys, because if he had given it to one, he could
not have given it to anyone else. But the counterpart of (49),
viz:
(51) (Ep) (b) (John gave p to b).
would conventionally be taken to entail that John gave the
picture to each of the boys.
Some other type of scope analysis of the collective/
distributive contrast may be possible. One might, for example,
try to capture the collective reading in terms of there being
just one instance or event of giving, rather than a number of
such events. Thus one might base an analysis on paraphrases
like:
(52) There was an event which was such that everyone was
such that John gave him a picture.
(53) Everyone is such that there was an event such that
John gave him a picture.
However, (52), at least when expressed in formal logical
symbols, still apparently entails that John gave each person
a picture. I can at present see no way of patching up this
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analysis satisfactorily. Rather than digress any longer on
the proper analysis of the collective/distributive distinction,
however, I shall take it as shown that, however this distinc-
tion is to be captured formally, it will not be in terms of
the scope of the universal quantifier. Thus we are free to
use the scope of this quantifier to capture the referential/
attributive distinction.
The referential/attributive ambiguity of a sentence
like (40) can be regarded, just like the referential/attributive
ambiguity of definite noun phrases, as a matter of whether or
not John is supposed to know who is in the room. Thus John
may want to talk to every boy in the room, in the attributive
sense, simply on the assumption that there are boys in the
room, and without knowing who they are. Taken referentially,
however, if it is true of every boy in the room that John
wants to talk to him, then John must presumably have some
particular boys in mind as the boys who are in the room.
There seems to be an interesting interaction between the
collective/distributive distinction, and this 'knowing who'
criterion for the referential sense. It seems to me, though
the intuition is not absolutely clear, that if (40) is taken
both as referential and as distributive, that is, as saying
that it is true of the boys in the room that John wants to
talk to each of them individually, then John must know who
is in the room in the sense of being able to list, or
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otherwise pick out, each boy who is in the room. If the
sentence is taken as referential and collective, on the other
hand, that is, as saying that it is true of the boys in the
room that John wants to address them collectively as a group,
it is sufficient for John to be able to designate in some
fashion what group of people is in the room, and not necessary
that he should know which individuals are in the group. Thus
John's knowing that it is the members of the botany club who
are in the room, even if he does not know who is a member of
the botany club, would seem to be sufficient for the collective
referential reading of (40), though not for the distributive
referential reading.
Since our original interest was whether noun phrases
with the definite article can be represented by means of the
universal quantifier, we should now consider definite noun
phrases in the light of these observations, and ask whether
the definite article has the same semantic properties as
every or all. In a wide range of examples, a collective
interpretation of a definite noun phrase is, if not obligatory,
at least much more natural than a distributive interpretation.
Thus the sentences:
(54) John gave the boys a picture.
(55) John talked to the boys.
would most naturally be interpreted, I think, as collective.
The distributive sense can be expressed by using each in
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conjunction with the definite article, as in:
(56) John gave the boys a picture each.
(57) John talked to each of the boys.
but if we wish to express the sense of (56) with the definite
article alone, without the aid of each, then we have to say:
(58) John gave the boys pictures.
and even this is not unambiguous. On the other hand, it is
possible to use a simple definite noun phrase with predicates
which can only be true of individuals and not of collections,
for example:
(59) The boys saw John.
(60) The boys craned their necks.
which shows that a distributive interpretation of the definite
article is not absolutely excluded. Assuming, then, that it
will be possible to state where and when a definite noun
phrase is collective or distributive, and assuming that some
means can be found for representing the collective/distributive
distinction, there seems to be nothing connected with this
distinction which would invalidate the representation of
definite noun phrases by means of the universal quantifier,
even though we also want to use this to represent all, each,
every, etc..
The proposal does run into trouble, however, of the
following kind. The sentence:
(61) John wants to have all the pictures.
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whether it is taken referentially or attributively, is com-
patible with John's already having some of the pictures,
(and is compatible with his knowing that he has). But it
would be odd to say:
(62) John wants to have the pictures.
if one were aware that John already had some of them. It
might be suggested that the explanation of this difference is
the tendency to interpret the simple definite article as
collective wherever possible, together with the fact that
John's having some of the pictures already is incompatible
with the collective interpretation of the sentence. It might
be argued that if John already has some of the pictures then
even if he were then to get the others, this would not count
as having them collectively. This explanation will not work,
however, because the difference between (61) and (62) also
shows up in (63) and (64):
(63) John had hoped to have all of the pictures.
(64) John had hoped to have the pictures.
The latter is odd if it is known that John did have some of
the pictures, but the former is quite acceptable, even if
interpreted as collective.
What seems to be going on in these examples is that
all can be used to contrast with some, but the cannot. And
this, of course, is true in general, and not only in opaque
contexts. Thus (65) is odd, though (66) is not.
(65) I didn't see the boys but I did see some of them.
-U
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(66) I didn't see all the boys but I did see some of them.
But the difference between the and all is more than just this.
Like many discussions of definite descriptions, the discussion
in Section 3 concentrated on singular definite noun phrases
at the expense of plural ones. And though analysing the king
of France as all one king of France looks both acceptable and
attractive, analysing the boys we met as all boys we met is
by no means so plausible. The sentence:
(67) The boys we met are orphans.
may be true only if all boys such that we met them are orphans,
but it is not obvious that it is false if not all boys such
that we met them are orphans. If you were to ask:
(68) Are the boys we met orphans?
it would be odd to reply:
(69) No, some of them are.
though this would be quite appropriate as an answer to the
question:
(70) Are all the boys we met orphans?
It is the same point, I think, which underlies the fact that
the only negation of (67) is:
(71) The boys we met are not orphans.
while the sentence:
(72) All the boys we met are orphans.
has the two negations:
(73) Not all the boys we met are orphans.
162
(74) All the boys we met are not orphans.
of which the former is obviously much the more natural.
It looks as though a simple definite noun phrase in the
plural not only does not contrast with some, but does not
even admit the possibility that the sentence might be true
of some but not all things of the kind described. Although
I suggested at the end of Section 3 that plural definite noun
phrases have no presupposition analogous to the presupposition
of uniqueness of singular definite noun phrases, the observa-
tions of the previous paragraph suggest that there is a
presupposition that the sentence is true either of all, or of
none, of the things that fall under the description contained
in a plural definite phrase. Treating this as a presupposition
will permit us to say that sentence (67) is not true if not
all the boys we met are orphans, but is not false either.
We can say that in those circumstances the sentence is neither
true nor false, and that there is likewise no straightforward
answer to the question (68). This is, in a sense, to say
that the boys we met is interpreted collectively, for it is
presupposed that the predicate are orphans is true of all of
them if it is true of any of them. But this interpretation
is 'collective' in a rather different sense from the one
with which we were concerned earlier. To see this one has
only to observe that a sentence such as:
(75) The boys sang the national anthem.
which has the 'all or none' presupposition, is still
-
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ambiguous between the boys' singing the national anthem
individually and their singing it together, that is, between
a distributive and a collective reading in the sense of the
earlier discussion.
If I am right about there being an 'all or none' pre-
supposition associated with plural definite noun phrases,
then it will not be possible after all to represent definite
noun phrases with the universal quantifier, since there is no
way, as far as I can see, of predicting this presupposition
as we were able to predict the uniqueness presupposition of
singular definite noun phrases. However, something very like
this presupposition seems also to be associated with generic
noun phrases. Thus the sentence:
(76) Women enjoy washing dishes.
will certainly be true if all women enjoy washing dishes, but
one hesitates to say it is false if not all women do.
Similarly the question:
(77) Do women enjoy washing dishes?
is not naturally answered by a straightforward 'no' simply
on the grounds that some women do not, though one could give
that answer to the question:
(78) Do all women enjoy washing dishes?
on those grounds. There is also only one negation of a
generic sentence like (76), viz:
(79) Women do not enjoy washing dishes.
which also, just like the affirmative statement, leaves no
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room for disagreements between different women about the
matter. This contrasts with the sentence:
(80) All women enjoy washing dishes.
which has the two negations:
(81) Not all women enjoy washing dishes.
(82) All women do not enjoy washing dishes.
There are further similarities between generic noun
phrases (at least, plural ones with no determiner) and
definite noun phrases. For example, a generic phrase, like a
definite one, is most natrually taken collectively. Thus the
sentence:
(83) Birds build a nest.
is rather odd, because it suggests that they build only one
between them; one would more naturally say:
(84) Birds build nests.
These examples should be compared with (54) and (58) above.
Parallel to (59) and (60), we also, however, have the distribu-
tive examples:
(85) Boys like John.
(86) Boys crane their necks (when girls go past).
Most importantly, however, generic and definite noun phrases
are similar in interpretation in opaque contexts too. Thus
the sentence:
(87) John wants to kill Russians.
exhibits the referential/attributive ambiguity but, like (62)
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and (64) above, does not show a contrast with some. Thus (87),
and especially:
(88) John had wanted to kill Russians.
are odd in the context of John's having already killed some
Russians.
These observations suggest that definite noun phrases
differ semantically from phrases with every, all, etc., in
just the way that generic noun phrases do. Therefore, however
generic phrases are to be represented formally (and this will
presumably not be by means of the universal quantifier), we
should represent definite noun phrases in the same fashion.
This would give us the advantages of the analysis in terms of
the universal quantifier which were outlined in the previous
section, but avoid the disadvantages of that analysis which
have been discussed in the present section. The referentiality
operator (Tx), then, is to be identified with whatever formal
device is used in representing generic phrases.
This identification does require, of course, either
that generic phrases and definite phrases be in free variation
or that they be in complementary distribution with some
general principle predicting which occurs where. In actual
fact we seem to have a mixture of both states of affairs.
There are contexts in which both generic and definite phrases
can appear, with little or no difference in sense, for example:
(89) Animals with backbones that we have examined have hearts.
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(90) The animals with backbones that we have examined have
hearts.
There are contexts in which a generic phrase may appear but
where a definite phrase is either deviant or must be taken
as elliptical, for example:
(91) Animals with backbones have hearts.
(92) The animals with backbones have hearts.
Sentence (92) requires, unlike (91), that a certain set of
animals be contextually indicated in some fashion. There
are also contexts in which definite phrases may appear, but
not generic ones, for example:
(93) The people in the next room are singing.
(94) People in the next room are singing.
Although (94) contains a plural noun phrase with no determiner,
this phrase cannot be interpreted as generic but is equivalent
to the phrase some people in the next room. Although I
cannot give a complete analysis of generic phrases here, the
principle at work in these examples is apparently that where
the set of things described by the noun phrase is a closed
set, a definite noun phrase is used; where the set is open,
a generic phrase is used. One way in which this difference
shows up is in the difference between sentences such as:
(95) The cows in this field wear bells.
(96) Cows in this field wear bells.
The latter sentence carries an implication of some kind that
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there is an essential connection between being a cow in this
field and wearing a bell, for example that it is because
they are in this field that the cows have, for some reason,
to wear bells, or perhaps that there is a rule that only cows
wearing bells are allowed into this field. And this suggests
that any other cow that is not in this field, if it were in
this field would also wear a bell. Sentence (95), by contrast,
carries no such implication, or at least far less of one; it
says only that cows which are in this field (and this is a
closed set of cows) wear bells.
I have one further point to make about the formal
representation of definite noun phrases. In Chapter II the
conjunctive analysis of noun phrases was discussed in some
detail, though virtually no evidence was found to support it.
In standard quantificational logic, something like the con-
junctive analysis is employed in connection with the universal
quantifier as well as the existential quantifier. For the
universal quantifier, however, the clause which represents
the lexical content of the noun phrase is not a conjunct in
the formula but a conditional clause. For example, the
sentence:
(97) All children like ice-cream.
is represented as:
(98) (x) (if x is a child then x likes ice-cream).
which in English is roughly:
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(99) Everything is such that if it is a child then it likes
ice-cream.
Now though (99) may be logically equivalent to (97), one
hesitates to say that they are synonymous. In particular, it
seems odd to say that sentence (97) is about everything,
as (98) suggests; it seems rather to be just about all children.
If we give up the conjunctive analysis of noun phrases, and
its counterpart for the universal quantifier, the conditional
analysis of noun phrases, then this counter-intuitive sugges-
tion is avoided. Furthermore, we have a uniform treatment
of the lexical content of all noun phrases, rather than two
quite different treatments for phrases with some and phrases
with all. Sentence (97) would be represented as:
(100) (x) (children) like ice-cream.
and only the nature of the quantifier differentiates this from
the representation of the corresponding sentence with some
rather than all. If the operator for generic phrases is
formally (though not semantically, of course) just like the
universal quantifier, the same point can be made in connection
with this generic operator. The connection between (97)
and (99), or between their generic counterparts, must then
be captured by an inference rule rather than by a grammatical
rule.
Section 5. Referential and attributive noun phrases and existence.
In Section 5 of Chapter II, we observed that in at least
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some cases, a sentence containing an indefinite noun phrase
which is within an opaque context but is interpreted trans-
parently (i.e. as specific), is not regarded as entailing
the existence of anything of the kind that the noun phrase
describes. Thus the sentence:
(101) John wants to catch a (certain) unicorn.
and even:
(102) There is a (certain) unicorn that John wants to catch.
are regarded by many speakers as quite compatible with the
non-existence of unicorns.
There were two kinds of case in particular for which
it seemed obvious that specificity does not entail existence.
One was the case of fictional or mythical entities, such as
unicorns. The other was the case of entities whose existence
is planned or projected, that is, which someone wants or
hopes or intends to create. An example of this second kind
is the sentence:
(103) I want you to dig a (certain) hole.
which, somewhat surprisingly, can be paraphrased as:
(104) There is a (certain) hole that I want you to dig.
For examples other than these two types, that is, examples
for which an existential interpretation is both possible and
plausible, it seemed less clear that an indefinite noun
phrase could be used without an existential implication.
Thus the sentence:
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(105) John wants to catch a (certain) mouse that lives in
my kitchen.
would normally be taken to imply that there is a mouse that
lives in my kitchen. There may be a weaker way of reading it,
as compatible with John's believing, incorrectly, that there
is a certain mouse living in my kitchen. There certainly
does seem to be such a reading of a sentence like:
(106) John wants to catch a (certain) mouse which he (mistaken-
ly) thinks lives in my kitchen.
that is, a reading compatible not only with John's being
wrong in thinking that the mouse he has in mind lives in my
kitchen, but compatible with his being wrong in thinking that
it exists at all.
So far I have simply summarized my remarks about
existence entailments of indefinite noun phrases in Chapter
II. I shall now consider the analogous question for definite
noun phrases, the question of whether definite noun phrases
have existential presuppositions in opaque contexts, as they
do in transparent ones. There are two parts to this question.
For indefinite noun phrases, the opaque (i.e. non-specific)
reading quite obviously does not entail the existence of
anything. The non-specific interpretation of:
(107) John wants to catch a unicorn.
is quite compatible with the non-existence of unicorns.
But for definite noun phrases it is not so obvious that the
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opaque (i.e. attributive) reading does not presuppose existence,
and so we must consider both the referential and attributive
readings of definite noun phrases in what follows. I shall
not consider, however, the case of definite predicate nominals
(by which, for present purposes, I mean any definite noun
phrase following the verb be or become). The presuppositions
of these phrases will be discussed in detail in Section 7.
Definite noun phrases describing familiar fictional or
mythical characters seem to be tolerated just as indefinite
noun phrases are. A sentence such as:
(108) John wants to meet the man in the moon.
could surely be true (i.e. neither false nor without truth
value) even though there isn't really any man in the moon.
Another example is the sentence:
(109) John believes that the seven dwarfs are alive and well
and living in Mexico.
It might seem doubtful that there could be a referential
reading of these sentences since no-one can actually be
acquainted with the man in the moon or the seven dwarfs.
Nevertheless it does not seem to follow that John could not
know who they are. If we are prepared to say that John
knows who the seven dwarfs are (were?), then we should also
be prepared, I think, to say:
(110) John believes of the seven dwarfs that they are alive
and well and living in Mexico.
Thus even a referential reading of (109) is compatible with
-U
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the referent of the noun phrase being only a fictional indi-
vidual. An example which shows that the attributive reading
is also compatible with merely fictional existence is:
(111) John wants to visit the town where Cinderella lived.
As far as I know, the Cinderella story does not specify which
town she lived in, so nobody could know which town it was.
Even so, sentence (111) may surely be true.
As pointed out in Chapter II, although it is clear
that noun phrases referring to fictional entities are tolerated,
it is not clear how to analyse sentences containing them. For
a completely transparent sentence, such as:
(112) The seven dwarfs were friends of Snow White.
one can account for its compatibility with the non-existence
of the seven dwarfs (and of Snow White) by treating the whole
sentence as if it were within the context of some phrase such
as 'Within the familiar story...'. But one cannot capture
the sense in which a sentence like (110) is true by regarding
it as an elliptical version of the sentence:
(113) In the familiar story, John believes of the seven dwarfs
that they are alive and well and living in Mexico.
or of the sentence:
(114) John believes of the seven dwarfs that in the familiar
story they are alive and well and living in Mexico.
One might, perhaps, paraphrase it as:
(115) John believes of the seven dwarfs of the familiar story
that they are alive and well and living in Mexico.
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with the reality-conceding phrase just within the noun phrase
itself, and not having scope over any other part of the
sentence. But this simply is, I think, to say that there
need be no real-world referent for the noun phrase in order
for the sentence to be true. It does not in any way explain
why one can believe something of something that does not
really exist although one cannot kick something that does
not exist. Allowing the 'story' operator to appear just
within the noun phrase does not explain why (115) might be
true but (116) is false.
(116) John kicked the seven dwarfs of the familiar story.
Opaque contexts with 'creative verbs tolerate non-
existence with definite noun phrases just as for indefinite
ones. Consider, for example, the sentence:
(117) I want you to build the largest wheelbarrow in the
world.
Unless by chance there are two or more wheelbarrows of the
same size, and larger than any other wheelbarrows, then there
must already be some wheelbarrow which is the largest wheel-
barrow in the world. But this is not the wheelbarrow I
want you to build. I want you to build a wheelbarrow that
does not yet exist. And, of course, since you may never
build such a wheelbarrow, the wheelbarrow I want you to
build may never exist. Nevertheless the sentence (117) may
be true. It appears, however, that it is only the attribu-
tive reading of (117) that tolerates merely planned existence
-E____________________________________ -~
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rather than actual existence. Paraphrasing the sentence
with of NP, which we have found brings out the referential
sense, gives:
(118) I want of the largest wheelbarrow in the world that
you should build it.
and this sentence is compatible only with my wanting,
illogically, that you should build what is already at this
minute the largest wheelbarrow in the world. This indicates
that the referential reading does presuppose existence, and
that it is only the attributive reading which does not. I
have been unable to find any examples with 'creative' verbs
for which this is not the case.
For noun phrases other than those describing familiar
fictional entities, and verbs other than 'creative' verbs,
it is very hard not to read an existential presupposition
into a sentence, whether it is taken attributively or
referentially. The sentence:
(119) John wants to talk to the man who broke the window.
does seem to presuppose that some man broke the window, which-
ever of the two readings we consider. I note in passing that
the uniqueness presupposition of definite noun phrases also
seems to be present. Thus the sentence:
(120) John wants to talk to the man in the next room.
would be an odd sentence for someone to use if he believed
there were several men in the next room, whatever John
-I
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believed. The situation for definite noun phrases is like
that for specific indefinites, where we observed that there
is, at the very least, an extremely strong tendency to read
the sentence as entailing existence. Just as for indefinite
noun phrases, however, it may just be possible to read the
sentence as entailing merely that John believes that something
of the kind in question exists, especially if the speaker
explicitly states that it does not really exist. Thus the
sentence (119) may be regarded as acceptable even if it is
widely known (though not to John) that no-one broke the window.
At least for the sentence:
(121) John wants to talk to the man he believes broke the
window.
there seems to be a weak reading which is compatible with
John's being mistaken that anyone broke the window, and even,
for the referential reading which says that he has a particular
man in mind, compatible with that man's not really existing.
So far, all of these observations about definite noun
phrases and existence presuppositions have paralleled those
for indefinite noun phrases and existence entailments. The
only significant departure is that the opaque (attributive)
reading of the definite may presuppose existence although
the opaque (non-specific) indefinite does not entail existence.
This is actually an important point, because what it means
is that the presuppositions of a definite noun phrase, even
-I___________________ -~ - - -----
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when the noun phrase is interpreted opaquely, are transparent.
Thus though we may represent the attributive reading of a
sentence like (120) as:
(121a) John wants (Tx) John talk to (the man in the next
room) 
.
and paraphrase it informally as:
(121b) John wants to talk to whichever man is in the next
room.
by contrast with:
(121c) (Tx) John wants John talk to (the man in the next
room) .
and:
(121d) Whichever man is in the next room is such that John
wants to talk to him.
nevertheless the existential and other presuppositions (i.e.
uniqueness for singular phrases, 'all-or-none' for plural
ones) of the definite noun phrase are not to be regarded as
solely within the scope of the opaque verb. It is not suffi-
cient for the truth of sentence (120), even on its attributive
reading, that John should want there to be one and only one
man in the next room and to talk to that man. And it is not
sufficient for John to believe that there is one and only
one man in the next room and want to talk to him. It must
be the case that there is one and only one man in the next
room and John wants to talk to whichever man is in the
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next room. Thus the sentence as a whole has these pre-
suppositions; the speaker is committed to the existence and
uniqueness implications himself and cannot use the sentence
simply on the grounds that John accepts them as true. Whether
it is a necessary condition on the truth of (120) that John
should believe there is one and only one man in the next
room, is another question, and it is a difficult one to
answer without running up against complications due to the
ambiguity of descriptive content which I do not want to
discuss at this stage. It seems to me, however, that at
least if we take the description 'man in the next room' as
one which John recognises and would be prepared to use him-
self, then the sentence does ascribe this belief to John.
If this is so, then the presuppositions of an opaquely inter-
preted definite noun phrase must be taken to hold both
transparently and opaquely.
There are two special points which should be made,
however, in connection with the attributive reading and
existence presuppositions. The first point is that where
uniqueness of reference is guaranteed, the presupposition
of existence is either very weak or entirely absent. By a
guarantee of uniqueness of reference, I mean a guarantee
that if there is a so-and-so, then there is only one so-and-so.
And when there is such a guarantee, one can apparently use
the phrase the so-and-so in an opaque context without there-
by committing oneself to the existence of the so-and-so.
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There are two types of phrase that I know of for which
there is such a guarantee. One is phrases with superlative
adjectives, as in:
(122) John wants to meet the cleverest girl in the room.
There may be no cleverest girl in the room, either because
there are no girls in the room at all, or because two girls
are equally clever, but if there is a cleverest girl in the
room then there is, of course, only one. And sentence (122)
seems to be compatible with there being no cleverest girl
in the room, or at least to be more compatible with it than
sentence (123) is with there being no girl who climbed Mount
Everest.
(123) John wants to meet the girl who climbed Mount Everest.
The second type of example involves a role or office or
position that only one person can fill at a time. The
sentence:
(124) John wants to meet the captain of the cricket team.
seems to be acceptable even if there is no captain of the
cricket team (and the speaker and hearers know there is none).
At least, like (122), it seems less unacceptable in those
circumstances than the sentence (123) if it is known that
no girl climbed Mount Everest. It is worth observing that
the phrase the present king of France, which, since Russell,
has been treated as the paradigm case of a definite descrip-
tion, is a phrase of this special kind. Notice also that
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it is only the attributive readings of these sentences which
are atypical with respect to the presupposition of existence.
If sentence (124), for example, is taken referentially, so
that it can be paraphrased as:
(125) John wants of the captain of the cricket team to meet
him.
then it does seem to presuppose the existence of a captain
of the cricket team.
Just why the existence presupposition is absent, or
at least much weaker, in these types of case, I do not know,
though I suspect that it is not merely an accident that it
correlates with the guarantee of uniqueness of reference.
Notice that for both kinds of example, there is no indefinite
noun phrase corresponding to the definite one. There is no
phrase *a cleverest girl in the room, and the phrase a
(present captain of the cricket team is semantically, even if
not syntactically, odd. Perhaps, then, the real precondition
on the proper use of a definite noun phrase is uniqueness of
reference, and existence is required only insofar as it is
needed to establish uniqueness of reference. For a phrase
such as the man in the next room, unlike the cleverest girl
in the class, the only situation in which one can be con-
fident that there are not two or more equally good candidates
for the description man in the next room is if one knows
that there is only one man in the next room, and this will
180
involve knowing that there is a man in the next room. Another
possible explanation (which may perhaps turn out to be the
same explanation cast in syntactic terms) is that phrases
like the oldest girl in the class, or the (present) captain of
the cricket team, are only superficially definite noun phrases.
In surface structure they contain a definite article rather
than an indefinite one, and they must do so. Just because
the definite article is fully predictable, it need not be
assumed to be present in the underlying structure. The phrases
which describe roles or offices can actually appear in surface
structure in some positions without any article. One can
say:
(126) Tom is captain of the cricket team.
so one might analyse at least some instances of the captain
of the cricket team as someone who is captain of the cricket
team. This is indefinite, so when it is interpreted opaquely
one would expect it, like non-specific indefinites in general,
not to imply existence. The trouble with this suggestion is
that one would then expect this phrase not to presuppose
existence, but to entail it, in transparent contexts. This
is partly true and partly false, but I must postpone further
discussion of this idea until Section 7 since it involves
predicate nominals.
It should perhaps be pointed out here, however, that
there are phrases which do guarantee uniqueness of reference
mE
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but which nevertheless presuppose existence in opaque contexts.
These are phrases containing the only. Thus the sentence:
(127) John wants to meet the only man in the room.
seems to presuppose that there is only one man in the room;
it would be odd to use this sentence if one knew there were
several men in the room, regardless of what John believed.
It seems, then, that we must either give up the guarantee
of uniqueness as a criterion for the absence of a presupposi-
tion of existence in opaque contexts, or else we must disregard
the word only in considering whether there is a guarantee of
uniqueness. It is obvious that we must, in any case, disregard
the definite article itself, for otherwise all singular
definite noun phrases would carry such a guarantee. The
phrase the man in the room will, of course, if it applies to
anyone, apply to only one man. The point is that the phrase
man in the room could apply to more than one man, unlike the
phrase (present) captain of the cricket team or oldest man in
the room. There is in fact some evidence that the only of
a phrase such as the only man in the room should also be
disregarded in determining whether there is a guarantee of
uniqueness. Notice that sentence (127) cannot be read as
saying that John wants it to be the case that only one man
is in the room and that he should meet that man. John
could want this, knowing that the room was packed with men;
he could want all but one to leave. But (127) cannot be
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used to describe this situation. Thus the only must apparent-
ly not be treated as part of the descriptive content of the
noun phrase; it must not be treated as part of the condition
that a person must fulfill if John is to want to meet him.
Therefore if the guarantee of uniqueness is determined by
the descriptive content of the phrase, the phrase the only
man in the room will not carry such a guarantee. I shall
have more to say about phrases containing the only in Section
7.
The second point to be made about attributively
interpreted definite noun phrases and the presupposition of
existence is that an explicit recognition of the possibility
of non-existence can be built into the sentence. Thus one
can say:
(128) John wants to meet the girl in the next room if there
is one.
This sentence may be taken as expressing a conditional
statement, thus:
(129) If there is a girl in the next room, then John wants
to meet her.
which does not entail that John has any want at all. But (128)
can also be taken as an unconditional statement about a
conditional want of John's, thus:
(130) John wants that if there is a girl in the next room
he should meet her.
Thus it can be John, rather than the speaker, who is allowing
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for the possibility that there is no girl in the next room.
By contrast, if (128) is read referentially, it can be para-
phrased as:
(131) If there is a girl in the next room, then John wants of
her that he should meet her.
but to paraphrase it as an unconditional statement about a
conditional want produces:
(132) John wants of the girl in the next room that if she
exists he should meet her.
which is decidedly odd. This difference shows up a general
difference between referential and attributive phrases in
connection with the existence or non-existence of a referent.
To use a phrase referentially and then allow that there
exists no referent for it, is to allow that a certain individ-
ual does not exist. Unless its referent is a fictional
individual, this can presumably only mean that someone has
conjured up the individual in question in his imagination,
and, as we saw earlier in this section, it is only with some
hesitation that one is prepared to accept as true a sentence
containing a noun phrase referring to such an individual. On
the other hand, if one uses a noun phrase attributively and
then admits that there exists no referent for it, what one
is admitting is that no-one is such that he has the property
designated by the noun phrase. Thus one is not saying that
a certain individual does not exist, but is saying that the
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property does not individuate anyone, and there is nothing
odd about this idea at all.
Section 6. On knowing who.
In Section 1 of this chapter, a close relationship
was posited between three notions, the notion of knowing who
someone is, the notion of knowing of someone that he..., or
wanting of someone that he..., suspecting of someone that
he..., etc., and the notion of the referential reading of a
definite noun phrase in an opaque context. It was claimed
that a sentence such as:
(133) John wants to talk to the man in the bowler hat.
has both a referential reading and an attributive reading
with respect to the phrase the man in the bowler hat. It was
claimed that the referential reading can be paraphrased,
somewhat inelegantly, as:
(134) John wants of the man in the bowler hat to talk to him.
and that this entails:
(135) John knows who the man in the bowler hat is.
which in turn can be paraphrased as:
(136) John knows of someone that he is the man in the bowler
. hat.
The attributive reading of (133), on the other hand, was
claimed to entail only the non-specific counterpart of (136),
viz:
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(137) John knows that there is someone who is the man in
the bowler hat.
The notion of knowing who someone is is not an easy
one to analyse and the literature that exists on it is some-
what confused. Since it is closely tied up with my account
of the referential reading of definite noun phrases, however,
I shall attempt to give some explication of it. I begin by
stating my intention to ignore, as I have throughout this
whole chapter, the ambiguity of the descriptive content of
noun phrases. This ambiguity is analysed in the following
chapter and I shall not attempt to relate it to the notion
of knowing who someone is until the end of that chapter.
As will become clear shortly, we shall have quite enough
ambiguity to cope with in our examples of knowing who some-
one is, without considering this one too. Thus all of the
examples in this section are to be read as implying that
the subject of the verb knows accepts all of the descriptions
that appear in the opaque context, in the sense that he
thinks that there is someone who can be so described, and,
furthermore, that if he has an opinion as to who or what
in particular can be so described, then this opinion is
correct. Thus, for the examples already cited, we are to
ignore the possibility that they might be true even if John
does not realise that there is anyone who can be described as
'the man in the bowler hat', or if he is wrong about who can
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be so described. Given this assumption, it follows, I think,
that sentence (135) will be true only if John can give a
correct answer to the question:
(138) Who is the man in the bowler hat?
The discussion can also be simplified by restricting
it to cases in which John's answer to such a question is a
definite noun phrase. John might, in reply to (138), say:
(139) A friend of Bill's.
that is:
(140) He
is a friend of Bill's.
(The man in the bowler hatJ
He might even perhaps say something like:
(141) He
came here to interview the vicar.
The man in the bowler hat
Whether or not these really count as answers to a question
like (138), I shall not consider them further here, but will
restrict my attention to replies such as:
(142) The leader of the orchestra.
that is:
(143) He
The man in the bowler hais the leader of 
the orchestra.
Thus what I shall be concerned with is the relationship
between sentences of the form:
(144) John knows that the ..... is the ------
and sentences of the form:
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(145) John knows who the ..... is.
where the dots and dashes are filled in with descriptive
phrases. Sentences of the form (144) will thus contain two
definite noun phrases within an opaque context. Though we
are to ignore the ambiguity of descriptive content, the
existence of a referential/attributive distinction would lead
us to predict that such sentences are (at least) four ways
ambiguous, since either of the two noun phrases could, at
least in principle, be interpreted either referentially or
attributively. It is confusions between these four possible
readings of sentences of the form (144) which are responsible,
I think, for many of the puzzles about the notion of knowing
who someone is, and I shall therefore attempt to disentangle
them from each other. In order to do so I shall first ignore
the verb knows, and opaque contexts in general, and consider
simple questions and answers of the form:
(146) Who is so-and-so?
(147) So-and-so is such-and-such.
There are two ways at least in which one can take the
question:
(148) Who is so-and-so?
These can be distinguished, very roughly, as:
(149) Which person has the property so-and-so?
(150) What property does the person so-and-so have?
If I am pointing to a man and I ask:
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(151) Who is that man over there?
then I am surely intending to ask the second kind of question,
for, as long as my pointing gesture is successful, there is no
question as to which person the description 'that man over
there' applies to. If I had been asking the first kind of
question, then the reply:
(152) The man in line with the end of your index finger.
ought to be an appropriate one. On the other hand, if I am
standing in front of a building which has flames pouring out
of its windows, and I ask:
(153) Who is the man in charge of this building?
then I am more likely to be intending my question as a
question of the first kind, that is, I want you to point out,
or otherwise indicate, the person to whom the description
'the man in charge of this building' applies. The reply:
(154) He's the only man who has ever jumped off the Empire
State Building and survived.
will not be the kind of response I had hoped for. It is,
however, a quite satisfactory answer to question (151) as it
would normally be understood.
It is not easy to keep these two kinds of question
apart. In practice one may often not know which of the two
is intended. Thus the question:
(155) Who is Mary's boyfriend?
out of context, can quite naturally be taken either way. If
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Mary is standing nearby entwined around some boy, and I am
looking at him as I ask (155), then you would be more likely
to treat it as a question of the second kind; if Mary has
just asked me to pass a note to her boyfriend, you are likely
to take it as a question of the first kind. Even if it is
clear which kind of question is intended, the range of
acceptable answers will usually overlap. In order to get
across to me which person the description 'so-and-so' applies
to, you must, unless he is actually there to point to, use
another name or description. And this might be the name or
description which would be a good answer to the corresponding
question of the second kind. The second kind of question is
a request for an interesting description or a significant
name, for if I have a certain person in mind and am able to
pick him out in order to ask a question about him, then
necessarily I know some description of him, even if it is
only 'that man over there'. In asking for other descriptions,
therefore, I am presumably asking for interesting ones. By
contrast, an answer to a question of the first kind should
not be too interesting, because it may then be of no use for
identificatory purposes. Since in this case one is to supply
a description as a means of indicating a certain person,
one's answer should consist of a description such that one
knows, or such that it is reasonable to expect, that the
questioner already knows which person it applies to. Notice
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also that I can answer the second kind of question indirectly
too, by giving a relatively uninteresting description, such
as 'the man we were just talking about', as long as that
description will in turn lead you to some interesting ones.
It is the second kind of question that is related to
comments like 'He is somebody', 'He is nobody', 'He isn't
anyone special'. Thus if I ask:
(156) Who is the man you just waved to?
when I can obviously see which person you waved to and am
therefore unlikely to be asking the first kind of question,
then you can reasonably reply:
(157) Oh, he's no-one special.
even if this would not count, in a sense, as having answered
my question. But if I ask you:
(158) Who is the Chief of Police in Milwaukee?
you can hardly reply:
(159) Oh, he's no-one special.
The distinction that I have been discussing is also
to be found in Donnellan's paper. Donnellan says (Reference
and Definite Descriptions, p. 287):
Suppose one is at a party and, seeing an interesting-
looking person holding a martini glass, one asks,
"Who is the man drinking a martini?" If it should
turn out that there is only water in the glass, one
has nevertheless asked a question about a particular
person, a question that it is possible for someone
to answer. Contrast this with the use of the same
question by the chairman of the local Teetotalers
Union. He has just been informed that a man is
drinking a martini at their annual party. He responds
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by asking his informant, "Who is the man drinking a
martini?" In asking the question the chairman
does not have some particular person in mind about
whom he asks the question; if no one is drinking a
martini, if the information is wrong, no person
can be singled out as the person about whom the
question was asked. Unlike the first case, the
attribute of being the man drinking a martini is
all-important, because if it is the attribute of
no one, the chairman's question has no straightforward
answer.
Donnellan makes the distinction primarily in terms of what
happens when the descriptive phrase used in the question
happens to describe no one. I have made it in terms of
what would be an acceptable answer to the question. But I
think they are one and the same distinction. Thus in the
first situation that Donnellan describes, none of the
following would be an appropriate answer:
(160) The man standing next to the blonde.
(161) The man we were talking about just before you came
into the room.
(162) The man whose name I always forget.
It would not be inappropriate to reply:
(163) He's no one special.
but (163) would be unlikely to satisfy the chairman of the
Teetotalers Union in the second situation Donnellan describes.
Donnellan discusses these two imaginary situations
as paradigm examples of the referential and attributive uses
of definite noun phrases. His first example is an example of
a question used in the second of the two ways I outlined
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above; the definite noun phrase is used referentially. His
second example is an example of a question used in the
first of the ways outlined above; the definite noun phrase
is used attributively. I wish to claim that a question
containing a noun phrase used referentially is to be answered
with a noun phrase used attributively, and a question con-
taining a noun phrase used attributively is to be answered
with a noun phrase used referentially. (Note: Since the
person who asks a question is, typically, different from the
person who answers it, and since the way in which one uses
or understands a noun phrase depends, typically, if not
essentially, on what one knows, a person may answer a question
to his own satisfaction but not to the satisfaction of the
person who asked it. What counts as having answered a
question is therefore more complicated than I have just
suggested, because it will depend on whose viewpoint we take.)
It might seem, contrary to my claim, that one can
give an attributive answer to an attributive question, and
a referential answer to a referential question. My intuition,
however, is that in cases where this appears to be so, the
answer given is only an indirect answer; it counts as an
answer only insofar as it leads the questioner to an answer
of the opposite kind. If, for example, I ask:
(164) Who is the world's expert on humming birds?
using the definite description attributively, and you reply:
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(165) He is the only man to have jumped off the Empire State
Building and survived.
your answer may or may not be adequate. If for me the phrase
the only man who jumped off the Empire State Building and
survived has a referential use, if I know to whom it refers,
then your answer does tell me who the world's expert on
humming birds is (whether you know who jumped off the Empire
State Building or not). If, as is more likely, I do not
know who jumped off the Empire State Building, then I still
do not know the answer to my question. But if I now ask you:
(166) Who is the only man to have jumped off the Empire
State Building and survived?
and you can supply a referential answer to this question, then
your two answers between them answer my first question. And
if I can find out in some other way the answer to question (166),
then in a way you have answered my question (164) too. How-
ever, if I do not know, and you cannot tell me, and I cannot
otherwise find out, the answer to question (166), then (165)
does not count as having answered the question (16 4) FN
FN. James Thomson has suggested to me that my claim is too
strong, and that one can in some cases quite properly answer
an attributive questioi with an attributive description. Thus
if it is generally true that the chairman of the disciplinary
committee is the Senior Proctor, regardless of who happens at
any particular time to be the Senior Proctor, then the question:
Who is the chairman of the disciplinary committee? surely can
be answered quite properly and informatively with: The Senior
Proctor. In order to maintain my theory, I should have to
claim that this counts as an adequate answer only inasmuch as
it may mediate a referential answer, that is, to the extent that
the questioner knows or can find out who the Senior Proctor
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A similar point can be made in connection with a
referential answer to a referential question, though natural
examples are harder to come by. Suppose I point to a man in
a photograph, and ask:
(167) Who is this man?
wanting you to tell me something interesting about him, and
you reply:
(168) That man over there.
pointing to someone across the room. This will be an adequate
answer to my question only insofar as I can use it as a basis
for finding out, from you or someone else, something interesting
about the man you are pointing to, or if I already know some-
thing interesting about him and simply failed to realise that
he was the man in the photograph.
With this account of simple questions and answers in
hand, we can no return to sentences of the form:
(169) John knows who so-and-so is.
and:
(170) John knows that so-and-so is such-and-such.
I pointed out that sentences of the form (170) should be
(at least) four ways ambiguous on the assumption that either
noun phrase can be interpreted either referentially or
attributively. In view of the foregoing discussion, however,
actually is. The example, however, is persuasive, and I
suspect that I should admit to error and recognise the
existence of such question and answer pairs.
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I shall claim that only two of these readings will count as
entailing that John knows who so-and-so is. If one of the
two noun phrases is interpreted referentially and the other
is interpreted attributively, then we can say that John knows
who so-and-so is. But observe that the sentence (169) will
be interpreted in a different way in each case. Thus, dis-
regarding the surface order of the two noun phrases (though
there are, in fact, some restrictions on it), one sentence
of the form (170) will warrant two statements of the form (169),
though these will differ in sense. For example, the truth
of:
(171) John knows that the world's expert on humming birds is
the man standing next to him.
interpreted, as it most naturally would be, as:
(172) John knows that [attributive noun phrase] is [referential
noun phrase].
warrants both:
(173) John knows who the world's expert on humming birds is.
(174) John knows who the man standing next to him is.
where (173) is interpreted attributively, and (174) is
interpreted referentially. On the other hand, a sentence of
the form (170) in which both noun phrases are interpreted
referentially or both are interpreted attributively, will not
justify a statement of the form (169).
Hintikka seems to have this same point in mind when he
says (Knowledge and Belief, p. 148ff.):
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When is it true to say "a knows who b is"?
Clearly a necessary condition is thaT the person
referred to by a should be able to give a right
answer to the question "Who is b?" and that he
should know that his answer is right. This necessary
condition is not a sufficient one, however. Any
correct and informed answer to the question "Who
is b?" does not show that the answerer really knows
to whom the term b refers; nor does such an answer
always suffice to let the questioner know it. If
you ask me "Who was the teacher of Antisthenes?"
and I reply "The teacher of Antisthenes was the.
same man as the teacher of Aristippus," my answer
does not necessarily help you to know who the teacher
of Antisthenes was, for you may fail to know who
the teacher of Aristippus was. Similarly, it is
conceivable that my answer should not even show
that I know who the former was; for I might likewise
fail to know who the latter was, although I happen
to know that the two are identical. (For a similar
reason, it is still less helpful of me to reply:
"The teacher of Antisthenes was the teacher of
Antisthenes," although there is no doubt that I know
this answer to be true.) The answer "The teacher of
Antisthenes was the same man as the teacher of Plato"
is a much better one just because it is ever so much
unlikelier that you (or I) should be ignorant of who
the latter was. The moral of these examples is clear:
a sentence of the form "a knows that b is c" does
not imply "a knows who bis" except iin conjunction
with the further premise "a knows who c is."
There are several comments to be made about this passage.
The first, although I shall not dwell on it, is that Hintikka's
'necessary condition' is not even a necessary condition unless
some allowance is made for the opacity of the descriptive
content of noun phrases, for there surely is a sense of,
for example:
(175) John knows who the man over there is.
which is compatible with John's not being able to answer the
question:
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(176) Who is the man over there?
At the very least, John might not be able to see who is over
there.
The second point to be made is that it is not absolutely
obvious that "a knows that b is c" in conjunction with the
further premise "a knows who c is" does imply "a knows who b
is" for it is possible that the person referred to by a has
not put his two bits of knowledge together. (This is possible
whether or not we take 'b' in these sentences as opaque or
transparent with respect to their descriptive content.)
Hintikka uses constants in his formulae attributively.
Thus for example he allows that sentences of the form "a knows
that b is b" are bound to be true as long as the person
referred to by a knows that someone describable as 'b' exists.
On the other hand, he treats 'knowing who' as involving a
referential noun phrase. Thus he says (p. 131ff.):
..when is it true to say of you, "He knows who is the
murderer of Toto de Brunel"? Clearly you know this
only if you know a right answer to the question: Who
killed Toto? And this you can do only if there is
someone of whom you know that he (or she) killed Toto.
It is clear from Hintikka's use of the 'of whom' paraphrase
in this passage (especially in view of the way in which he
expresses 'of whom' sentences in his formal notation), that
Hintikka's condition on knowing who is the murderer of Toto
is that one can supply a referential description as the
answer to the question: Who killed Toto?. In both of these
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quoted passages, therefore, Hintikka is considering only
questions of the form:
(177) Who is so-and-so?
in which so-and-so is used attributively, and the point that he
is making is that an attributive description does not constitute
a proper answer to such a question; only a referential descrip-
tion is adequate. At least I assume this is the point that
his somewhat questionable moral is intended to make.
Hintikka apparently does not, either in these passages,
or anywhere else in his book, recognise questions of the
form (177) with the so-and-so used referentially, and so he
misses the point that his condition also applies in reverse,
i.e. that only an attributive description is appropriate as
an answer to such a question. He also, as one might expect,
allows only one interpretation of sentences of the form: 'a
knows who b is', the interpretation for which 'b' is attribu-
tive. I suspect that if he had not overlooked this other
sense of 'knowing who', and the related use of questions of
the form (177), he would have been less likely to complain,
(as he does in the footnote to p. 149), that "The criteria as
to when one may be said to know who this or that man is are
highly variable". It is undoubtedly true that the criteria
are variable, but the variability is at least more under-
standable if one recognises that there are two senses in
which one may be said to know who someone is and that there
are different conditions on each sense.
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On the other hand, the circularity of Hintikka's
account is not eliminable, at least it is not eliminated
simply by recognising this ambiguity, for it remains in one
of the two cases. The condition on the truth of a sentence of
the form:
(178) John knows who so-and-so is.
when so-and-so is interpreted referentially, is, roughly, that
John should know of some interesting property that the person
so-and-so has. This is a vague condition, of course, since
what counts as interesting will vary from case to case and
person to person. For the other reading, however, we cannot
even approximate a statement of the truth conditions which is
not circular, for we have said that (178) is true on this
reading if John knows which person has the property so-and-so.
This in turn is true if there is a true sentence of the form:
(179) John knows that such-and-such is so-and-so.
where such-and-such is interpreted referentially, that is:
(180) John knows of such-and-such that he is so-and-so.
And the only account we have been able to give of this is that
it requires that John should know who such-and-such is. What
we have done is to delineate some of the internal connections
between notions like knowing who so-and-so is (on one reading),
knowing (wanting, etc.) of someone that he..., having a
particular person in mind, referring to someone in particular,
using a description referentially. What we have not done is
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to break out of this circle and give an analysis of one of
these notions that does not invoke the others, and I do not
know how to do so.
Observe also in this connection that my remarks about
the relationship between sentence (171) and sentences (173)
and (174), appear to suggest that merely knowing two descrip-
tions that apply to one and the same person (and knowing that
they do) is sufficient for knowing who the person they apply
to is. But this is not really the case, for one of these two
descriptions, I have claimed, must be a referential one, and
although I have not been able to say what is involved in being
able to use a description referentially, it does rather
obviously involve more than just knowing that it is co-
referential with some other description that one is in no
position to use referentially.
I have as yet said nothing at all about 'knowing who'
when it is not a matter of knowing who someone is, that is,
about sentences like:
(181) John knows who stole the jewels.
(182) John knows who is standing behind him.
(183) John knows who you had lunch with yesterday.
These sentences ought to be simpler to analyse than the ones
we have dealt with so far, since they are presumably to be
related to sentences of the form:
(184) John knows that so-and-so stole the jewels.
(185) John knows that so-and-so is standing behind him.
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(186) John knows that you had lunch with so-and-so yesterday.
which contain only one potentially ambiguous noun phrase
rather than two (ignoring the jewels, and you, of course).
The obvious question to ask about these sentences is how the
phrase so-and-so in (184) - (186) must be interpreted in order
that sentences of this kind should entail sentences
like (181) - (183). Here, unfortunately, my intuitions are
not so clear, and I suspect that the answer depends on the
nature of the predicate. Sentence (181), for example, appears
to require a referentially interpreted so-and-so in (184),
and closely resembles the sentence:
(187) John knows who the man who stole the jewels is.
If, for example John is asked:
(188) Who stole the jewels?
it would hardly do for him to reply:
(189) Oh, no-one special.
On the other hand it seems possible to take sentences (182)
and (183) either way, and the sentence:
(190) John knows who he is pointing to.
unless John has his eyes closed, would only naturally be
taken as entailed by the corresponding sentence with
attributive so-and-so. Both senses of 'knowing who' there-
fore appear to be possible when a non-nominal predicate
follows the who.
I shall return to the notion of 'knowing who' in the
next chapter, following a discussion of the ambiguity of
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descriptive content, in order to discuss examples like:
(191) John knows that the man who stole the jewels is the
man who stole the jewels.
(192) John knows that the man who stole the jewels stole
the jewels.
and their relation to the sentences:
(193) John knows who the man who stole the jewels is.
(194) John knows who stole the jewels.
Section 7. Predicate nominals and attributive noun phrases.
In the previous section, I distinguished four different
kinds of statement that can be made with a sentence of the
form NP is NP2 , in terms of whether either or both of the
noun phrases is used referentially or attributively. Given a
distinction between referential and attributive uses of noun
phrases, it would actually have required some explanation if
sentences of this form could not be used in these four differ-
ent ways. There are, however, two objections that might be
made to talking of the noun phrases in such sentences having
an attributive use.
The sentence:
(195) Smith's murderer is insane.
if the phrase Smith's murderer is used attributively, can be
paraphrased as:
(196) Whoever murdered Smith is insane.
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But the sentence:
(197) That man is Smith's murderer.
in which, I have claimed, Smith's murderer may be used
attributively, cannot be paraphrased naturally as:
(198) That man is whoever murdered Smith.
In fact this sentence is at best only barely grammatical.
This fact does not, however, show that it is wrong to
say that Smith's murderer in (197) cannot be used attributively.
A noun phrase is, characteristically, used attributively if
the speaker does not know to whom or to what in particular
the description applies. A noun phrase with whoever or which-
ever is only properly used if the speaker does not know to
whom or to what in particular the description applies.
Therefore in very many cases, when a noun phrase is used
attributively, it can be paraphrased by means of a phrase
with whoever or whichever. Now sentence (197), unlike
sentence (195), actually says who Smith's murderer is, and
so we obviously cannot assume that a person who uttered (197)
has no idea as to whom the phrase Smith's murderer applies.
It is this which is responsible for the oddity of (198).
But the absence of a whoever phrase does not show that the
phrase Smith's murderer cannot have an attributive use in (197),
for Donnellan explicitly states: "It is possible for a definite
description to be used attributively even though the speaker
(and his audience) believes that a certain person or thing
- - -
-~ - -~
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fits that description". The correlation between what a
speaker knows or believes and the way in which he uses a
given noun phrase is not essential to the referential/
attributive distinction, but is merely a matter of what is
usually the case. Thus it is not ruled out that a noun
phrase can be used attributively even in a sentence which
says who or what the description applies to.
Even though this objection cannot be upheld, it might
be objected that to invoke the referential/attributive
distinction to account for the varieties of NP is NP
sentence is unnecessary, since grammars already recognise a
category of (definite) predicate nominal, and the explanation
of the differences could be based on this, rather than on
the notion of an attributively used noun phrase. The
question that must be answered, therefore, is what is the
relationship between the referential/attributive distinction
and the concept of a predicate nominal. Do we need a category
of predicate nominals as distinct from the category of
attributively used noun phrases? Should we say that there
are predicate nominals and other noun phrases, and that the
latter can be used either referentially or attributively?
Or should we say rather that predicate nominals simply are
noun phrases used attributively? And if there is a distinc-
tion between the two, which category does the phrase Smith's
murderer in (197) fall into?
Since there is presumably some connection between the
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concept of a predicate nominal and the concept of a predica-
tive sentence, one might expect to gain some understanding
of the nature of the phrase Smith's murderer in (197) from a
distinction between predicative statements of the form
NP is NP and identity statements. Unfortunately this
distinction is itself a matter of some confusion, but Linsky
provides a test which will be a helpful start to answering
the questions of the previous paragraph. Linsky says
(Reference and Referents, in: Philosophy and Ordinary
Language, p. 80):
Some of the statements which have been counted as
identities cannot be interpreted as such. Suppose
I explain to my confused son, "Charles de Gaulle is
not the king of France". That this statement is not
an identity can be shown as follows. From a / b,
it follows that b / a, but from "Charles de Gaulle
is not the king of France" it does not follow that
"The king of France is not Charles de Gaulle". The
first of these statements is true while the second
is neither true nor false.
Linsky is pointing out that the phrase the king of France when
it precedes the verb to be presupposes the existence of some-
one who is the king of France, while when it follows the verb
to be it has no such presupposition. Since his two sentences
differ in this way, they are not logically equivalent and
therefore cannot both be identity statements. I assume that
Linsky would say that it is sentences with definite descrip-
tions following the verb to be that are not identity state-
ments, since they do not presuppose the existence of a referent
for the definite description. In this respect they are like
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sentences which have quite straightforwardly predicative
expressions following the subject noun phrase. Thus the
sentences:
(199) Charles de Gaulle is not hungry.
(200) Charles de Gaulle is not a busdriver.
(201) Charles de Gaulle is not singing.
(202) Charles de Gaulle did not step into a puddle.
do not presuppose, or in any way imply, that anyone is hungry,
a busdriver, or singing, or that anyone stepped into a puddle.
Linsky's test, however, picks out only a very small
class of definite noun phrases; there are many sentences
with definite descriptions following the verb to be which
do presuppose the existence of something falling under the
description, and which might, therefore, as far as Linsky's
test is concerned, be regarded as expressing identity state-
ments. It was observed in Section 5 of this chapter that
some definite noun phrases describe roles or offices or
positions that only one person or thing can occupy at any
one time, so that if they are true of anyone then necessarily
they are true of only one person. These noun phrases were
observed to be atypical with respect to existence pre-
suppositions in opaque contexts; if they are interpreted
attributively, they apparently carry no presupposition of
existence, unlike other definite noun phrases. Now it is
just these noun phrases which carry no presupposition of
----------- 
__ ---- - __ __ I
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existence when they follow the verb to be in transparent
contexts. Thus examples like:
(203) Tom is not the captain of the cricket team.
(204) The captain of the cricket team is not Tom.
parallel Linsky's examples:
(205) Charles de Gaulle is not the king of France.
(206) The king of France is not Charles de Gaulle.
Sentence (204), though not sentence (203), presupposes that
someone is the captain of the cricket team; and sentence (206),
though not sentence (205), presupposes that someone is the
king of France. By contrast, with a phrase such as the man
who murdered Smith, which does not describe a role or an
office, we have:
(207) Tom is not the man who murdered Smith.
(208) The man who murdered Smith is not Tom.
both of which presuppose that someone is the man who murdered
Smith. Notice that the sentences:
(209) Mary was not the first person I spoke to this morning.
(210) The first person I spoke to this morning was not Mary.
also seem to presuppose that there is someone who is the
first person I spoke to this morning. In view of the fact
that in opaque contexts, phrases containing superlative
adjectives behave like phrases describing roles, in that
neither presuppose existence, it is somwhat surprising that
sentence (209) is not free of a presupposition of existence
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as (203) and (205) are. I have no explanation for this fact.
The class of noun phrases that describe roles are
picked out by a number of other criteria too. There are
corresponding phrases with no article at all, thus:
(211) Charles de Gaulle is king of France.
(212) Tom is captain of the cricket team.
but not:
(213) *Tom is man who murdered Smith.
or:
(214) *Mary is first person I spoke to this morning.
Notice the contrast between (215) and (216):
(215) Bill is the ugliest man on campus.
(216) Bill is ugliest man on campus.
The latter is only appropriate if there was a competition
resulting in the selection of Bill as the ugliest man on
campus, that is, if the noun phrase describes a position or
status.
A further difference appears in cleft sentences. We
have:
(217) What de Gaulle is is the king of France.
(218) What de Gaulle is is king of France.
but not:
(219) *What Bill is is the man who murdered Smith.
(220) *What Bill is is man who murdered Smith.
It is worth observing that adjectives can appear in this
~~6
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context. For example:
(221) What Bill is is crafty.
and some indefinite noun phrases can do so too, thus:
(222) What de Gaulle is is a figurehead.
Following the verb become we find this same class of con-
stituents (adjectives, some indefinite noun phrases, definite
noun phrases that define roles, and the corresponding phrases
with no article at all). Thus:
(223) Mary became bitter.
(224) John became a busdriver.
(225) De Gaulle became the king of France.
(226) De Gaulle became king of France.
By comparison, the sentences:
(227) Mary became the first person I spoke to this morning.
(228) Bill became the man who murdered Smith.
are distinctly odd.
Thus there appears to be a rather well-defined class
of noun phrases which can describe roles or offices. They
do not carry an existence presupposition when they follow the
verb to be. They have counterparts with no article which
can only follow the verb to be, or to become thus:
(229) *King of France came to tea.
(230) *John met king of France.
and when they do follow these verbs, these phrases do not
carry an existence presupposition either. Wherever a phrase
210
without an article can appear, the corresponding phrase with
a definite article can appear, although other definite noun
phrases cannot. A range of predicative phrases can appear
in these same contexts. The obvious hypothesis, then, is
that when one of these definite noun phrases occurs without
a presupposition of existence, it is synonymous with the
corresponding phrase with no article, and it is to be regarded
as a predicative phrase. Thus the reading of the sentence:
(231) Charles de Gaulle is not the king of France.
which does not have a presupposition of existence (whether
or not there is also another reading), is synonymous with:
(232) Charles de Gaulle is not king of France.
and they both mean something like:
(233) Charles de Gaulle does not hold the office, king of
France.
The phrase king of France, without an article, cannot
appear in superficial subject position and it is not obvious
whether this is merely a superficial fact about English syntax,
or whether 'role-descriptions' in general cannot occur as
surface subjects. However, since other predicative expressions
are ungrammatical:
(234) *Hungry is John.
or at least distinctly odd:
(235) ? A busdriver is John.
in subject position, it looks as if the sentence:
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(236) *King of France is Charles de Gaulle.
is ruled out by something more than a superficial constraint
on the distribution of articles in English. And if this is
so, then it explains why the sentence:
(237) The king of France is not Charles de Gaulle.
does presuppose the existence of someone who is the king of
France. The phrase the king of France in this context cannot
be used as a 'role-description' and thus it has a presupposi-
tion of existence just like other definite noun phrases which
cannot be so used. Thus sentence (237) does not mean:
(238) The office, king of France, is not held by de Gaulle.
which, like (233) does not presuppose that anyone does hold
the office, i.e. that there is a king of France. It can only
be taken to mean something like:
(239) The holder of the office, king of France, is not
de Gaulle.
which does presuppose that someone holds the office, i.e.
that there is a king of France. It seems to me that there
is probably also a reading of sentence (231) which is like
this, that is, that sentence (231) is ambiguous, and has,
in addition to the reading (233), a reading to the effect:
(240) Charles de Gaulle is not the holder of the office,
king of France.
which does presuppose that there is a king of France.
A sentence of the form NP is NP, where the second
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noun phrase is interpreted as a role-description, does not,
by Linsky's test, express an identity statement, and we have
seen that in a number of other ways it resembles quite
straightforward examples of predicative sentences. Since
Donnellan makes it clear that definite noun phrases used
attributively do carry presuppositions of existence, it seems
reasonable to say that these role-describing definite noun
phrases are predicative and are not instances of attributively
used noun phrases. Notice that the phrase the man who murdered
Smith in the sentence:
(241) That man is the man who murdered Smith.
does not count as a predicative expression in this sense,
since it does presuppose existence. Curiously enough, however,
the phrase Smith's murderer in the sentence:
(242) That man is Smith's murderer.
does seem to count as a role-description and thus as predica-
tive in this sense, since its negation is compatible with
Smith's not having been murdered:
(243) That man is not Smith's murderer.
This just shows, I think, that the phrase Smith's murderer
has at least one reading on which it is not synonymous with
the phrase the man (the person) who murdered Smith. Other
noun phrases of the same superficial form, such as Smith's
girlfriend, Smith's brother, Smith's lawyer, can also be
used as role-descriptions by our criteria.
It still remains as a question whether, having
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separated off this class of predicative noun phrases, any
further distinctions need to be made, or whether the distinc-
tion between referential and attributive uses is sufficient
to account for all the facts. The class of definite predica-
tive expressions that we have recognised is undoubtedly
smaller than the class of definite phrases which would
standardly be called predicate nominals, but I know of no
facts which require a wider class of predicate nominals to be
admitted. I do have one rather odd observation about identity
statements to offer, however.
Linsky's condition on identity statements is a necessary
condition. Unless a sentence of the form NP is NP2 is logically
equivalent to a sentence of the form NP2 is NP1 , then at
least one of them cannot be expressing an identity statement.
We might, however, wish to impose a stronger condition than
this as a sufficient condition on identity statements. One
plausible candidate for such a condition is that a sentence
of the form NP is NP expresses an identity statement only if
it can be paraphrased with the phrase 'the same person as'
or 'the same object as'. Now two of the four kinds of NP is NP
sentence distinguished in the previous section do clearly
have paraphrases of this kind. For example, if both the
noun phrases in the sentence:
(244) Dr. Jekyll is Mr. Hyde.
are used referentially, as would be quite natural, then the
sentence can be paraphrased as:
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(245) Dr. Jekyll is the same person as Mr. Hyde.
or as:
(246) Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde are the same person.
If both of the noun phrases in the sentence:
(247) The man who stole the jewels is the man who broke the
window.
are used attributively, as would be quite natural, then this
sentence can be paraphrased as:
(248) The man who stole the jewels is the same person as the
man who broke the window.
or as:
(249) The man who stole the jewels and the man who broke the
window are the same man (person).
On the other hand, for examples which contain one noun phrase
used referentially and another noun phrase used attributively,
such a paraphrase is somewhat peculiar. Thus the sentences:
(250) The man you should speak to is that man over there.
(251) That man over there is the man you should speak to.
though they may be logically equivalent to the sentences:
(252) The man you should speak to is the same person as that
man over there.
(253) That man over there is the same person as the man you
should speak to.
(254) The man you should speak to and that man over there are
the same man (person).
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do not seem to be synonymous with these sentences. This
correlates with the intuition (of some speakers, at least)
that sentences like (250) and (251) do not really express
identity statements but predications. They differ in pre-
suppositions from sentences with role-describing definite
noun phrases, and other predicative expressions, it is true,
but they do not seem to be true identity statements either.
This might be taken to suggest that a third category of state-
ments, and of types or uses of noun phrases, must be
recognised. In the absence of any other evidence for this,
however, we could simply say that an identity statement
requires that both noun phrases be used in the same way,
referentially or attributively. Whatever the explanation,
however, we are left with the rather surprising conclusion
that to know that p is true of someone, where p is quite
clearly an identity statement and can be paraphrased with
'is the same person as', does not count as knowing who that
person is. It is only if one knows something like (250)
or (251) that one can properly be said to know who the man
you should speak to is, or who that man over there is, and
these sentences are not true identity statements.
Section 8. Logical relationships between definite and indefinite
noun phrases.
In Section 5 of Chapter II it was suggested that it
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might be a necessary condition on the truth of a sentence
with a specifically interpreted indefinite noun phrase in
an opaque context, that there should be some true sentence
of the same form but with a definite noun phrase in place
of the indefinite one. It was not discussed there whether
this definite noun phrase should be a referential or an
attributive one. In Section 1 of the present chapter it was
claimed that both the referential and the attributive
readings of the sentence:
(255) John wants to meet the boy who failed the exam.
entail the specific reading of:
(256) John wants to meet a boy.
since both provide an answer to the question:
(257) Which boy does John want to meet?
There is a difference between the entailments of the refer-
ential and attributive readings of (255) which is connected
with the specific/non-specific contrast, but this concerns
not (256) but the sentence:
(258) John knows that a (one) boy failed the exam.
The referential reading of (255), it was claimed, requires
the truth of (258) on its specific reading, while the attribu-
tive reading of (255) requires only that the non-specific reading
of (258) is true, (disregarding here any questions concerning
the opacity of the descriptive content of the noun phrases).
I shall now add a few tentative comments about these
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semantic connections between definite and indefinite noun
phrases. They are tentative because the intuitions, both mine
and those of other speakers, on which they are based are far
from confident. In this area of the language there are,
as I have shown, a number of semantic distinctions to be
made, and they are all rather fine ones; it appears that
speakers of the language are not able to operate consist-
ently, or at least confidently, with all of them at once.
It is difficult to describe the logic of this part of the
language, because its logic is, apparently, not precisely
defined.
With this limitation in mind, I would suggest that
for verbs like thinks and knows, rather than wants, intends,
and so on, the observations of the above paragraph do
not all hold. In particular, the inference of a specific
indefinite from an attributive definite is not, or not
obviously, valid. While the sentence:
(259) John knows that that man was arrested.
with referential that man, does entail:
(260) There is someone (a man) whom John knows was arrested.
it is doubtful whether the sentence:
(261) John knows that whoever broke the window was arrested.
entails (260). The specific reading of an indefinite noun
phrase, I have said, requires that the subject should have
someone (something) particular in mind. For verbs like
want, intend, hope, it apparently counts as having someone
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particular in mind if one has decided whom one wants to meet
(intends to marry, etc.). And it is apparently sufficient
for this that one should have settled on a criterion that
distinguishes that person from all others; it is not
necessary that one should know whom that criterion picks
out. This is the content of the claim that an attributive
definite entails a specific indefinite.
For epistemic verbs, on the other hand, the specific
reading of the indefinite is, or at least may be, construed
more strongly. It can be taken to require not only that
one has a criterion that picks out just one individual from
the possible range, but also that one knows which individual
that criterion picks out, i.e. to whom (in the referential
sense) the attributive description applies.
Some sense can be made of this difference between
epistemic and non-epistemic verbs in terms of the which-
question criterion for the specific reading of an indefinite.
Consider the discourse:
(262) Q. Which man does John think will win?
A. John thinks the youngest man will win.
Q. But which man does John think is the youngest man?
where, given an attributive answer to the first question,
there is still another which-question that can be asked, a
request for a referential description. This may be compared
with the discourse:
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(263) Q. Which man does John want to win?
A. John wants the youngest man to win.
Q. But who does John want to be the youngest man?
in which the second question is distinctly odd. One can,
of course, ask in this context who John thinks is the
youngest man, but because of the difference of the verbs
here, this question is apparently not taken to be part of
the original question.
Whether or not this is the correct explanation for
the stronger construal of a specific indefinite for
epistemic verbs than for non-epistemic verbs, the difference
does shed some light on the observation of Chapter II,
Section 6, that for factive verbs, the specific and non-
specific readings are semantically closer with non-epistemic
verbs than with epistemic verbs. For epistemic verbs,
the specific reading is, or may be, construed in the
strong sense outlined above, and thus stands more clearly
distinct from the non-specific reading, which is in
general weaker than the specific. In fact the argument
(which I maintained was invalid) from the non-specific
reading of a sentence like:
(264) John regrets having killed a spider.
to its specific reading, seems to be mediated by a related
sentence with an attributive definite noun phrase. If,
as I have claimed, the specific reading of (264) can be inferred
220
from a similar sentence with an attributive definite noun
phrase, then it should be possible to infer it from the
attributive reading of:
(265) John regrets having killed the spider that he killed.
But this in turn seems to follow from the non-specific
reading of (264). For even the non-specific reading of (264)
entails that John killed a spider, and if he regrets this
then he presumably knows that he killed a spider. But then he
could hardly fail to know that the description 'the spider
that he (I) killed' is true attributively of the spider
that he killed, i.e. it is hard to imagine that (265) is
false if the non-specific reading of (264) is true.
For epistemic factive verbs, by contrast, the specific
reading can be inferred only from a referential definite,
and thus the attributive reading of a sentence like:
(266) John knows that he killed the spider that he killed.
cannot be taken to mediate the inference of the specific
reading of:
(267) John knows that he killed a spider.
from its non-specific reading. Hence the readings of this
sentence do not tend to fall together. Notice that the
referential reading of (266), from which the specific reading
of (267) can be inferred, can, unlike the attributive reading,
quite easily be imagined to be false when the non-specific
reading of (267) is true. For the referential reading
of (266) requires that John should know which spider he
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killed, and he might know that he killed one without
knowing which.
I maintained in Chapter II that the non-specific
reading does not, in fact, entail the specific reading
even for a sentence such as (264), though the argument is
at least superficially more plausible than in the case
of (267). We can now ask where we should drive the wedge
that blocks the inference --- between the non-specific
indefinite and the attributive definite, or between the
attributive definite and the specific indefinite? The
latter, I think, is correct; some argument can be made for
it, at least, on the basis of the which-question criterion
for the specific reading of an indefinite phrase. The
question:
(268) Which spider does John regret killing?
can obviously be answered truly but quite uninformatively
by:
(269) He regrets killing the spider that he killed.
given that it is true that John regrets killing a spider.
This is because John could not, logically, regret killing
any spider that he did not kill -- regret has a factive
presupposition. This contrasts with the case for non-factives;
for example the answer:
(270) John wanted to kill the spider that he killed.
to the question:
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(271) Which spider did John want to kill?
is not uninformative, even given that John did want to kill
a spider. Thus (270) is an acceptable answer to the
question (271), while (269) is not an acceptable answer to (268).
Since someone asking (268) presumably is not seeking the
answer (269), his question must either be taken as a request
for a non-obvious attributive description, or for a
referential description, or else must be taken in some other
way, for example with an implication of non-uniqueness as:
(272) Which of the spiders that he killed does John regret
killing?
And these answers cannot be derived automatically from
the fact that John regrets killing a spider. If the
which-question criterion for the specific reading is thus
strengthened to the condition that there must be an informative
answer to the relevant which-question, the specific reading
of an indefinite will not, after all, be entailed by just
any attributive definite, and the attributive definite
cannot be taken to mediate the inference of the specific
indefinite from the non-specific.
I also note, finally, that a definite noun phrase
which is co-referential with an indefinite noun phrase must
be attributive if the indefinite phrase is non-specific.
Thus in the discourse:
(273) John wants to catch a fish. The fish that he catches...
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with a fish read as non-specific, the phrase the fish that he
catches is obviously attributive. By contrast, in the
discourse:
(274) John wants to catch a fish. The fish that he wants
to catch...
with a fish read as specific, the phrase the fish that he
wants to catch may be read either as attributive or as
referential.
-.
qq
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CHAPTER IV. OPACITY AND DESCRIPTIONS.
Section 1. The ambiguity of the descriptive content of noun
phrases.
In Chapter I, two criteria for opacity were given, the
invalidity of existential generalization, and the invalidity
of substituting one description of something for another
description of it. The status of existential inferences from
opaque contexts was examined in some detail in Chapters II and
III, and I shall now consider some problems about semantic
representation which arise in connection with the substitutivity,
or non-substitutivity, of descriptions.
The intersubstitution of alternative descriptions of
one and the same object is a valid inferential procedure in
transparent contexts. The following argument, for example, is
a valid one.
(1) Tom is a busdriver.
(2) Tom is Jim's best friend.
(3) Therefore Jim's best friend is a busdriver.
Within an opaque context, a similar substitution is not valid,
for example:
(4) Mary realises that Tom is a busdriver.
(5) Tom is Jim's best friend.
(6) Therefore Mary realises that Jim's best friend is a
busdriver.
It was pointed out in Chapter I that sentences like (4) and (6)
225
can be read in such a way that, on that reading, the argument
is valid. If (4) is read as saying that Mary realises of the
person, Tom, that he is a busdriver, then from the fact that
the person, Tom, is Jim's best friend, it obviously does follow
that Mary realises of Jim's best friend (i.e. Tom) that he is
a busdriver. These sentences also have another, stronger,
reading, however, and on that reading the argument is not
valid. Thus (4) may be construed as saying that Mary realises
that 'Tom' is a description (name) of the person Tom, as
well as that she realises that the person Tom is a busdriver,
and (6) can be construed similarly as saying that Mary realises
that 'Jim's best friend' is a description of the person who
is Jim's best friend (i.e. Tom), as well as that she realises
of that person that he is a busdriver. On these readings, (6)
obviously does not follow from (4) and (5), for Mary might
well realise that 'Tom' is a description of the person Tom, and
not realise that 'Jim's best friend' is a description of him.
Thus (6) might be false if (4) and (5) are true. It is this
second way of reading such sentences that is called 'opaque'
since it is for these readings that the otherwise valid
inference rule for substituting descriptions is invalid.
Postal (Restrictive Relatives, 1967) illustrates the
contrast between the two readings very clearly by means of
examples in which the complement clause is self-contradictory,
e.g.
(7) Charley assumed that the book which was burned was not burned.
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Interpreted opaquely, this sentence does ascribe a self-
contradictory assumption to Charley, the assumption which
can be expressed in the words 'The book which was burned was
not burned'. Interpreted transparently, the sentence is
compatible with Charley's merely having assumed something which
is factually false, i.e. with his having assumed of a certain
book which in fact was burned that it was not burned. This is
because, on the transparent interpretation, the sentence does
not ascribe to Charley acceptance of the description 'the book
which was burned' as a description of the book which he assumed
was not burned. Postal stresses, quite rightly, that the
problem that such sentences pose for the linguist is the
problem of finding two distinct ways of formally representing
their meanings. I shall discuss shortly the particular
proposal that Postal makes as to how this is to be done. First,
however, it is important to realise that the ambiguity of
sentences like (4), (6) and (7) that we have just been dis-
cussing is different from the ambiguities with which we were
concerned in Chapters II and III.
In Chapter II, we discussed the specific/non-specific
ambiguity of indefinite noun phrases in opaque contexts. In
the context:
(8) Charley wants to buy a coat like Bill's.
for example, the noun phrase a coat like Bill's can be taken
to refer to a particular coat that Charley wants to buy, or
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or else we can take the sentence to mean simply that Charley
wants to buy some coat like Bill's though he has no particular
one in mind. Whether or not the sentence is read as ascribing
to Charley acceptance of the description 'a coat like Bill's' as
a description of what he wants to buy, is a question which
cuts right across the specific/non-specific distinction. The
specific interpretation of the noun phrase in (8) is con-
sistent with the opaque interpretation of the descriptive
content of the noun phrase; we can read the sentence as saying
that there is a particular coat that Charley wants to buy and
that he wants to buy it under the description 'a coat like
Bill's'. On the other hand we can read it as saying that
there is a particular coat that Charley wants to buy but
without ascribing acceptance of the description 'a coat like
Bill's' to Charley. Charley might, after all, not know Bill,
or, if he does, he might not know what Bill's coat is like.
His desire can still be reported by sentence (8), but in this
case obviously the speaker must be the source of the descrip-
tion. This reading of (8) is transparent with respect to
the descriptive content of the noun phrase, and also specific,
that is, transparent with respect to existential generalization.
If we now consider the non-specific interpretation of
(8), we see that it too is consistent with either the trans-
parent or the opaque reading of the descriptive content of
the noun phrase. Thus Charley might, having seen Bill's coat
and admired it, say: 'I want to buy a coat like Bill's', and
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though he has no particular coat like Bill's in mind to buy,
he nevertheless accepts the description 'a coat like Bill's'
as a description of the kind of coat he would like. On the
other hand sentence (8) is compatible with Charley's having
decided what kind of coat he wants to buy but having no idea
that the kind of coat he wants is just like Bill's coat.
The two kinds of ambiguity can thus be seen to be
independent and to cut right across each other; the one in-
definite noun phrase in (8) allows of four different inter-
pretations. This is a very important point and one that
seems to have been overlooked, or at least blurred, in previous
discussions of opaque contexts. Quine, for example, (Word
and Object, p. 146ff.) clearly states that indefinite noun
phrases have no interpretation which is opaque for descriptive
content, that is, for which the substitutivity of descriptions
is invalid. He discusses the specific/non-specific ambiguity
of such noun phrases, and then quite clearly suggests that
while opacity shows up in connection with definite noun phrases
as a matter of the invalidity of substitutivity, it shows up
in connection with indefinite noun phrases as a matter of
specificity. His view that the two are mutually exclusive may
well be due to the fact that in discussing specificity he
employs examples containing the indefinite pronoun someone
rather than indefinite noun phrases with some lexical content,
such as a coat like Bill's. But whatever its source, I think
it is clear that this view is incorrect, and this is important
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because it means that the two criteria for opacity, failure of
substitutivity and failure of existential generalization, are
FN
not co-extensive. This is not simply to claim that there
might be sentences which exhibit an ambiguity of the one kind
but not of the other, although there are indeed such sentences.
As pointed out in Chapter I, the sentence:
(9) Charley recognised a friend of mine.
has no non-specific interpretation but is ambiguous with
respect to the descriptive content of the noun phrase a friend
of mine and may be read as saying that Charley recognised a
friend of mine as a friend of mine, or as saying that Charley
recognised a friend of mine but without any implication that
Charley was aware that the person he recognised was a friend
FN. It was mentioned in Chapter I that there seems to be an
implicit assumption in many discussions of opacity, that the
failure of substitutivity and the failure of existential
generalization are necessarily connected. The idea is apparent-
ly that if existential generalization is valid, then this means
that the sentence expresses a proposition about a particular
individual. But if something is true of a particular individual,
it should be true of him whatever description is used to refer
to him, and therefore substitutivity must be valid. What I
am suggesting, on the other hand, is that there are two quite
independent questions. (a) Does the sentence predicate
something of a particular individual? (b) Under what descrip-
tion of that individual does it do so? The claim that these
questions are independent is not, I think, logically incoherent.
But the idea that something might be true of an individual
though only under some descriptions of him, does require
recognizing that a single noun phrase may have two distinct
functions in a sentence -- to pick out, refer to, an individual,
and to provide a particular description of him. Any co-extensive
phrase could equally well fulfill the first of these functions,
but this is obviously not so of the second, which is why
substitutivity is not generally valid. This point will, I
hope, become clearer in Sections 5 and 6 of this chapter. It was
observed in Chapter I that Quine assumes that if existential
generalization is valid then substitutivity must also be valid.It
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of mine. What is justified by the other examples we have
considered, however, is the stronger claim that sentences
which exhibit both ambiguities have readings which are simul-
taneously opaque by one criterion but transparent by the
other. They also, of course, as is generally recognised,
have readings which are transparent by both criteria or
opaque by both criteria.
The same point can be made about definite noun phrases.
For these, the ambiguity of descriptive content cuts across
the referential/attributive ambiguity. The sentence:
(10) Charley thinks that the man who stole his car has been
arrested.
may be interpreted referentially, as saying that Charley has a
certain person in mind and thinks he has been arrested. Or it
may be interpreted attributively, as saying that Charley thinks
it is true that whoever stole his car has been arrested even
though he may not know who the thief is. It is easy to see
that the referential interpretation is still ambiguous, that
it either may or else may not be taken to ascribe to Charley
the belief that the person whom he thinks has been arrested
is the man who stole his car. It is also easy to see that
the noun phrase can be interpreted attributively and as opaque
for the descriptive content, that is, as saying that though
Charley may not know to whom the description 'the man who stole
his (my) car' applies he nevertheless thinks that whoever it
applies to is such that he has been arrested. The fourth
is the unwelcome consequences of this assumption that lead him
to deny the legitimacy of 'quantifying into' opaque contexts
(see Chapter II, example (11)).
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interpretation that I am claiming that sentence (10) may have
is the interpretation on which the noun phrase is attributive
but transparent for descriptive content, and over this inter-
pretation there might be some scepticism. Suppose Charley
thinks that whoever the man is who broke into his house last
night has been arrested. Suppose, that is, that the sentence:
(11) Charley thinks that the man who broke into his house
last night has been arrested.
is true when the noun phrase is interpreted as attributive
and as opaque for descriptive content. Then if I know that
the man who broke into Charley's house last night is the man
who also stole Charley's car (whether or not I know who he is),
then I might report Charley's belief in sentence (10) and
sentence (10) would be true if read as attributive and trans-
parent for descriptive content of the noun phrase. (Note:
Even if there is no general agreement over the possibility
of this reading, the fact that referentially interpreted
definite noun phrases, and specific and non-specific indefinite
noun phrases, are ambiguous with respect to descriptive content
is quite sufficient for my point.)
There is a possible criticism that I would like to
forestall, a criticism not of the claim that sentences
like (8) and (10) have the readings that I have outlined, but
a criticism of the theoretical descriptions given of the
readings. One noun phrase may contain another noun phrase,
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as the man who stole his car in (10) contains the noun phrase
his car, and a coat like Bill's in (8), since it means a coat
like Bill's coat, can be said to contain the noun phrase
Bill's coat. The ambiguities affect both the containing and
the contained noun phrases in such cases, and it might be
suggested that those sentences have four possible readings
not because the two ambiguities are orthogonal to each other,
as I have claimed, but because of the ambiguity of the noun
phrases within the larger noun phrases. The relationship
between the opacity or transparency of another noun phrase
contained within it is an interesting topic and one that I
shall return to in a later section. A full account of this
relationship is not needed, however, to rebut the suggestion
just outlined; all that is needed is to exhibit the four-way
ambiguity in opaque contexts of noun phrases which do not
have other noun phrases internal to them. I shall not
describe at length all their possible interpretations, but
I think it should be clear upon consideration that the
following two sentences are ambiguous in ways exactly parallel
to sentences (8) and (10) respectively.
(12) Charley wants to buy an inexpensive coat.
(13) Charley thinks that the burglar has been arrested.
Section 2. The formal representation of the ambiguity.
Whatever formal device we use to distinguish between
the opaque and the transparent readings of the descriptive
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content of noun phrases in opaque contexts must obviously
be different from the formal device used to indicate specific-
ity and/or referentiality of noun phrases. If it were not,
we would not be able to indicate the independence of the two
kinds of phenomenon. It may be noted in passing that the same
form of paraphrase may be used informally for the purpose of
disambiguation in both cases. Thus we might say:
(14) Mary realises of Jim's best friend that he is a
busdriver.
in order to pick out the reading of sentence (6) for which
Jim's best friend is transparent with respect to descriptive
content, that is, to avoid the implication that Mary realises
that the person concerned is Jim's best friend. However, this
same paraphrase might also be used, if there seemed to be a
danger of confusion between the referential and attributive
interpretations of the noun phrase, to pick out its referential
interpretation. Despite its usefulness on occasion to avoid
misunderstanding, it is clear that this form of paraphrase
at best only partially reduces the number of possible
readings and is not itself univocal. It embodies implicitly
the assumption discussed above, that a noun phrase is either
opaque according to both criteria or is transparent according
to both, and since this assumption is incorrect, a paraphrase
like (14) is not powerful enough to serve as a model for the
formal representation of noun phrases in opaque contexts.
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Since the same kind of paraphrase seems to lend itself
equally well (and equally badly) to the disambiguation of
both kinds of ambiguities, and since this kind of paraphrase,
as noted in previous chapters, seems designed to express the
scope relation between the noun phrase in question and the
opaque verb, it does suggest that the ambiguity of descriptive
content, like the specific/non-specific and referential/
attributive ambiguities, is to be accounted for in terms of
scope. The ambiguity does indeed exhibit the kinds of prop-
erty that seem to demand an analysis in terms of scope re-
lations. The number of possible readings depends on the degree
of embedding in a sentence. So far all of our examples have
been sentences containing a single complement clause,
and we have observed that they have two readings with respect
to the descriptive content of any noun phrase in the
complement. But more complex examples have more possible
readings. The sentence:
(15) Charley hopes that Mary thinks that Jim's best friend
is a busdriver.
can be taken as fully transparent for the descriptive
content of the phrase Jim's best friend, that is, it can
be taken to mean that Charley hopes of Jim's best friend,
though not necessarily under that description, that Mary
thinks that he is a busdriver. It can be taken to mean that
Charley hopes of Jim's best friend, under that description,
that Mary thinks that he is a busdriver. And it can be
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taken to mean that Charley hopes of Jim's best friend,
under that description, that Mary thinks of him under that
description that he is a busdriver. Notice that if a set
of independent feature specifications were an appropriate
way of representing the ambiguity, there should be a fourth
possible reading, to the effect that Charley hopes of Jim's
best friend, though not necessarily under that description,
that Mary thinks of him, under the description 'Jim's best
friend', that he is a busdriver. This is certainly a pos-
sible state of affairs. Charley might, for example, know
Tom, who is Jim's best friend, not know that he is Jim's
best friend, and yet hope, for some reason, that Mary thinks
Tom both is Jim's best friend and is a busdriver. Although
one can imagine the situation, however, it is not one which
is expressed by a reading of sentence (15). Apparently if
the description is taken as transparent with respect to
Charley's hope, it must also be taken as transparent with
respect to the thought that he hopes Mary has.
As the complexity of sentences increases, the ability
to keep their various alternative readings distinguished
in one's mind decreases rapidly, even more rapidly, it
seems, than for the ambiguity of specificity or of refer-
entiality of noun phrases. I think it is fairly clear,
nevertheless, that in all cases there are as many readings,
with respect to the descriptive content of a noun phrase,
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as there are nested complement clauses in which it appears.
And it is not only the number of possible readings that is
predictable on the basis of an analysis in terms of the
relative scope of the noun phrase and the opaque verbs in
the sentence. The difference between the possible readings
is not a matter of reading the descriptive phrase itself in
a number of distinct ways, as one might read light coat or
colourful ball, but is a matter of construing the role of
the phrase in relation to other parts of the sentence in
a number of different ways.
We might propose, then, as we did for the ambiguities
discussed in the previous chapters, that some symbol sub-
scripted for the noun phrase in question, say (Dx), be allowed
to appear in any one of the clauses of the representation
of the sentence, in order to indicate whether the noun phrase
is to be taken as inside or outside the scope of the various
opaque verbs that the sentence contains. This would be the
minimal hypothesis, designed merely to capture the number of
possible readings and the fact that the differences between
them are scope differences. More interesting and substantive
claims about the nature of the readings could then be made
by proposing to identify this arbitrary symbol (Dx) with
some already recognised constituent of semantic representa-
tions. I shall argue later that this whole approach to
the representation of the ambiguity should be rejected,
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but it is worth considering in some detail because the only
proposal that has been made in the linguistic literature,
as far as I know, is a proposal of just this form.
Postal's proposal (Restrictive Relatives, 1967) is
based on the conjunctive analysis of relative clauses to-
gether with the derivation of lexical noun phrases from
predicate nominals in relative clauses. (See Chapter II,
Section 4.) In fact the existence of the ambiguity of
descriptive content of noun phrases, together with the success
of Postal's proposed representations, are presented by
Postal as one of the major arguments in favour of these
analyses. The proposal is, in effect, to use the conjoined
clause which is supposed to underly a noun phrase, in the
role of (Dx), that is, to allow this clause to be conjoined
at any one of the clausal levels in the underlying repre-
sentation, with each of its possible positions defining
its scope on one possible reading of the sentence. These
underlying representations (which Postal regards, I believe,
as syntactic but which I shall consider only in connection
with the semantics of the sentences concerned) will thus
be something along the lines of:
(16)FN. x is Jim's best friend and Mary realises that x is
a busdriver.
FN. These representations are adaptations of Postal's. I
think, especially in the light of Lakoff's discussion of
Postal's paper in lectures (Illinois, Summer 1968), that
they do capture the essence of Postal's proposal accurately.
Postal uses numerical referential indices in his representations
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(17) Mary realises that (x is Jim's best friend and x is
a busdriver).
where (16) is supposed to express the transparent reading
of sentence (6), and (17) to express its opaque reading.
Some linguists believe that at the highest level of the
underlying representation of any sentence there should be
a 'performative' clause, and if this is written into (16)
and (17), thus:
(18) I say to you that (x is Jim's best friend and Mary
realises that x is a busdriver).
(19) I say to you that Mary realises that (x is Jim's best
friend and x is a busdriver).
the resulting structures portray quite clearly Postal's
notion that on the transparent reading the source of the
description 'Jim's best friend' should be the speaker, and
that on the opaque reading the source of this description
should be Mary, the subject of the opaque verb realises.
and also what appear to be some form of variable, though
nothing resembling quantifiers to bind these. To use
referential constants would not, as far as I can see, be
consistent with Postal's intention; he does in any case
note a similarity between his ideas and those of Bach, who
employs something very like the quantifiers and variables
of the predicate calculus. To sort out the exact status of
these constants or variables or whatever they are, would
be a lengthy task and it is one which I shall not undertake
in view of the fact that I shall argue later that Postal's
type of analysis should be rejected. I shall have occasion,
in the next section, to comment on the role of the x's in
my representations (16) and (17) above, but apart from this
I shall simply leave it open as to exactly what formal
properties they are supposed to have.
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In the next few sections of this chapter I shall
make some observations about the nature of the ambiguity
of descriptions, and the nature of these representations,
which suggest that this treatment is not appropriate.
Section 3. Paradoxes of scope.
It was observed above that the ambiguity of descriptive
content of noun phrases cuts across the ambiguities of
specificity and referentiality of noun phrases, and that
therefore whatever device is used to represent the former
cannot be the same as is used to represent the latter. This
places some constraints on the representation of specificity
and referentiality in Postal's system. He has, in effect,
used up the whole of the noun phrase in representing the
relative scope of the description, and this leaves little
over to function as the scope indicator for specificity and
referentiality. We can, of course,. simply stick to arbi-
trary operators like (Sx). It is also possible to maintain
that the determiner of the ambiguous noun phrase is to be
used for indicating specificity, for, as has often been
pointed out in the linguistic literature, the determiner
that appears in the underlying representation of a noun
phrase which gets 'relativised' is not the determiner which
appears in the noun phrase in surface structure. The latter,
since it is therefore not part of the conjoined clause which
Postal supposes underlies the noun phrase and indicates
240
the scope of the description in underlying representations,
is still available for indicating specificity. The obvious
similarities between determiners and the quantifiers of
logic would make this a natural decision, and intuitively
it seems most satisfactory to relate the ambiguities of
specificity and referentiality to the determiner of a noun
phrase, and the ambiguity of descriptive content to the rest
of the material in the noun phrase. This would account for
the fact that the ambiguity of descriptive content affects
indefinite and definite noun phrases alike, the fact that
it is present simultaneously with these other ambiguities,
the fact that the ambiguity of specificity, which affects
indefinite noun phrases, and the ambiguity of referentiality,
which affects definite noun phrases, are very alike in many
ways and yet are mutually exclusive. Thus these proposals
would seem to add up to a very coherent general picture
of opacity. This coherent picture rapidly dissolves into
incoherence, however, if the semantic representations of
the grammar, and the definitions of scope for the symbols
they contain, are supposed to be modelled on those of
standard systems of logic.
The problem is the interaction of the ambiguity of
descriptive content with specificity or referentiality. I
shall illustrate it with respect to specificity. A
sentence like:
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(20) Charley wants to buy a coat like Bill's.
is, as we saw in the previous section, four ways ambiguous.
The noun phrase a coat like Bill's can be taken as specific
or as non-specific, and,in either case, as either transparent
or opaque with respect to its descriptive content. We
therefore need four distinct semantic representations for
this sentence. Using (Sx) to indicate specificity, and
otherwise modelling our representations on Postal's, we
shall have:
(21) (Sx) (x is a coat like Bill's and Charley wants to
buy x).
(22) (Sx) (Charley wants (x is a coat like Bill's and
Charley wants to buy x)).
(23) x is a coat like Bill's and Charley wants (Sx)
(Charley buy x).
(24) Charley wants (Sx) (x is a coat like Bill's and
Charley buy x).
The first two represent specific readings, the second two
represent non-specific readings. The first and third
represent readings which are transparent for descriptive
content, the second and fourth represent readings which are
opaque for descriptive content. And the problem, of course,
is that (23) is not well-formed, or rather, that it is well-
formed only if the first occurrence of x in it is regarded as
unbound by the (Sx) and, if it is, then the representation
------ - - - ----
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does not indicate any connection at all between what
Charley wants to buy and a coat like Bill's. The paradox
of scope is that the first conjunct of (23) must be within
the scope of the (Sx) if its variable is to be co-referential
with the object of Charley buy..., the (Sx) must be within
the scope of the verb wants if it is to express the non-
specific reading, but the first conjunct must be outside
the scope of wants if it is to express the reading which is
transparent for descriptive content. Since scope relations,
at least in standard systems of logic, are transitive, these
three requirements cannot all be satisfied in one formula.
Also worrying, although less so, is the representa-
tion (22) which, like (23), represents a reading of the
sentence as transparent in one way and opaque in the other.
There is no question in (22) of the variables being unbound,
but (22) seems to attribute to the sentence (20) a reading
which is compatible with Charley's wanting to buy, say, a
telescope, or a porcupine, and wanting it to be a coat
like Bill's. The representation (22) indicates that there
is something in particular that Charley wants to buy and
it says what Charley would like it to be, but it does not
actually say what it actually is.
In Chapter II, when discussing the formal representa-
tion of specificity by means of devices like quantifiers
and variables, I made use of forms like (21) and (24) only,
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simply in order not to get involved with these problems.
Now that we require our representations to express the trans-
parency or opacity of the descriptive content of noun
phrases as well as specificity, it is clear that those two
forms of representation, even if they are themselves well-
formed, are not sufficient. The problems that arise in
connection with the other two forms do not prove conclusively
that representations along these lines could not be employed
in a linguistic description, but they do show that a lin-
guistic description containing such representations must
also contain some principles governing the binding of
variables, or the notion of non-transitive scope relations,
or an account of the x's in these representations as some-
thing other than variables which must or may be bound by
quantifier-like elements. And this must be done in such a
way that it does not destroy the suitability of these
devices for representing pronominalization or any other
syntactic or semantic phenomenon which they are supposed to
underly. And even if it can be done, there are further
problems.
Section 4. Simplification of conjunctions and the opaque
reading.
Postal's analysis makes crucial use of the derivation
of relative clauses from underlying conjoined clauses.
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Relative clauses have to be loosened from the noun phrases
in which they appear in surface structure, so that in the
underlying structure they can appear in different positions
relative to the other clauses of the sentence. At one point
Postal writes as if he can imagine no other way of analysing
sentences which exhibit the ambiguity. He says: "Clearly
no structural account which requires all R [i.e. restrictive
relative clauses, JDF] to originate inside the NP they
modify can possibly account for this [ambiguity, JDF]".
There obviously are other ways of accounting for it, though
perhaps less suitable and less elegant. Postal's way is
elegant; like all analyses in terms of scope it seems ideally
suited to capture both the number of readings and the way
in which the readings differ from each other. The very
strong appeal of Postal's particular variety of scope
analysis stems, I think, from the fact that just reading
his representations out into English seems to provide a
quite direct and explicit account of what a sentence means
on each of its readings. Thus the representation:
(25) Mary realises that (x is Jim's best friend and x is
a busdriver).
seems to express quite directly the fact that Mary realises
two things, that someone is a busdriver and that the person
is Jim's best friend. The representation of the transparent
reading of the same sentence:
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(26) x is Jim's best friend and Mary realises that x is
a busdriver.
seems to express quite clearly that what it is being claimed
that Mary realises is simply that a certain person is a
busdriver, and not that that person is Jim's best friend.
However, in Chapter II, we concluded that simplifica-
tion of conjunctions within the scope of opaque operators
must not be permitted since it produces invalid arguments.
This means that (25) is not equivalent to:
(27) Mary realises that x is Jim's best friend and Mary
realises that x is a busdriver.
and it means that we cannot infer from (25) that Mary
realises that someone is Jim's best friend. But it was
only reading (25) as if it did entail this that made (25)
seem so attractive as a representation of the opaque sense.
Even for verbs like realise, then, the analysis is not
nearly so appealing as it seems at first sight. And for
other verbs, such as wants, hopes, orders, fears, and so on,
it is not appealing at all. Postal does not consider
sentences with these verbs, but if we consider the
sentence:
(28) Charley wants to buy a coat like Bill's.
and the putative representation of its opaque reading:
(29) Charley wants (x is a coat like Bill's and Charley
buy x).
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it is hard to find a way of reading this into English which
directly expresses the meaning of the sentence. If it is
taken as roughly equivalent to the English sentence:
'Charley wants to buy something and wants what he buys to be
a coat like Bill's', then perhaps it is not too bad. But
if we can read it this way then we can also, by interchanging
the conjuncts, read it as: 'Charley wants something to be
a coat like Bill's and he wants to buy whatever is'. This,
even if it makes sense at all, is hardly a good paraphrase
of sentence (28). Examples like this simply emphasize
that simplification of conjunctions must not be allowed
within opaque contexts because of the odd results that it
produces. But if simplification is not allowed, then Postal's
way of indicating the scope relationships in sentences is
no more attractive than any other way of doing so; all that
made it look especially attractive was the illusory impres-
sion that to use the conjoined clause underlying the ambigu-
ous noun phrase as the scope operator would be to spell out
the meaning and entailments of the sentence explicitly. It
has been stressed in previous chapters that the semantic
representation of a sentence need not, should not, and
probably could not, consist of a list, or conjunction, of
all the entailments of the sentence. The fact that Postal's
proposed representations do not spell out the entailments
of opaque sentences therefore does not show that those
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representations are inadequate. It shows only that, just
like representations employing completely abstract and
arbitrary means of indicating scope, such as (Dx), they would
need to be supplemented with some general rules which, when
applied to the representations, generated the entailments.
It should be observed that Postal's argument (or
assumption) that the ambiguity of descriptive content should
be captured by deriving noun phrases from clauses conjoined
at different levels of embedding in underlying structures,
was one of his main arguments in support of the claim that
noun phrases must be derived from underlying conjoined
clauses. If the former argument does not hold, as I have
suggested, then it obviously cannot carry any weight as an
argument for the conjunctive analysis of relative clauses.
It seems, in fact, that there is virtually no positive
motivation for adopting such an analysis.
Section 5. The speaker's responsibility for the description.
The logical discussions focus mainly on the fact that
substitutivity of identicals is not a valid inference rule
within opaque contexts, that is, that one cannot move from
a sentence containing one description of something to a
sentence containing an alternative description of it. The
linguistic discussions focus mainly on the fact that
sentences containing opaque contexts are ambiguous and that
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some account must be given of each of their readings and
how the readings differ. These are, of course, opposite
sides of the same coin, for it is some aspect of the opaque
reading of these sentences, an aspect that it does not share
with the transparent reading, that is responsible for the
fact that substitutivity is invalid. In considering how
this phenomenon should be handled in a grammar of English,
linguists have assumed, and rightly I think, that the
difference between the opaque and the transparent reading
of a sentence is that the former expresses some relation-
ship between the subject of the opaque verb and the descrip-
tive content of the noun phrase in question. They also
seem to have assumed that although on the transparent reading
the usual relationship between a speaker and a description
he uses holds, this is not so for the opaque reading; on
the opaque reading the speaker is merely taking over a
description from the subject of the opaque verb, saying
what would count, in his opinion, as a description of the
object in question from the point of view of that subject.
This assumption, I shall argue, is incorrect.
The assumption that the source of the description,
or the responsibility for it, is always either the speaker
(on the transparent reading) or the subject of the opaque
verb (on the opaque reading) is embodied in the proposed
representations that we have been considering. The
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difference between (16) and (17), or between (18) and (19)
above, is a matter of whether the descriptive content of
the noun phrase is represented as part of what the speaker
is asserting, or is represented as part of what he is
asserting that Mary realises, i.e. is ascribing to Mary.
I shall maintain that these two alternatives are not mutually
exclusive and that in fact the speaker is always responsible
for the descriptions that he employs, even if he is also
attributing them to the person whose beliefs, hopes, etc.,
he is reporting. I shall maintain, that it to say, that
there is no purely opaque reading of these sentences, of
the kind just outlined, but that every reading which is
opaque in this sense is also transparent. The contrast
between the two readings is not a matter of whether the
speaker or the subject of the verb is responsible for the
description; the speaker is always responsible, and the
ambiguity is a matter of whehter or not he is also
ascribing responsibility to the subject of the opaque verb.
To establish this will be a somewhat lengthy
business. Since it is a question of what sentences mean
on certain readings, it will require the examination of
examples. Since all the examples are ambiguous in other
ways, this will mean running through examples of each of
the various kinds, to make sure that my claim holds for
them all. The strategy will be the same in all cases,
however. If it assumed that the speaker and the subject
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agree as to how the object in question may be described,
there will be no way of telling who is supposed to be the
source of the description. We must therefore consider the
examples in relation to supposed situations in which the
speaker and the subject disagree over what would be a correct
description; we can then ask whose description may properly
appear in a sentence reporting that situation.
Lakoff has observed (lectures, Illinois, Summer 1968),
that in employing a noun phrase containing a demonstrative
expression, the speaker is responsible for the description
used. This can be illustrated by an example of Postal's.
(31) Charley believes that this chicken soup is not
chicken soup.
We are concerned with the opaque reading of this sentence,
the reading on which a contradictory belief is ascribed to
Charley. (I have some doubts about such examples, since
I have some doubts about what would count as grounds for
holding that Charley believes something contradictory. I
shall do my best to put these doubts aside, however, since
examples with contradictory complement clauses make it
very much easier to keep the difference between the opaque
and transparent readings clear in one's mind.) Let us
assume, as is most natural, that the speaker does not
himself hold this contradictory view but believes that
Charley has made a mistake. Now notice that what the
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speaker disagrees with must be Charley's opinion that the
stuff in question is not chicken soup, not Charley's belief
that it is chicken soup. To see this we have only to compare
the two discourses:
(32) Charley believes that this chicken soup is not chicken
soup. Silly old Charley. Of course it is chicken
soup.
(33) Charley believes that this chicken soup is not
chicken soup. Silly old Charley. Of course it isn't
chicken soup.
I use the double shriek to indicate that a sentence or
discourse, though not syntactically ill-formed, is one
which no speaker in his rational moments would utter, that
is, a sentence or discourse which commits the speaker to
something which is quite patently logically inconsistent.
I think it is clear that (33) deserves the double shriek
and that (32) does not. A similar point can be made in
respect of proper names, thus:
(34) Charley believes that Tom is not Tom. Silly old
Charley. Of course he is Tom.
(35) !! Charley believes that Tom is not Tom. Silly old
Charley. Of course he isn't Tom.
Before considering any further cases, I must intro-
duce a word or caution. We are to contemplate situations
in which Charley's views about something are in conflict
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with the speaker's, in order to decide whether, in such a
situation, the speaker can take over a description from
Charley and use it in reporting Charley's beliefs, hopes,
etc., even if he, the speaker, believes the description
to be incorrect. But when Charley's views are in conflict
with our own, we may, for that very reason, be uncertain as
to just what Charley does think, and what mistake it is that
he is making. We may not know, for example, whether his
mistake consists of thinking that something has a property
which it does not in fact have, or whether it consists
of thinking that something of a certain kind exists when
in fact it does not. These two cases cannot even be
clearly distinguished, for if, for example, Charley points
to a red book and says something about 'that green book',
then he is simultaneously indicating that he thinks that
a certain book which is not green is green, and that he
thinks there exists a green book in the place to which he
is pointing even though there exists none. But we can cer-
tainly make a distinction in practice in many cases. If
Charley points to a red book and calls it a green book,
then, especially if the light is unusual, or if Charley is
known to be colour-blind, it is reasonable to assume that
he has mistaken the colour of the book. If he points into
thin air and says something about 'that green book', then
the most reasonable conclusion is that he is hallucinating
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a green book that is not there at all; to mistake thin air
for a green book just is to hallucinate a green book. On
the other hand, there may be a vast number of cases where
Charley is not there, helpfully pointing at something or
nothing. Then, unless we can question Charley further, and
even if we can, his utterances and his other behavior may
leave considerable room for doubt as to just what kind of
mistake he is making, just where it is that we disagree
with him. In these cases we may simply not know how to
report Charley's beliefs for even what he said (see
Davidson, 'On Saying That', Synthese 1968-69). Since we
are concerned with what would count as a correct account
of Charley's opinions, I shall try to avoid these cases of
uncertainty in the discussion that follows, and consider
only cases in which it is as clear as one could ever
expect it to be, what Charley's views are, and exactly how
they conflict with our own.
So far I have illustrated my claim about the nature
of the opaque reading of descriptions with reference to
proper names and demonstrative expressions. Demonstrative
phrases might be considered suspect examples since they
constitute a rather special case. For one thing, the
demonstrative word itself is always interpreted transparently,
in the sense that it is always interpreted relative to the
speaker and not relative to anyone he is talking about
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(except when it appears within a context of direct quotation).
In this respect it is like other 'token reflexive' expressions,
such as here, now, I, you, etc.. Whether because of this or
not, there also seems to be nothing like a referential/
attributive distinction for demonstrative noun phrases as
there is for other definite noun phrases; there seems to be
no difference between Charley's believing of that chicken
soup that such-and-such, and his believing that whatever is
that chicken soup is such-and-such. Furthermore, demon-
strative noun phrases always apparently entail, or presuppose,
the existence of what they describe. Since by existence
we usually mean existence of things of a certain kind,
rather than just things in general with no properties at
all, that is, we mean existence under some description, it
might be thought that it is just this existence entailment
of demonstrative phrases that commits the speaker to the
descriptions they contain. We shall see shortly, however,
that this will not do as a general account of the commit-
ment.
I now turn to non-demonstrative definite noun phrases,
interpreted referentially, We can use another example of
Postal's:
(36) Charley assumed that the book which was burned was
not burned.
Since we are to take the noun phrase referentially, we
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must suppose that Charley had a particular book in mind
and assumed of it that it was not burned. Since we are to
take the sentence as opaque with respect to the descriptive
content of the noun phrase, we must suppose that the speaker
is attributing to Charley the description 'the book which
was burned' as a description of that book. But now, just
as for the demonstrative examples, for someone to say (36)
is consistent only with his disagreeing with Charley over
the assumption that the book was not burned. Thus:
(37) Charley assumed that the book which was burned was
not burned. Silly old Charley. Of course it was
burned.
The speaker cannot consistently disagree with Charley's view
that the book was burned. Thus:
(38) Charley assumed that the book which was burned was
not burned. Silly old Charley. Of course it wasn't
burned.
There is, of course, nothing inconsistent about someone's
thinking, like Charley, that the book was not burned. It
is just that sentence (36) is not consistent with this
belief. Someone who had that belief could perfectly well
express it and Charley's views by means of a sentence with
the complement of (36) reversed, thus:
(39) Charley assumed that the book which was not burned
was burned.
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Whichever opinion as to the state of the book is expressed
by the content of the noun phrase is the one to which the
speaker is committed. He may be ascribing it to Charley,
but he is also, in using it in his report, endorsing it
himself. Notice that if the speaker has no opinion either
way about the book, then both (36) and (39) seem inappropri-
ate, as witnessed by the inconsistency of both:
(40) !! Charley assumed that the book which was burned was
not burned, but I don't know whether it was burned
or not.
(41) ' Charley assumed that the book which was not burned
was burned, but I don't know whether it was burned
or not.
There seems, then, to be no possibility of taking over a
definite description from Charley, and using it referen-
tially in a sentence, without thereby endorsing it oneself.
Indefinite noun phrases interpreted as specific have,
as we have seen, some affinities with definite noun phrases,
and they too cannot be used, even opaquely, without the
speaker being taken to assent to them. Thus:
(42) Charley thinks a certain book of mine belongs to him,
but I can prove it is mine.
(43) 2 Charley thinks that a certain book of mine belongs
to him, and I can prove that it is his.
(44) 2 Charley thinks that a certain book of mine belongs
to him, but I don't know whose it is.
__ 
--
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Plural specific indefinites, noun phrases with every, each,
many, a few, etc., can also be substituted into frames such
as these. If they are interpreted referentially, the same
conclusions follow. I shall not go through these cases in
detail.
One point remains to be made, however, before we can
leave specific and referential noun phrases. We have
observed (with some hesitation) in earlier chapters that,
unlike demonstratives, specific and referential definite noun
phrases are not inconsistent with the non-existence in the
real world of the things that they describe. What is the
status of the descriptive content of a noun phrase when
what it 'describes' does not really exist? Since some
people may boggle at the idea of either correct or incorrect
descriptions of something that does not exist, I shall dis-
cuss this case in some detail.
If something does not exist, then we cannot go and
look at it and see what properties it has to find out whether
the way in which someone else would describe it is correct.
We can know of its properties only by hearsay, on the report
of the person who has imagined it or designed it or other-
wise conceived of it, or else from a report based on his
report. It may seem in this case that anything a person
says about a non-existent object that he has in mind must
be true of it, that his account of what it is that he is
imagining must be regarded as authoritative. But
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as a statement of the difference between the situation in
which the object described does exist and the situation in
which it does not, this is far too crude. For one thing,
many existent things are not available for inspection either,
and there may often be no way of checking on the properties
that someone ascribes to them. We very frequently rely on
other people's reports, even when the object concerned does
exist. We can, furthermore, often establish on the basis
of such reports that someone is in error about the supposed
properties of a thing, for his report may be internally
inconsistent, or it may conflict with things we are sure of,
such as that mice cannot fly. Questioning the person may,
though it also may not, establish the precise nature of
the error and allow us to determine what the real properties
of the object in question are. To some extent the same
applies to reports about non-existent things too. We may
be quite sure in some such cases that a person's description
of what he is imagining is incorrect and we may even be
sure about what would constitute a correct description.
However, since people can imagine or believe that there
are flying mice and even more extraordinary things than
that, the task of establishing that an error has been made
and what a correct description would be, is likely to be
much harder to succeed in in this case. Still, whether we
say that non-existent things have properties that can be
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described correctly or incorrectly, or whether we say that
one can give correct or incorrect descriptions of what would
exist if what is imagined to exist did exist, it looks as if
one of the main differences between the case of non-existent
objects and existent ones is simply a matter of how easy it
is to discover that a description is incorrect and what a
correct description would be. And this has no bearing on
the thesis that one cannot take over another person's
description of something without thereby committing onself
to its accuracy too. One's responsibility for the
descriptions one uses could be just as great for non-existent
things as for existent ones, even though harder to fulfill.
It might, however, be maintained that there is another,
and more relevant, difference between the two cases, viz.
that disagreements about merely imaginary objects must be
terminological disagreements rather than factual disagree-
ments. Suppose, for example, Charley tells me that he is off
to catch an animal that he is convinced is eating the
tulips and that he refers to this animal as a unicorn. In
telling me about it, however, he gives me a perfect descrip-
tion of a griffin. I am not sure that it even makes any
sense to suppose that a person can imagine a griffin and
imagine that it is a unicorn in any sense other than thinking
that griffins are called unicorns, but in any case it is
this mistake that one would naturally suppose Charley to
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have made -- apart, that is, from thinking that the animal
exists at all. But now if I describe Charley's plans in
the words of (45) rather than (46):
(45) Charley wants to catch a certain griffin.
(46) Charley wants to catch a certain unicorn.
this is not because I disagree with him about the particular
properties of his imaginary beast, but because I disagree
with him about whether 'unicorn' is the right word to use
of a beast with those properties. Charley still seems to
be the ultimate authority as to the nature of the beast
which he has imagined, even though I can correct him when
he calls it a unicorn. Whether or not my claim that factual
errors cannot be taken over by a speaker without his there-
by being taken to endorse them is true, the speaker certain-
ly does have a responsibility to correct terminological
errors that he detects, and I shall digress on this topic
briefly.
There is an important difference between verbs of
reported speech, such as say, remark, announce, etc., and
verbs which describe mental processes or states which are
not necessarily associated with any verbal behaviour, verbs
such as believes, thinks, expects, hopes, wants, fears, etc..
Suppose Charley utters the sentence:
(47) Stephanie prevaricates so much that she is always late
for school.
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I can certainly report:
(48) Charley said that Stephanie prevaricates so much that
she is always late for school.
but it would be very unfair and misleading of me to report:
(49) Charley believes that Stephanie prevaricates so much
that she is always late for school.
unless I honestly believe that Charley knows the difference
between the words 'prevaricate' and 'procrastinate', meant
to say 'prevaricate', and does believe that Stephanie tells
untruths and that this has some connection with her being
late for school. In the much more likely event that I
suspect Charley of having used the wrong word, that is, of
having used a word which does not, conventionally, mean
what he wished to express, then it would be more charitable
and less misleading of me to say:
(50) Charley believes that Stephanie procrastinates so
much that she is always late for school.
The contrast between verbs of saying and verbs of
believing is seen very clearly in examples like:
(51) Charley says that Stephanie prevaricates but he means
that she procrastinates.
This kind of reformulation of Charley's propositional
attitudes does not involve a factual disagreement between
me and Charley. The situation we have imagined is one in
which both Charley and I are contemplating the proposition
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that Stephanie dawles and not the proposition that she tells
lies. The only disagreement between Charley and me is as
to whether or not 'prevaricate' means to postpone doing
something. It is a terminological disagreement. In
reporting Charley's beliefs, hopes, etc., I clearly may,
and in fact should, substitute my own terminology for
Charley's when I believe his is incorrect, and this sub-
stitution is not restricted to noun phrases in a sentence
but applies to every part of it. There will, of course, be
cases in which I take Charley's remarks at their face Value
without it ever occurring to me to wonder whether he really
said what he meant or meant what he said, and there will be
other cases in which I suspect that he has misrepresented
his views but I am not sure. But this does not affect the
general principle that whenever I do realise that Charley
has used an inappropriate word or expression to say what
he meant to say, then I must change this to an appropriate
word or expression when I report what he believes, hopes,
etc., even though not when I report what he said.
While on the topic of the contrast between verbs of
indirect speech and other verbs of propositional attitude,
I should point out that for the former, the view held
apparently by Postal, Lakoff and perhaps others, that on
the opaque reading sentences with these verbs do not commit
the speaker to the factual accuracy of the descriptions
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he uses, does appear to have some truth in it. For verbs
of saying, that is, semantic representations like Postal's
do seem to do justice to the opaque as well as the trans-
parent reading. There is one kind of use of verbs of saying
that quite obviously does not commit the speaker in any way
to the descriptions that appear in noun phrases in the
complement. This is when the complement consists of a di-
rect quotation of Charley's words. In this case the speaker
should not correct even Charley's terminological errors,
yet alone his factual ones. On the other hand, one can put
Charley's remark into indirect speech, substituting third
person for first person, past tense for present tense, etc.,
wherever necessary. Already, in doing this, one is con-
centrating more on the content of what Charley said than on
the sounds that came out of his mouth. I go further in
this direction if I report what Charley said by using a
completely different but synonymous sentence, for example
if I report Charley's utterance of (52) in the words of (53).
(52) I am a bachelor.
(53) Charley said that he wasn't married.
There is yet another use of the verb say which takes me
even further from Charley's actual words, and is not even
necessarily connected with any particular act of saying
something on Charley's part. This is the repetitive sense
of the verb, as in 'Charley says that...' or 'Charley used
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to say that...', the sense in which it means something like
'Charley tends to go around saying that...? or 'Charley once
said to someone, and if you ask him he will probably say
to you that...'. The correct use of say in this sense
perhaps does require that there was once an occasion on
which Charley uttered words expressing the proposition in
question, but apart from this, its meaning is very close
to that of thinks, believes, holds, etc.. After all, what
people say is one very important, if not infallible,
criterion for what they think, and so it is not surprising
that we often use say and think more or less interchangeably.
I suspect that closer observation of this end of the range
of uses of verbs like say would show them to be just like
other verbs of propositional attitude with respect to the
ambiguity of descriptive content. There is something clear-
ly wrong, after all, in saying:
(54) '. Charley said that this chicken soup was for me,
but actually it is cold tea.
Nevertheless at the other end of the scale, certainly for
direct quotation, these verbs do seem to require special
treatment in that they permit one to take over from Charley
all sorts of errors.
Now to pick up the threads of the discussion about
describing imaginary things which do not really exist, and
to retur-n to the question whether only terminological
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disagreement is possible in such a situation. First it
should be observed that terminological disagreement is pos-
sible even over things that do exist. Thus if Charley
points to a cat and calls it a rat, he may be making a
factual error, but if he enumerates all its features and
the features he enumerates are those characteristic of cats
rather than of rats, then it is reasonable to suppose that
his error is merely an error about the meaning of the word
'rat'. Secondly, even if terminological disagreement were
the only possible kind of disagreement in the case of
descriptions of non-existent objects, this would not contra-
dict the claim that the speaker cannot take over factually
incorrect descriptions from Charley without committing
himself to them too, but would simply remove a certain set
of examples from the domain of that claim. Thirdly,
factual error is possible in describing things that do not
exist.
We observed in earlier chapters that to use a
specific or referential noun phrase without any existential
implications is most common and most acceptable either in
talk about mythological or fictional creatures, or in
talk involving the 'creative' verbs, i.e. in talk about
situations in which it is being planned to create something,
to bring it into existence even though it does not exist
now. It is obvious that one can misdescribe Winnie the Pooh
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or Santa Claus. It is also possible to misdescribe some-
thing whose existence is as yet only planned. Many of the
properties of such a thing are determined before it is
brought into existence, and even if it never is; it is just
this which makes it possible to individuate such things
and refer to them specifically even though they do not,
and may never, actually exist. And, of course, Charley
may be mistaken about these properties. Thus suppose a
marble arch is to be built in memory of some eminent
person, then it might be true that:
(55) Charley thinks that the marble arch is to be made
of granite.
or even perhaps that:
(56) Charley thinks that the memorial arch is a bridge.
Having finally hit upon a case where the descriptive
phrase in question is being used of something that does
not actually exist and is not being asserted to exist, and
where it is nevertheless plausible to suppose that there is
a factual, and not merely a terminological, disagreement
between the speaker and Charley, we must now see whether
it would be consistent for the speaker to use such a
sentence but to deny the correctness of the description
that it contains. And it seems clear from the discourse:
(57) Charley thinks that the marble arch is to be made
of granite but in fact it is to be made of wood.
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that this would not be consistent. These examples, then,
also conform to the principle that in taking over Charley's
description, the speaker commits himself to its accuracy
too.
The examination has so far covered all varieties of
noun phrases which are transparent with respect to specific-
ity or referentiality, and they all conform to this principle.
This should really not be too surprising, since in these
cases the speaker is himself referring to something by means
of the noun phrase in question, just as he would be in using
a sentence that does not contain an opaque context. And
if one is to refer to something by means of a noun phrase
containing some descriptive content, then the description
had better be true of the thing one means to refer to.
It would in fact be surprising if this principle did not
hold for examples like:
(58) Charley assumed that the book which was burned was
not burned.
where the phrase the book which was burned is interpreted
referentially, just at it does for examples like:
(59) The book which was burned was mine.
where only a referential interpretation of the book which
was burned is possible. The story is not quite as simple
as this, for there certainly is a sense in which one can
quite properly take over someone else's description of
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something, knowing it to be an incorrect description of the
object to which one means to refer. Donnellan's discussion
of this phenomenon is familiar to many linguists and I shall
therefore comment on it briefly with a view to showing that
it does not significantly affect the point at hand.
Donnellan illustrates the phenomenon as follows
(Reference and Definite Descriptions, pp. 290-1).
"Suppose the throne is occupied by a man I firmly believe
to be not the king but a usurper. Imagine also that his
followers as firmly believe that he is the king. Suppose
I wish to see this man. I might say to his minions 'Is
the king in his countinghouse?'. I succeed in referring
to the man I wish to refer to without myself believing
that he fits the description." The point is even stronger;
I succeed in referring to him even though I myself believe
him not to fit the description. The first point to be made
about this is that Donnellan's example is not an example of
an opaque context. The possibility of using an incorrect
description in referring to someone or something applies
to all referential noun phrases, and thus has no special
bearing on questions about opacity. Secondly the use of
an incorrect description in referring to something is only
acceptable in a limited kind of situation. It was in order
to communicate effectively with the usurper's minions, in
order to find out what he wanted to know, that Donnellan
employed the misdescription 'the king', and the phenomenon
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is in general characteristic of situations in which one is
trying to get something across or to get something done.
The misdescription is used for practical purposes, and not
simply in order to state some truth about the world. Of
course the assertion of a fact may often count as an instance
of trying to do something, trying to get something across
to someone else effectively, but this just brings us to a
second constraint on the use of a misdescription for the
purpose of referring. There is no point to it unless the
person addressed believes the misdescription to be a correct
description. In the case of noun phrases in opaque contexts,
such as in sentence (58) above, we are concerned with whether
or not Charley, the subject of the opaque verb, accepts
the description employed. Since (48) is not the kind of
sentence that characteristically would be addressed to
Charley, the existence of the phenomenon that Donnellan
describes would therefore not constitute adequate grounds
for taking over from Charley the description the book which
was burned if one believed that to be a misdescription of
the object in question. Of course, a sentence like (58)
might be addressed to a third person who, like Charley,
apparently accepts the description the book which was burned,
and in that case one would be justified in using (58) even
if one believed that description to be an incorrect one.
But this simply emphasises the fact that the phenomenon
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has nothing to do with opaque contexts, and nothing to do
with ascribing a description to the subject of an opaque
verb. In particular, it does not save representations like
Postal's from the criticism that they imply, incorrectly,
that on the opaque reading only the beliefs of the subject
of the opaque verb are relevant to the appropriateness of
the description used. If one felt obliged to take account
of the phenomenon in formal semantic representations of
sentences, then not Postal's representations, but something
along the lines of:
(60) You believe x is the king. Is x in x's countinghouse?
would be needed to do it justice. However, I suspect that
it is no more necessary or even desirable to set up such
representations to capture this way of using descriptive
phrases than it is to set up representations like:
(61) I don't believe that p but p.
in order to capture the fact that any sentence that can be
used to assert something sincerely could also be used, in
other circumstances, to tell a lie.
I assume, therefore, that Domellan's observations
can be set aside as having no bearing on the point with
which we are concerned here. The point has, however, only
been established so far with respect to referential and
specific noun phrases, and we must now consider attributive
and non-specific noun phrases. To imagine a case of
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factual disagreement relevant to the descriptive content
of a non-specific noun phrase is not easy. This is in part
because such a noun phrase does not entail the existence of
anything falling under the description used, and these
examples are therefore subject to all the problems that we
observed earlier in connection with specific noun phrases
used non-existentially. But whereas in the latter case
the noun phrase is used to describe something in particular,
an individual, even if a non-existent one, in the case of
a non-specific noun phrase the subject need not even have
any particular object in mind at all. What, then, could
he possibly be said to be misdescribing? If Charley says
he wants to buy an astrakhan coat, he is not either describ-
ing or misdescribing any individual at all, real or
imaginary; he is stipulating some property that something
must never have if he is to be interested in buying it,
and how could he make a factual error in stipulating some-
thing? It is easy to see how he could make a terminological
error, but we already know that terminological errors have
to be corrected by the speaker.
For non-specific, and for attributive, noun phrases,
which are not used to refer to or describe any particular
individual, the question who is responsible for the correct-
ness of the descriptive content of the noun phrase thus
appears to take on a different sense, to be a rather differentV
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question from the one asked of noun phrases which do refer
to individuals. Since there can be cases of non-specific
wants, hopes, etc., which are based on factual errors, I
shall discuss some examples and I hope to establish in the
course of the discussion that in these cases it is acceptable
for the speaker to take over from Charley a descriptive
phrase which is based on Charley's error, but that the
reason for this is not that the speaker has no responsibility
for the correctness of the descriptions he uses, but rather
that in such a case Charley's description of what he wants,
hopes, etc., even if it is based on some error, must be
regarded as a true description.
Suppose Charley mistakenly believes that astrakhan is
sealskin, in the sense that he believes that the stuff,
astrakhan, is what seals are covered in. And suppose that
Charley, having reflected upon seals and how they keep warm
in the arctic, decides that what he needs for the winter is
a coat made out of the skin of seals. Now it seems proper
to say:
(62) Charley wants to buy a sealskin coat.
But it also seems proper to say:
(63) Charley wants to buy an astrakhan coat.
since it is astrakhan that he has in mind whenever he thinks
about seals. This should be contrasted with the situation
in which Charley picks out a particular coat that he wants
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to buy, thinking that it is a sealskin coat whereas in fact
it is astrakhan. Here one could say:
(64) Charley wants to buy this astrakhan coat.
but not:
(65) Charley wants to buy this sealskin coat.
Sentences (62) and (63), on the other hand, are both true. (62)
is true because what Charley really wants is to have a seal-
skin coat, and it can in fact be construed opaquely since a
sealskin coat is also what Charley thinks he wants. (63) is
also true, because for Charley, believing that sealskin is
astrakhan, wanting to buy a sealskin coat just is wanting
to buy an astrakhan coat; astrakhan is what he has in mind
when he thinks about what he wants to buy. If Charley does
not realise that the stuff that he thinks is sealskin is
called astrakhan, then (63) will, however, be true only in
its transparent interpretation. If there is any doubt about
the fact that both (62) and (63) are true, one need only
consider the criteria by which we characteristically
determine what it is that someone wants, for these criteria
pull apart in such situations; some of them provide justi-
fication for the truth of (62) and others for the truth
of (63). Thus we can imagine Charley scanning advertise-
ments for sealskin coats, seeking out shops reputed to
carry sealskin coats, asking salesgirls if they have any
sealskin coats in stock and so on, but also as picturing
-U
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himself in an astrakhan coat, trying on astrakhan coats in
shops, finding out what colours astrakhan comes in, and so
on. Thus (63), unlike (65), contains not a description,
based on a mistake, of what Charley wants to buy but a
description of what Charley, due to a mistake, wants to buy.
The same is true of generic noun phrases. Suppose,
for example, that Charley believes that Russian women are
beautiful on the grounds that Brigitte Bardot, Jeanne Moreau
and Francoise Hardy are beautiful, believing these women
to be Russian. Though the source of his belief is a
mistake it is nevertheless true that Charley believes that
Russian women are beautiful if he is prepared to generalise
from these three women to what he supposes to be their
fellow-countrywomen. On the other hand, given his opinion
of those three and his willingness to generalise about
national types, we are also justified in saying that Charley
believes that French women are beautiful. The latter
claim must be taken transparently, the former may be taken
opaquely, but both in their way are accurate statements of
what Charley believes. To say that Charley believes that
Russian women are beautiful, knowing that the belief is
based on a mistake, is thus not to take over the mistake
oneself, but to give an accurate statement of the con-
sequences of Charley's mistake.
In examples of this kind, the speaker is not using
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the noun phrase in question to describe any individual or
individuals at all, and to ask whether he may Properly take
over the description from Charley is therefore not to the
point. If the speaker is describing anything, it is simply
Charley's belief or want or hope etc., and this is pre-
sumably something that he will try to get right; otherwise
his assertion that Charley believes it or hopes it etc.,
will just be false. If Charley is wrong about the meanings
of words and thus misstates his belief or hope, then the
speaker must correct this in his report. If Charley is
wrong about the facts of the case then this will actually
affect his beliefs, hopes, etc., but the speaker's task is
still just to describe these beliefs and hopes correctly.
There is still no question of his taking over from Charley
a false description of anything.
The idea that the speaker may be describing something,
referring to it under a certain description, and yet may
take over that description from Charley knowing it to be
incorrect, looks very much as if it derives from a confusion
of the two kinds of case, the referential case in which
the speaker is referring to something under a certain
description,and the attributive case in which what Charley
mistakenly believes is relevant to what he hopes, wants,
etc.. And this confusion in turn is due to the failure to
recognise that the ambiguity of descriptive content is
- U ~-
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independent of specificity or referentiality, and thus
to see that it may take different forms depending on whether
a sentence is transparent or opaque in these other ways.
Section 6. Peculiarities of the scope of the description
operator.
The observations of the previous section mean that a
specific or referential noun phrase interpreted as opaque
with respect to its descriptive content has two functions
within the sentence. It is used to attribute acceptance of
that descriptive content to the subject of the opaque verb,
and it is also used to refer to something in the usual way.
A similar noun phrase interpreted as transparent with respect
to its descriptive content has only the latter function.
This suggests, and it appears to be true, that the opaque
reading of a sentence with respect to the descriptive
content of a noun phrase entails the transparent reading
of that sentence with respect to that noun phrase. It is
on the opaque reading that the sentence expresses the
stronger claim. This is exactly the reverse of the situation
for specificity and referentiality of noun phrases. We
saw in earlier chapters that for these ambiguities it is
the transparent reading, i.e. the specific or referential
reading, that expresses the stronger claim.
There is certainly a way of describing the difference
between the opaque and transparent readings of descriptive
-U
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content which makes it look as if the opaque is the weaker
one. Opacity was, after all, originally defined in terms
of the failure of an inference rule; the opaque reading
does not permit inferences which are admissible on the
transparent reading. But the reason for the failure of the
substitutivity of identicals, unlike the failure of exis-
tential generalizationis, to put it roughly, that the
opaque reading of a description says more than the
transparent reading. The description has two functions in
the sentence, and though any other true description would
do as far as one function is concerned, this is not the
case for the other.
I know of no special reason for supposing that an
opaque reading should in general be weaker than the corre-
sponding transparent reading, but this observation about
the opacity of descriptions does have some rather strange
consequences for the nature of the formal representations
of meaning. The arguments given in Section 2 above to the
effect that the phenomenon is a scope phenomena are, I
think, valid, but the idea that an operator like (Dx) can
be used to indicate the scope of descriptions runs into some
problems. By analogy with the representations of specificity
and referentiality, we would represent the reading of (66)
which is fully transparent
(66) Charley believes that Mary wants Jim's brother to win.
with respect to the descriptive content of Jim's brother,
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by means of a (Dx) operator at the far left of the repre-
sentation, thus:
(67) (Dx) Charley believes that Mary wants (Jim's brother)
to win.
But the sense that this representation is supposed to capture
is that Jim's brother is such that Charley hopes of him,
though not necessarily under the description 'Jim's brother',
that Mary wants of him, though not necessarily under that
description, that he will win. In other words, the
descriptive content of the phrase Jim's brother is not part
either of what Charley is said to believe, or of what Mary
is believed by Charley to want. Thus the scope of the
description should be shown not to extend over the Charley
believes.. and Mary wants.. clauses. However if the (Dx)
operator is regarded as anything like ordinary quantifiers,
then by the usual conventions which define scope its scope
does extend over these clauses.
Sentence (66) can also be read with the description
opaque with respect to Charley's belief but transparent
with respect to Mary's want. On this reading it means
that Charley believes of Jim's brother, under the description
'Jim's brother' that Mary wants of him, though not
necessarily under that description, that he should win.
This reading, we might suppose, is to be represented as:
(68) Charley believes that (Dx) Mary wants (Jim's brother) x
to win.
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But now, assuming that the scope of (Dx), as for quantifiers,
extends to its right, this representation is also precisely
the reverse of what it should be, for it suggests incorrectly
that the description 'Jim's brother' is part of what Mary
is believed by Charley to want, though not part of what
Charley believes. The representation (68) would only be
appropriate to the reading we are trying to capture if we
could regard the (Dx) symbol as indicating the end of the
scope of the description, that is, if we could regard the
scope of the description as running backwards from the (Dx)
symbol.
The third possible reading of (66) makes the same
point. The sentence is to be read as saying that Charley
believes of Jim's brother, under that description, that
Mary wants of him, under that description, that he should
win. This reading is thus fully opaque with respect to
the description. Assuming that the opaque reading is to
be represented with the scope operator within the scope
of the opaque verbs, we shall have:
(69) Charley believes that Mary wants (Dx) (Jim's brother)x
to win.
But here again, by the usual conventions for scope, the
scope of the description would be taken to be just the
Jim's brother win clause, and not the higher clauses, whereas
what we need is exactly the reverse. If the (Dx) operator
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can be taken to mark the scope of the description at all,
its scope would have to be read leftwards over the repre-
sentation rather than rightwards as is usual.
The (Dx) operator not only requires an odd convention
for specifying its scope, it also forces us to recognise the
possibility that an operator can have scope over a part of a
sentence which is not a constituent. This is not the case in
standard systems of logic. As a simple example, the formula:
(70) (p & (qvr))=> s
contains the sub-formulae (constituents):
p, q, r, s, (q v r), (p & (q v r)), ((p & (q v r)) => s).
Any one of these constituents could be negated, or placed
within the scope of a sentential operator such as the
necessity operator, or a quantifier. What is not possible
is to insert into the formula, for example, a negation sign
with scope over just the string of symbols p & (q for this
string is not a constituent. (Incidentally, the notion of
constituent negation does not conflict with this principle.
It departs from standard assumptions only in that, while
standardly only constituents which are 'sentential', in the
sense that they can stand alone as well-formed formulae,
may be placed within the scope of some logical operator, in
a system with constituent negation, predicates and terms
could also be negated. However, since predicates and terms
are constituents of formulae, this does not involve extending
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scope over non-constituent strings of symbols.)
The (Dx) operator that we are considering, however,
must be regarded as having scope over non-constituent strings
of symbols if it is to be used in the way we have supposed
in semantic representations. In (68) it is to have scope
over Charley believes though not over Mary wants; in (69)
it is to have scope over Charley believes that Mary wants
but not over Jim's brother wins. But Charley believes, for
example, is not a proper constituent of the sentence, in
fact the smallest constituent of which both these words are
part is the whole of the sentence and thus includes constitu-
ents over which we do not want the description to have scope.
These features of the (Dx) operator could presumably
be incorporated into a formal grammatical system, even if
not into anything resembling standard systems of logic. And
there are other ways out if we do not wish to take this one.
We might, for example, adopt an operator (NDx), with
exactly the inverse of the meaning of (Dx), that is,
something like 'but not necessarily under this description'.
Then we could represent the possible readings of (66) as:
(71) (NDx) Charley believes that Mary wants (Jim's brother)x
to win.
(72) Charley believes that (NDx) Mary wants (Jim's brother) x
to win.
(73) Charley believes that Mary wants (NDx) (Jim's brother)
x
to win.
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Substitutivity of descriptions could then be set up to apply
only within the scope of this operator. Notice, however,
that it would be semantically quite odd, in this system, to
identify the scope operator with a clause containing the
descriptive content of the noun phrase, as Postal does.
I shall pursue this point in Section 9. Meanwhile
I shall consider some further facts about the opacity of
descriptive content which are relevant to semantic representations.
Section 7. The substitutivity of non-nominal constituents.
The customary emphasis on the substitutivity of
descriptions in opaque contexts tends to suggest that opacity
affects only the noun phrases within an opaque context, and
not the predicative constituents of a complement clause.
It seems to be assumed that in reporting Charley's beliefs,
hopes, wants, etc., I can if I wish substitute for a descrip-
tion of Charley's an alternative description on the basis
of some identity known to me though not necessarily to
Charley, but that I cannot make any such substitutions when
it comes to predicative parts of the sentence. Thus if
Charley wants to marry a certain chorus girl and thinks
she is the most beautiful of them all, whereas to my mind
she is quite the ugliest, I will report this as:
(74) Charley wants to marry the ugliest chorus girl.
not as:
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(75) Charley wants to marry the most beautiful chorus girl.
But it would not be appropriate to substitute my opinion
for Charley's in the predicative part of the complement
clause. I cannot properly say:
(76) Charley thinks that the chorus girl he wants to marry
is the ugliest one.
but only:
(77) Charley thinks the chorus girl he wants to marry is
the most beautiful one.
The same point was made with respect to examples (36)
and (39) in Section 5 above.
This is not to say that in my reports I am bound to
the words that Charley himself would use. Even if I know
how he would express his belief or hope or want, then unless
I quote him directly, I shall almost certainly have to make
some changes in his words, such as interchanging I and you
and adjusting time and place expressions. Since Charley
may not have expressed his belief or hope in words at all,
or may have expressed it in some other language, it is
generally accepted that I can substitute for what I believe
Charley might himself have said, some synonymous expression.
Thus if Charley says 'Tom is a bachelor' it is reasonable
to report that Charley believes that Tom is unmarried. And
if Charley were to reject this as a report of his opinion,
for any reason other than simply not knowing what the words
284
mean, then this would not show that my report was faulty
but that there was something wrong with Charley.
It is arguable, however, that substitutions for non-
nominal constituents in opaque contexts are acceptable even
if they are based on factual identities and not simply
identities of meaning. Suppose, for example, that there is
a curfew in force, and that it takes effect at 6 p.m., though
Charley does not know what time it begins. And suppose that
Charley is afraid that his wife broke the curfew last night.
Then surely I can report:
(78) Charley is afraid that his wife was out after 6 p.m.
last night.
This will only be true if it is interpreted transparently,
of course, for it is an account of what Charley fears that
he is in no position to provide himself and might even, in
his ignorance, positively disagree with. The importance
of (78) is that it is not the result of substituting one
noun phrase for another, but the result of substituting the
verb phrase was out after 6 p.m. last night for the verb
phrase broke the curfew last night. Other examples are not
hard to find. To have been convicted of a felony is to be
ineligible for the draft. Therefore if it is true that:
(79) Charley proved that he had been convicted of a felony.
then it is also true that:
(80) Charley proved that he was ineligible for the draft.
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(even if Charley does not realise this, though it is only
transparently true in that case). If Tom and I disagree
utterly about something, so that to believe Tom is to dis-
agree with me, then one can infer from:
(81) Charley expects that most people will believe Tom.
that:
(82) Charley expects that most people will disagree with me.
Such substitutions are very like substitutions in
noun phrases which are not being used specifically or
referentially. One is substituting not one description of
an object for another, but one description of what Charley
fears, or proved, or expects, for another description. The
examples given so far have involved situations in which
Charley is simply ignorant of some fact known to the speaker,
but just as for non-referential noun phrases, substitutions
are possible even where Charley and the speaker flatly
disagree about some fact, and in these cases, just as for
non-referential noun phrases, both accounts of what Charley
believes, fears, etc., seem to be justified. Thus if
Charley thinks the curfew takes effect at 7 p.m. rather than
6 p.m., and if he is afraid that his wife broke the curfew,
then all three of the following are correct reports:
(83) Charley is afraid that his wife broke the curfew.
(84) Charley is afraid that his wife was out after 7 p.m.
(85) Charley is afraid that his wife was out after 6 p.m.
The reason why (76) is not a correct report of Charley's
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opinion is not just that Charley and the speaker disagree
about the chorus girl, but because there is no identity
statement to the effect that to be the most beautiful chorus
girl is to be the ugliest chorus girl, on which the substitu-
tion could be based. But because to break the curfew is to
be out after 6 p.m., to have been convicted of a felony is
to be ineligible for the draft, to believe Tom is to dis-
agree with me, there can be substitutions based on these
identities.
The impression that substitutions, other than merely
terminological ones, can be made only for noun phrases in
opaque contexts is, I think, due once again to the failure
to distinguish the ambiguities of specificity and referential-
ity of noun phrases from the ambiguity of descriptive content.
The former ambiguities do affect only noun phrases; an
adjective cannot be non-specific, a verb phrase can only be
non-specific insofar as it contains a noun phrase which is
non-specific, and it does not make sense to talk of a
referential verb phrase, for example. Because opacity of
these kinds shows up only in noun phrases, it is easy to
suppose that opacity with respect to the lexical content of
constituents applies only to noun phrases too. But it seems
that this is not the case, and that 'opacity of descriptions'
is in fact a much more general phenomenon. It is worth
observing that many examples of opacity in noun phrases
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actually affect only part of the phrase, thus:
(86) Charley thinks that this green book is a red book.
(87) Charley thinks that this green book is a green envelope.
(88) Charley thinks that the book which was burned was not
burned.
On the assumption that substitution involves substituting
one noun phrase for another, the transparency of some part
of a noun phrase has to be described in terms of the trans-
parency of the whole phrase. If we recognise that any kind
of constituent may be interpreted transparently and may be
substituted for on the basis of a factual identity, then
we can describe this situation in a much more natural and
intuitive way, and simply say that it is an adjective, or
a relative clause, etc., that is being substituted for.
There may, in some cases, be independent motivation
for an analysis of a sentence on which the transparent
constituent, though not superficially a noun phrase, is one
in deep structure. For example, the sentence:
(89) Mary thinks that John is cleverer than he is.
appears to involve the transparency of a measure adverb
modifying clever. But it has often been claimed that
comparatives should be analysed in terms of a phrase like
'the degree to which...', and if this is correct then the
transparent constituent can, after all, be regarded as a
noun phrase. In many cases, however, this manoeuvre of
analysing a sentence so that a noun phrase can be regarded
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as transparent would be motivated solely by the desire to
preserve the principle that only noun phrases are substituta-
ble, for it would lead to otherwise unnecessary complications
in the syntactic component. Thus sentence (86), for example,
might be rendered as:
(90) Charley thinks that this book which is of the colour
green is a book of the colour red.
with the adjectives expressed by noun phrases. In formal
logic, such a move would constitute a move from a first order
logical system to a second order (i.e. a much more powerful)
system. It may turn out to be necessary to make this move,
but it does not appear to be required by the facts under
consideration, as long as we permit non-nominal constituents
in opaque contexts to be represented as transparent.
Even if, in principle, any constituent in an opaque
context may be interpreted as transparent, some may in
practice be excluded because of the absence of any appropriate
identity statement that could serve as the basis for the
speaker's substituting his own words for those of the person
whose belief, want, etc., he is reporting. For example,
though a noun phrase governed by a preposition may be sub-
stituted for, and a prepositional phrase as a whole may be
substituted for, on the basis of an identity such as:
(91) behind the aspidistra is next to the whatnot.
it is hard to imagine an identity statement that would serve
as the basis for substituting one preposition for another.
This will limit the number of possibilities to be captured
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formally to some extent, though not perhaps very much.
It is also obvious that if a certain constituent is
interpreted as transparent with respect to its descriptive
content, then all constituents in which it is included must
also be regarded as transparent. For example, if we interpret
the sentence:
(92) John thinks Smith's murderer is insane.
as transparent with respect to the description 'Smith', i.e.
as not implying that John accepts this as a description of
Smith (or anyone), then clearly the sentence must also be
interpreted as transparent with respect to the description
'Smith's murderer', i.e. as not implying that John accepts
this description either. Transparency of descriptive content
is thus inherited from internal constituents to the
constituents that contain them. It is interesting to con-
trast this with the case for specificity and referentiality,
which can be indicated schematically in the following way:
(92) a (specific ) friend of a (specific)actor
((fofl-specif c
a ( eific.) friend of a (non-specific) actor
the (referentia ) best friend of a (specific) actor
L attr ibutive)
the ( rib)tia best friend of a (non-specific)
actor
the (eferentia) best friend of the (referential)battributivr
bridegroom
290
the ( *refrential best friend of the (attributive)
bridegroom
a ( specific . friend of the (referential) bridegroom(non-specifici
a ( *specific .) friend of the (attributive) bridegroom
non-specific)
There is certainly more to be said than is contained in this
informal chart (particularly in connection with phrases like
the colour of a lemon, the insanity of Smith's murderer, etc.),
but what the above examples illustrate is that for specificity
and referentiality of noun phrases, it is opacity rather
than transparency which is inherited by a constituent from
the constituents that it contains. This contrast between
specificity and referentiality on the one hand, and the
opacity of descriptive content on the other, is related to
the observations of Section 6 above about the logical relation-
ships between the opaque and transparent readings.
Section 8. Descriptive content and surface structure.
Chomsky has suggested, informally, that the opaque
reading of a sentence should be represented by means of a
pair consisting of a semantic representation of the usual kind,
and a representation of the surface structure of the material
within the opaque context. The former will indicate what
the sentence says is believed (hoped, wanted, etc.,) and
by whom; the latter will provide the description under which
it is believed (hoped, wanted, etc.). For the transparent
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reading, since the actual descriptions employed are irrelevant
to its truth value except in the usual way, a representation
of surface structure will not be included as a part of the
formal semantic representation.
This proposal, unlike Postal's, does not run into
problems connected with reconciling the representation of
specificity and referentiality of noun phrases with the
representation of the opacity of descriptive content. The
interpretation of the descriptive content of a phrase is not
represented by variations in the position of that phrase in
the semantic representation. The phrase can be left in its
normal position, and the presence or absence of a surface
structure representation will determine how it is to be read.
Notice, incidentally, that specificity and referentiality
cannot be treated in this fashion; a surface structure
representation of the clause within an opaque context will
not distinguish a specific reading from a non-specific one,
or a referential reading from an attributive one.
However, this analysis in terms of surface structure is
in fact appropriate only for a certain rather small subset
of opaque constructions, for in the majority of cases
surface structure is not relevant to the truth value of the
sentence. It is relevant in the case of verbs that introduce
direct quotations, and perhaps also (if some allowance is
made for pronouns, demonstratives, and other 'token-reflexive'
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items) for verbs that introduce indirect speech (see Section
5). Conceivably it is also relevant in the case of a number
of other verbs such as is aware or realises. For most verbs,
however, though the truth value of the opaque reading of
the sentence does depend on the descriptions employed, it
is not sensitive to variations merely in surface structure --
it does not depend on the actual words that are employed. A
sentence such as:
(93) John believes Smith's murderer is insane.
may after all be true, and true on an opaque reading, even if
John has never uttered any sentence resembling the complement
clause. People do often express their beliefs or their wants,
hopes, etc., in words, but they also often do not, and we
can know that someone has a certain belief, want, hope, etc.,
without knowing anything at all about what he has said.
The strongest possible claim about the relationship between
a sentence such as (93) and the surface structure of its
complement clause is therefore that those words are the
words that John would use if he were to express his belief
in words. But even this conditional statement is too strong
because of the fact that we can know and report someone's
beliefs, wants, etc., and report them opaquely, even if
that person only speaks languages other than the one in which
we are doing the reporting. We can report John's belief
by means of (93) even if John speaks only French and
-m
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Swahili. And, furthermore, we can report opaquely the beliefs
and wants of people and animals that speak no language at all.
The most we could claim, therefore, is that the words that
appear in the opaque context are the words that the subject
would use to report his own belief, want, etc., if he were
able to report it in English. But it is clear that by
now we are no longer talking of a relationship between the
truth of a sentence and a particular form of words, a particular
surface structure. We can pin down the way in which John's
belief is expressed only within the bounds of a set of
synonymous sentences.
It is widely accepted that the substitution, within an
opaque context, of one expression for another with which it
is synonymous does not affect the truth value of the sentence
even on an opaque reading. The kind of substitution that
differentiates opaque and transparent readings is the
substitution of one expression for another that, as a matter of
fact, is co-extensive with it, not the substitution of
synonymous expressions. This observation leads to the same
conclusion as in the previous paragraph. Surface structures
are too particular a specification of the description under
which someone believes, hopes, wants, etc., something. On
the assumption that all and only expressions which are
synonymous are assigned the same semantic representation, it
is in fact the semantic representation of the material within
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the opaque context, not a representation of its surface
structure, which is needed to indicate the description under
which something is said to be believed, wanted, etc..
Now, however, the suggestion that the representation
of the opaque reading consists of a semantic representation
of the usual kind plus a representation of the descriptions
which appear within the opaque context, turns out to be simply
the suggestion that the representation is a semantic repre-
sentation of the usual kind. There will therefore be nothing to
distinguish the representation of an opaque reading of a
sentence from a representation of a transparent reading. The
distinction that was proposed, and that we have rejected, was
a distinction between John's believing that a certain form
of words expresses a true proposition, and John's simply
believing that the proposition is true. The distinction that
we actually need is a distinction between John's believing
that a certain proposition corresponds to some state of
affairs in the world and John's believing simply that that
state of affairs does obtain. For example, if John believes
(opaquely) that Smith's murderer is insane but does not know
that Smith's murderer is Jones, then we cannot conclude that
John believes the proposition that Jones is insane. But if
Smith's murderer is Jones, then the proposition that Jones
is insane and the proposition that Smith's murderer is insane
do in fact correspond to the same state of affairs, and from
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the fact that John believes that the state of affairs corre-
sponding to the proposition that Smith's murderer is insane
does obtain it follows that he believes that the state of affairs
corresponding to the proposition that Jones is insane does
obtain. The whole distinction has thus been shifted along the
scale. What we have now is not the contrast between the pair:
(94) John believes the proposition p in the words 'p'. (OPAQUE)
John believes the proposition p. (TRANSPARENT)
but, if I may be forgiven some imprecision in expressing it,
the contrast between the pair:
(95) John believes the state of affairs p in the proposition
p. (OPAQUE)
John believes the state of affairs p. (TRANSPARENT)
I shall not even attempt to formulate (95) more
precisely than this since, because of a number of observations
made in earlier sections of this chapter, it is not suitable as
even the basis for an adequate representational system. It is
important to bear in mind, however, that whatever representa-
tional system we do employ must not portray the difference
between opaque and transparent readings in terms of anything
as particular as surface structures. What is common between
the two readings is what I have loosely called the state of
affairs that is believed (wanted, hoped, etc.) to obtain.
What differentiates them is whether or not the subject of the
opaque verb is supposed to accept as an account of this state
of affairs some sentence which means the same as the
sentence which appears within the opaque context.
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Section 9. Implications for semantic representation.
A number of observations have been made in this
chapter which must be regarded as constraints on a formal
system for the semantic representation of the opacity of
descriptive content. The difference between the alternative
readings of an ambiguous sentence is a difference in scope
relationships (Section 2). Whatever operator is used to
indicate these scope relationships must be independent of
the operators used to represent specificity and referentiality
of noun phrases (Section 3). Either the scope of this operator
must be regarded as running in a backward direction, or else
a semantic interpretation must be found for this operator
which is designed to avoid this (Section 6). It is not only
noun phrases but also other types of constituent within the
opaque context that may be interpreted transparently (Section
7).
What is needed, therefore, is some formal device that
can appear in any one of the clauses of the representation
to indicate scope. It must be applicable to verb phrases,
adjectives, etc., as well as to noun phrases. It must be
interpreted to mean not something like 'under the description..'
but something like 'not necessarily under the description..'.
The representation of the ambiguous phrase itself should
not be used positionally in the role of scope operator
because of interactions with the specificity and referentiality
operators. One formal system which fulfills these conditions
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can be illustrated by the following representations for the
sentence: Mary hopes that John believes that my brother is
ineligible for the draft.
(96) Mary hopes that John believes that my brother is
(97) Mary hopes
ineligible
(98) Mary hopes
ineligible
(99) Mary hopes
ineligible for the draft.
(ND John believes that my brother is
for the draft) that John believes that my
brother is ineligible for the draft.
that John believes (ND my brother is
for the draft) that my brother is
ineligible for the draft.
(ND John, my brother) that John believes
(ND ineligible for the draft) that my brother is
ineligible for the draft.
(100) Mary hopes (ND John)that John believes (ND my brother)
that my brother is ineligible for the draft.
This is just a selection from the set of possible readings
that could be represented. Of these, (96) represents the
fully opaque reading, and (97), since the (ND...) operator
has scope over the embedded clause too, represents the fully
transparent reading. In (98) the clause 'my brother is
ineligible for the draft' is represented as opaque with
respect to Mary's hope but transparent with respect to John's
belief. In (99) the phrases 'John' and 'my brother' are
represented as transparent with respect to Mary's want, the
phrase 'my brother' is therefore also to be taken as transparent
298
with respect to John's belief, and in addition the phrase
'ineligible for the draft' is represented as transparent with
respect to John's belief. In (100), the phrase 'John' is
transparent with respect to Mary's hope, and the phrase 'my
brother' is transparent with respect to John's belief.
The repitition, inside the (ND...) operator, of
material that also appears elsewhere in the representation
makes these representations look extremely redundant. The
repeated material is, however, merely serving in the role
of an indexing system; instead of duplicating the lexical
material we could instead have used a set of subscripts
on phrases to indicate which operator, if any, governs
them. The two systems would be formally equivalent.
Neither, obviously, is particularly elegant or simple, but
this seems to be unavoidable. As long as we take seriously
the idea that any constituent within an opaque context may
be interpreted as transparent independently of the others,
then we shall need a representational system that allows
for a rather large number of distinct readings for all but
the simplest of sentences. A proposal such as Chomsky's,
discussed in the previous section,ascribes far fewer readings
to sentences, for it treats clauses within opaque contexts
as a whole as either opaque or transparent, and does
not make distinctions among the internal constituents of
these clauses. A very much less complex indexing system
is obviously sufficient on such a theory.
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The difference between these approaches is very like
the difference between theories which recognise constituent
negation, and those which permit only sentence negation.
The decision between these types of theory also turns on
intuitions as to when a sentence is ambiguous and when it
is simply non-committal, i.e. when it has a number of
distinct readings and when it has a single reading which is
compatible with a number of distinguishable states of affairs.
For negation there do exist some clear examples (e.g. sentences
containing quantifiers) which have two or more distinct negations.
For opaque constructions, however, it is less easy to find
any hard facts to back up the claim that, for example,
sentence (96) has the distinct readings represented above (and
others too), and not simply the three readings that an
analysis such as Chomsky's would assign to it. This claim
therefore rests solely on the intuition that such a sentence
is in fact many ways ambiguous, but this intuition might be
questioned and I admit to being unable to shake off a lingering
doubt about it myself.
Section 10. The meaning of 'under the description...'.
I have so far given more attention to the problem
of providing distinct representations for the various readings
of a phrase which is ambiguous with respect to descriptive
content, than I have to the question of what precisely is
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involved in each of these various readings. Finding natural
informal paraphrases of the readings is not easy. I have
expressed the opaque reading by saying that it entails that
the subject of the opaque verb 'accepts' the description ex-
pressed by the phrase in question, or alternatively that
the subject wants or hopes or thinks something 'under the
description' which the phrase expresses. But these explica-
tions explain nothing unless we can state what is meant by
them in their turn.
I shall take it for granted that, as argued in Section 8,
to ascribe acceptance of a description to someone is not to
ascribe to him the use, or even the potential use, of a
particular form of words. Setting this aside, there are still
at least two ways in which we might construe the claim that
the opaque reading of a sentence such as:
(101) John wants to buy a coat like Bill's.
entails that John 'accepts' the description 'a coat like Bill's',
or wants to buy something 'under the description "a coat like
Bill's"'. We might be claiming that John believes (or knows
or realises or is aware) that what he wants to buy is a coat
like Bill's. Alternatively we might be claiming that John
wants to buy such a coat inasmuch as it is a coat like Bill's.
Since this could hardly be the case unless John believed
(at least in some weak sense of 'believe') that such a coat
is a coat like Bill's, this second version of the claim is a
stronger one than the first. It is very like, though perhaps
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not quite as strong as, the claim that John wants to buy
something because it is a coat like Bill's.
The difference between the two accounts becomes clear
if we consider a situation in which they pull apart. Thus
suppose John wants to buy a coat, knowing that it is like
Bill's coat, but insofar as its being like Bill's coat
affects him at all, he would prefer it not to be. He might,
for example, be quite put out that Bill has caught on to
the latest fashion before he himself has done so. Now
is this situation compatible with the truth of the opaque
reading of sentence (101) with respect to the descriptive
content of the phrase a coat like Bill's, or is it com-
patible only with the truth of the transparent reading
of that sentence? Should we, that is to say, take the
opaque reading to require John's wanting to buy something
inasmuch as it is a coat like Bill's, or should we take
it to require only that John wants to buy something knowing
it to be a coat like Bill's?
From the literature on opacity, it is not at all easy
to determine what the answer to this kind of question is
commonly supposed to be. Much has been written on the topic
of 'wanting something under a certain description', and it
appears that someone's merely knowing that a description is
true of something that he wants is not generally regarded as
counting as his wanting it under that description. For example,
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the fact that I want to spend next week in Paris, knowing
that this would mean missing three lectures, is not usually
held to be sufficient grounds for the claim that I want to
miss three lectures.
On the other hand, Linsky, in discussing the familiar
example:
(102) Oedipus wanted to marry his mother.
says ('Referring', pp. 74-5): "Understood transparently,
'Oedipus wanted to marry his mother' means something like,
'Oedipus wanted to marry a person who, in fact, was his
mother'. This last would naturally be understood not to
imply that Oedipus knew that the woman he wanted to marry
was, in fact, his mother. Understood opaquely, 'Oedipus
wanted to marry his mother' means something like 'Oedipus
desired to make true the proposition that the mother of
Oedipus is the wife of Oedipus'. This last paraphrase is
correct only if it would naturally be understood in such a
way that it would not be true unless Oedipus did know that
the woman he wanted to marry was his mother." The trouble
is that Linsky's paraphrase 'Oedipus desired to make true
the proposition that the mother of Oedipus is the wife of
Oedipus' does not distinguish between Oedipus wanting to
marry Jocasta despite the fact that she was his mother and
his wanting to marry her inasmuch as she was his mother.
Linsky's stress on the question whether Oedipus knew that the
woman he wanted to marry was his mother suggests that he
regards the opaque reading as consistent with Oedipus's wanting
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to marry her despite her being his mother as well as with his
wanting to marry her inasmuch as she was his mother, as long
as, in both cases, we assume that he knew that she was his
mother.
It is possible that the reason for this diversity, or
even confusion, of opinion about what is involved in wanting
something under a certain description is that philosophers
have concentrated mostly on examples with verbs like know
and believe rather than want, hope, fear, and so on. For know
and believe and similar verbs, the difference between the two
accounts more or less vanishes. If I know that Cicero de-
nounced Catiline, knowing him to be Cicero, then surely I know
that Cicero, under the description 'Cicero', denounced
Catiline. There does not even seem to be any sense to the
further condition that I should know that Cicero, inasmuch as
he was Cicero, denounced Catiline. For examples with necessary
and possible, which have also been studied in detail, it is by
contrast only the 'inasmuch as' paraphrase that makes sense.
Thus it is necessarily true that my mother, inasmuch as she
is my mother, is related to me; it is not necessarily true
that inasmuch as she is the chairman of the drama committee
she is related to me. In these examples, of course, the verb
has no subject and so there is no-one to whom knowledge of
the description could be ascribed.
Sentences with verbs like want, hope, fear, and so on,
seem to be under tension from the opposite pull of these two
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kinds of paradigm. My intuition is that they can be, and are,
taken in both ways. In fact there is an interesting correla-
tion between the referential/attributive ambiguity and the
way in which the opaque reading with respect to descriptive
content is construed. The fact that these two different kinds
of opacity are often confused probably also helps to explain
the uncertainty about what is involved on the opaque reading
of a description. Thus Linsky distinguishes only two
readings of the sentence (102), and although his paraphrases
do not make entirely clear what these two readings are supposed
to consist of, it appears that the first is both referential
and transparent with respect to descriptive content, and the
second is both attributive and opaque with respect to
descriptive content. If, however, we distinguish the two kinds
of ambiguity, and thus recognise four readings of sentence (102),
then an interesting point emerges.
On the attributive reading, no particular individual
is referred to by the phrase his mother; rather, this phrase
functions more as a criterion or condition than as a description.
What Oedipus wants is that he should marry whatever person
satisfies this condition. Thus for the attributive reading,
the 'inasmuch as' account of wanting under a description,
though not actually forced on us, will in fact be much more
natural than the 'knowing who' account. For the referential
interpretation of the phrase his mother, on the other hand,
the sentence will be true only if there is some person
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of whom Oedipus wants it to be the case that he should marry
her. In Chapter III we found it extremely difficult to state
the truth conditions on this kind of statement, but it was
clear that merely knowing one description which was true
of his mother would not count as sufficient for Oedipus'
wanting, in the referential sense, to marry his mother.
On the referential reading, therefore, we can assume that
Oedipus knows more than one description that is true of his
mother, and then it is an interesting question whether or not
he knows that the description 'Oedipus' mother' is true of
her. Thus the referential reading tends to favour (though,
once again, it does not force on us) the 'knowing who' account
of wanting under a description, at the expense of the 'inasmuch
as' account.
In addition to depending on the kind of opaque verb
in the sentence, therefore, the way in which the opaque read-
ing of a description is construed also seems to depend upon
whether the phrase is interpreted as referential or attributive.
If I am right that in many cases it may be construed in either
of the ways I have described, then this doubles the number
of readings that must be recognised for the already many
ways ambiguous examples that have been discussed, and thus
puts an additional burden on a system of semantic representa-
tion.
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Section 11. Some further logical relationships between noun
phrases.
In Chapter II it was argued that the specific
reading of a sentence with an indefinite noun phrase in
an opaque context does not, for many opaque verbs, entail
the non-specific reading. An analogous question can be asked
about the relationship between the referential and
attributive readings of definite noun phrases. I did not
discuss this question in Chapter III because the answer
to it involves matters concerning the opacity of descriptions.
The referential reading of a definite noun phrase,
as I have characterised it, is 'stronger' than the attributive
reading since it requires that the subject should know who
the definite noun phrase refers to. To determine whether
the referential reading actually entails the attributive
one, we must control for the effects of the ambiguity
of the descriptive content of the phrase. But this is in
fact extremely difficult to do. If we suppose the phrase
is opaque with respect to its descriptive content, then
we come up against the problems raised in Section 10,
viz. the uncertainty as to what is involved in the opaque
reading of a description, and the correlation between
what is usually taken to be involved and the referential/
attributive contrast. The referential reading of:
(103) John wants to meet the Lord Mayor.
may be true when the description 'the Lord Mayor' is taken
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opaquely, in the sense that there is some person whom John
knows to be the Lord Mayor whom he wants to meet. But the
attributive reading which is opaque for descriptive content
is only naturally taken in the 'inasmuch as' sense, i.e. John
wants to meet whoever is the Lord Mayor because there is
something about Lord Mayors that interests him. And read
this way, the attributive reading of (103) certainly does
not follow from the referential reading outlined above.
It may, perhaps, be entailed by the referential reading
if this too is taken in the 'inasmuch as' sense, but my
own intuitions and those of many other English speakers
become just too shaky here to be certain.
Since this variation in the construal of the opaque
reading of a description is not found for epistemic verbs,
we may consider instead an example such as:
(104) John knows that the Lord Mayor has gout.
In this case the attributive reading does seem to follow
from the referential one (at least, given a theory of
immediate reference). It should be remembered, however,
that epistemic verbs differ in a number of ways from
non-epistemic opaque verbs (for example, the specific
reading of an indefinite noun phrase entails the non-
specific; the attributive reading of a definite noun phrase
does not entail the specific reading of a related indefinite
phrase). Thus this observation about the referential and
attributive readings of (104) may not be generalizable.
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If we try to determine the relationship between
referential and attributive phrases when they are both read as
transparent with respect to their descriptive content, we
come up against the point made in Section 3, viz. that
it is not clear that an attributive noun phrase does
have a reading which is transparent with respect to
descriptive content. In the light of the discussion of
Section 5, some further, though tentative, comments
can be made on this point. For indefinite noun phrases,
the non-specific reading may be transparent with respect to
descriptive content because, although no particular
referent for the noun phrase is supposed, the speaker,
knowing what kind of thing John wants to catch, hopes to
buy, etc., can provide an alternative description of this
kind of thing. If we try to extend this account to attributive
definite noun phrases, the only sense that can be made of it
is that the speaker may provide an alternative description
which will always pick out the same person as John's own
description, regardless of which particular person fits either
description. The kind of contingent identity statement
that would mediate a substitution for attributive noun
phrases is thus not one that is tied to a particular
individual but one which is true in general, for example:
(105) The Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces is the
President.
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(106) The man I shall marry will be the first man who asks
me.
There are obviously fewer contingent identity statements
of this kind than of the usual kind.
And the condition may be even stronger than this.
Since the function of an attributive noun phrase is
apparently to provide a criterion rather than a description
in the usual sense, it may be that attributive phrases
are subject to substitution only on the basis of an
identity between the properties expressed by the two
phrases in question. Thus instead of (105), we might
require:
(107) To be the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces is
to be the President.
which, though true in a sense, is not true in the stronger
sense in which (108) is true:
(108) To be out after 6 p.m. is to break the curfew.
given that there is a curfew that takes effect at 6 p.m..
But if this is what is involved in the transparency of
descriptive content of an attributive definite noun phrase,
then the phrase the man who broke the curfew in the sentence:
(109) John wants to meet the man who broke the curfew.
is still functioning as a criterion rather than as a
straightforward description, even if it is taken as
transparent (i.e. as one that John would not necessarily
be able to provide himself). And so once again the 'inasmuch
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as' implication of the attributive reading tends to obscure
the nature of the connection between referential and
attributive noun phrases.
All of these comments are very tentative and imprecise,
but in view of the uncertainty of intuitions in this area,
any hard and fast conclusions are more or less bound to
be incorrect. I shall therefore leave this question and
turn to another point about the relationship between referential
and attributive noun phrases. This is that the inference from an
attributive reading of a definite noun phrase to its
referential reading can be mediated by an identity statement;
therefore the referential/attributive distinction appears to
be very like the opacity of descriptive content (which concerns
the substitutivity of identicals). Since I have taken pains
to keep these two kinds of opacity distinct, some comment is
in order.
If, as I have maintained, the referential reading of
a definite noun phrase requires that the subject knows who
(what) the referent of the noun phrase is, then the
referential reading of a sentence should follow from the
attributive reading together with the premise that the
subject knows to whom the attributive phrase applies.
For example the referential reading of:
(110) John wants to meet the Lord Mayor.
should follow from the attributive reading together with:
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(111) John knows who the Lord Mayor is/who is the Lord
Mayor.
But (111) is true if John knows the truth of an identity
statement concerning the Lord Mayor. It is therefore
important to observe that the descriptions involved may be
held constant in this identity statement, so that this is
not a case of substituting a phrase expressing one description
for a phrase expressing another which happens to be co-
extensive with it. A sufficient condition for the truth
of (111) is the truth of:
(112) John knows that the Lord Mayor is the Lord Mayor.
This distinguishes the relationship between referential
and attributive readings from the opacity of the descriptive
content of noun phrases. But another point now arises.
Sentence (112) seems to express an almost trivial claim.
Since (112) mediates the inference of the referential
reading of (110) from the attributive reading, this
inference will be just as trivial as the truth conditions
on (112). It is true that sentence (112) can be taken in a
way which makes it almost trivial. If both of the noun phrases
in (112) are taken as attributive, then the sentence will be
true just as long as John knows that there is a Lord Mayor ---
since John surely does not doubt that everyone is identical
with himself, then as long as he knows that someone is
the Lord Mayor, he could hardly doubt that whoever that
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person is, he is identical with himself, i.e. with the
Lord Mayor. Similarly, if both of the noun phrases in (112)
are taken as referential, then as long as John is acquainted
with the person who is, in fact, the Lord Mayor, i.e. is
in a position to know anything of the Lord Mayor in the
referential sense, then he could hardly fail to know that
that person is identical with himself. These two readings
of (112) can be rendered roughly as respectively:
(113) John knows that it is true that whoever is the Lord
Mayor is identical with whoever is the Lord Mayor.
(114) The Lord Mayor and the Lord Mayor are such that John
knows that they are identical.
However, it was pointed out in Section 6 that if the noun
phrases in a sentence such as (112) are both interpreted
referentially or are both interpreted attributively, then
the sentence does not constitute grounds for the John
knows who ... statement (111). If the truth of (112) is
to mediate the inference from the attributive reading of (110)
to the referential reading, then one of the noun phrases
in (112) must be taken referentially and the other
attributively. And then (112) is no longer trivial. (Hintikka
makes much the same point as this in Knowledge and Belief,
Chapter Six, in his discussion of Quine's views on opacity.)
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CHAPTER V. THE SYNTAX OF OPAQUE CONSTRUCTIONS.
Section 1. Introduction.
In the previous chapters I have attempted to establish
the nature of the semantic representations that must be
assigned to sentences containing complement clauses. The
semantic relationships between the constituents of such sen-
tences are not congruent with the syntactic relationships
between them. Therefore the semantic representations must
either contain representations of the same constituents as
in surface structure but in a different configuration, or
else they must contain operators of some kind that 'bind'
these constituents and mark their semantic relationships
(scope) with respect to other constituents. For a complete
account of opaque constructions, we must specify the
rules of the grammar that correlate surface structures with
semantic structures of this kind.
The general properties of this body of rules is a
subject of some disagreement at present. There are differ-
ences of opinion as to the answers to such questions as
whether the semantic component should be interpretive or
generative, whether there is a semantic component distinct
from the syntactic component at all, whether recognition of
a level of deep syntactic structure simplifies or obstructs
grammatical derivations, whether surface structures should
be semantically interpreted, and so on. It would be absurd
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to pretend that my observations about opaque constructions
determine the answers to these questions. It is widely agreed
that all of the current linguistic theories are too powerful,
that they do not impose sufficient constraints upon the range
of possible grammars. While there is no shortage of facts
that we cannot account for at all, for most observations there
are too many, rather than too few, possible ways of handling
them formally. It should therefore not be too surprising to
find that the facts about opaque constructions are compatible
with more than one answer to the kinds of question just raised.
It is possible, however, to make certain negative points, to
show that as far as opaque constructions are concerned,
certain powers are not required of the grammar and certain
possible treatments are excluded. Since opaque constructions
are syntactically complex and are not, by any standards,
semantically impoverished, these observations may perhaps
turn out to have some significance in the determination of
the constraints that can be imposed upon grammars.
I shall present arguments in this chapter to the effect
that surface structures do not contain sufficient information
to serve as the input to an interpretive semantic component,
that deep structures as standardly defined (e.g. by Chomsky,
in Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, 1965) are adequate as input
to such a component, that the specific and non-specific
readings of ambiguous sentences are not distinguished at this
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level of deep structure, and that the facts about opacity
do not, as has been claimed, show that this level of
representation should be abandoned.
Section 2. Surface structures and semantic interpretation.
If a grammar contains an interpretive semantic component,
the representations of sentences which serve as input to this
component must determine the set of possible readings that
any sentence has. It is not required, though it may be the
case, that each of the possible readings of a sentence has a
different structural representation at the input level. All
that is required is that it should be possible to state (and
the more general the statement the better, of course) which
structures at this level are open to multiple interpretation,
and how many and which readings they have. Distinct repre-
sentations for each of these readings could then be constructed
by the rules of the semantic component which operate on the
input structures.
It is obvious, just from the fact that English sentences
containing complement clauses are systematically ambiguous,
that the level of surface structure does not provide distinct
representations for each of the readings of opaque construc-
tions. It might nevertheless be possible to state a generaliza-
tion over surface structures about which noun phrases (and
perhaps other constituents in the case of the opacity of
-U----- - ------ --
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descriptive content) are ambiguous, and what readings they
may have. It can be shown, however, that even if this is
possible, it is very far from optimal.
With some exceptions on either side, all and only
those noun phrases which appear in complement clauses are
ambiguous with respect to opacity, and any grammar that failed
to capture this generalization would be defective to that
extent. However, a noun phrase which is in a complement
clause in deep structure but is moved out of that clause
during the transformational derivation, is still ambiguous.
Sentence (1) is ambiguous with respect to specificity in the
same way as sentence (2):
(1) Mary believes one of the eggs to be broken.
(2) Mary believes that one of the eggs is broken.
even though there may be, for some speakers, a difference as
to which of the possible readings is the 'preferred' one in
each case. Similarly, sentence (3) is ambiguous with respect
to the referential/attributive distinction in the same way as
sentence (4):
(3) John proved Smith's murderer to be insane.
(4) John proved that Smith's murder was insane.
Assuming that the pairs (1) and (2), (3) and (4), are indeed
transformationally related (by the subject-raising rule),
then this suggests at the very least that a more general
statement about which noun phrases may be interpreted opaquely
could be defined over a level prior to the application of
-- - ~-----
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the subject-raising transformation.
An even stronger point can be made, however. There
is, as far as I know, no reason to assume that the surface
structure of sentences like (1) and (3) differs in relevant
respects from that of a sentence such as:
(5) Mary persuaded one of her friends to sing.
but the noun phrase one of her friends in (5), unlike one of
the eggs in (1), does not have a non-specific interpretation.
If the range of readings of a noun phrase is determined prior
to subject-raising, there is an obvious explanation of this
fact. The noun phrase in (5) is in the main clause prior to
subject-raising, the noun phrase in (1) is in the complement
clause prior to subject-raising; the difference between (5)
and (1) is therefore in accord with, rather than an exception
to, the generalization about noun phrases in complement clauses.
Since subject-raising applies within the transformational
cycle, this argument applies not only to the level of
surface structure but equally to any other post-cyclic
level of representation, for example the level of 'shallow
structure' which has recently been proposed.
If the opacity of noun phrases were to be read off
some post-cyclic level of representation rather than a
level prior to subject-raising, the class of opaque noun
phrases could not be structurally defined. Reference would
be needed to the particular verb present in a sentence,
and the class of verbs which would have to be mentioned
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would be precisely those which already have to be categorized
for the subject-raising rule. An even greater loss of
generality would be involved, however, for to state which
noun phrases not in complement clauses may be read opaquely
would require a further subdivision of this class of verbs,
and this subdivision will mirror precisely the subdivision
between verbs which take subject complements and those which
take object complements. Thus in the sentence:
(6) Someone seems to have taken my coat.
the subject noun phrase someone may be specific or non-
specific. In sentences (1) and (3), it is the object noun
phrase which is ambiguous, and the subjects of those sentences
are unambiguous. Given that there is a subject-raising rule,
the difference between (6) and (1) or (3) is obviously that
the verb seem takes a subject complement, and subject-raising
affects its subject position, while believe and prove take
object complements and subject-raising affects their object
positions.
It is in fact obvious in general that if the class of
noun phrases that may be read opaquely were to be defined
over surface structures, this would involve, in effect, the
unpicking of the operations of the transformational component.
For example, the contrast between:
(7) Someone is thought to have taken my coat.
in which the subject noun phrase may be specific or non-
specific, and:
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(8) Someone was persuaded to sing.
in which the subject noun phrase has no non-specific reading,
is a result of subject-raising together with passivization,
and it obviously should not be recorded as an independent fact
about the verbs think and persuade. We may conclude, there-
fore, that deep structures rather than surface structures
should constitute the input to the semantic component.
Section 3. Opacity and the level of deep structure.
Bach (Nouns and Noun Phrases, 1968) has argued in a
fashion somewhat similar to the preceding section that
the level of deep structure as traditionally conceived
(for example in Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax,
1965) should be rejected. Bach claims that the distribution
of opaque noun phrases can be defined most simply and generally
over a level of representation 'deeper' (more abstract) than
the traditional level of deep structure, and that recognition
of the traditional deep structure level actually obstructs
the statement of the generalization in question. The argument
concerns opacity in sentences which do not contain complement
structure. Since I have ignored these cases in preceding
chapters, I shall now consider their implications for the
linguistic description of opacity before discussing Bach's
argument in detail.
There are a number of different types of example of
non-complement constructions which are opaque, for example:
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(9) One of the burglars may be hiding in the cellar.
(10) Bill has apparently proposed to a friend of mine.
(11) John wants a yacht.
(12) I am looking for a pencil.
It was pointed out in Chapter I that not only do complement
constructions constitute much the widest class of opaque con-
texts, but there also seems to be some inherent connection
between these structures and the possibility of opaque inter-
pretations. The ambiguities we have been concerned with
appear to be ambiguities of the scope relationships between
a noun phrase and the clausal units of the sentence in which
it occurs, but this account of the nature of opacity only
makes sense of the ambiguities if there is more than one
clausal unit in the sentence. Any representational system
which is based on the intuition that there is some inherent
connection of this kind, and employs complement structure
essentially in making formal distinctions between transparent
and opaque readings, will have to make special allowance for
examples like those above. It is not just that they are
exceptions to the most obvious generalization about the
distribution of opaquely interpreted noun phrases; even if
we solve the problem of predicting that there are opaque
readings of such examples, it is still not clear in what form
these readings should be represented unless the semantic
representations contain something like complement structure.
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It may be possible to devise some king of formal repre-
sentational machinery which does not essentially employ
complement structure in distinguishing opaque and transparent
readings. One would then have to decide whether to allow the
semantic representations of sentences like those above to be
quite different from the representations of sentences which
are superficially complement constructions. This would, in
effect, be to employ two different kinds of representational
device for one and the same phenomenon. On the other hand
one might decide that this other representational system
cannot be employed in the case of complement constructions
without the loss of some significant insight. In fact the
tendency, both in philosophy and linguistics, has been to make
the opposite move, that is to assume complement-like structure
in the semantic representations of all sentences that have
opaque interpretations even if their superficial syntax does
not exhibit such structure. This move permits the essential
connection between complement structure and opacity, if it
really exists, to be captured. It is reinforced by the fact
that non-complement constructions which have opaque readings
can be paraphrased by complement constructions, but the
reverse is not generally true. Thus the meaning of the
sentence:
(13) I want an icecream.
can reasonably be expressed as:
(14) I want to have an icecream.
eat
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but the meaning of:
(15) I want to borrow a hammer.
cannot be expressed, without extreme unnaturalness, in a
sentence which does not contain complement structure (even
if disguised by means of anaphora). Whether this is univer-
sally the case I do not know; it certainly is so in all the
languages with which I am familiar. There even seems to be
some absurdity about the idea that it might not be so.
I shall simply assume, therefore, in what follows,
that in the semantic component there are no essential
differences between the representations of opaque contexts
which are superficially complement constructions and those
which are not. It still remains to be asked how the mapping
between the semantic representations and surface structures
is effected, and at what point in the grammar the two kinds
of example are differentiated. In particular, is it necessary
to assign examples like (9) - (12) syntactic representations
containing complement structure?
Any sentence containing a modal verb in its main clause
has an opaque interpretation, for example:
(16) I shall bring a friend.
(17) Someone should fix that traffic light.
(18) A burglar might get in through one of those windows.
Generally, any noun phrase in the sentence may be interpreted
opaquely or transparently, even the subject noun phrase, which
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precedes the modal verb in surface structure. Thus if what
we are dealing with is a scope phenomenon, the surface structure
appears not to display the scope relationships accurately.
There are some exceptions to this generalization, however.
In the sentence:
(19) One of the boys can do it.
if the can is a can of permission, then there is a specific
reading of the subject noun phrase and a non-specific reading.
The sentence can mean either:
(20) It is permitted that one of the boys should do it.
or:
(21) One of the boys is such that he is permitted to do it.
If, however, the can is a can of ability, then it appears
that there is only a specific reading, something like:
(22) One of the boys is such that he is able to do it.
and there is no non-specific reading any more than there is
a sentence:
(23) *It is able that one of the boys (should) do it.
For the adjective able, the fact that its subject
noun phrase has no non-specific interpretation can be
explained if we conclude from the ungrammaticality of (23)
that able takes an object complement rather than a subject
complement, and thus that the structure of the sentence:
(24) One of the boys is able to do it.
is something like:
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(25) One of the boys is able S[he do it].
rather than:
(26) S[one of the boys do it] is able.
Thus the subject noun phrase of (24) appears in the matrix
clause in deep structure, which explains why it has no opaque
interpretation. Any other noun phrase in such a sentence may
be interpreted opaquely, however, for these will be in the
complement clause in deep structure. For example, the noun
phrase one ball is ambiguous in the sentence:
(27) John is able to balance one ball on his nose.
This would be predicted from the deep structure:
(28) John is able S[John balance one ball on his nose].
Notice that exactly the same ambiguity exists in the
corresponding sentence with can, thus:
(29) John can balance one ball on his nose.
Either there is a particular ball such that John can balance
it on his nose, or else John can balance any one ball on his
nose at a time.
If it is assumed that sentences containing modals are
like sentences containing complement structure not only at
the semantic level but at the level of deep syntactic structure
also, that is, that modals are not introduced into deep
structures within an Aux constituent but are introduced as main
verbs taking complements, then the generalization that noun
phrases in complement structures have an opaque interpretation
will cover sentences with modals too; one large class of
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exceptions to the partial generalization that only noun phrases
in complements have an opaque interpretation will have been
removed. Treating can on its two readings as structurally
different, one taking a subject complement, and one taking
an object complement like is able, will automatically explain
the observations above about the distribution of opaque noun
phrases in sentences with can. These advantages have an
associated cost, of course, for something will have to be
added to the transformational component, and also to the
selection restrictions, in order to generate the proper class
of surface structures. But Ross has put forward quite inde-
pendent arguments for the analysis of modals as verbs taking
complements (Auxiliaries as Main Verbs, 1968), and if those
arguments are accepted, then the generalization of the state-
ment of distribution of opaque noun phrases falls out as an
automatic bonus. It will simplify the semantic component,
since this component will not now need to contain a special
rule mapping sentences containing modals onto semantic repre-
sentations. The same rule can be used for sentences with
modals as is already needed for sentences with complement
structure.
A further move in the same direction would bring some
of the other apparently exceptional cases under the same
generalization about the distribution of opaque noun phrases.
Adverbs such as probably, perhaps, apparently, obviously,
conceivably, etc., create opaque contexts in the same way
as explicit clauses like It is probable that..., It may be
- WA ----- -___ - - ----- -- ____ - -
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the case that..., It is apparent that..., and so on. Thus
the sentence:
(30) Bill has apparently proposed to a friend of mine.
has the two interpretations:
(31) There is apparently a friend of mine that Bill has
proposed to.
(32) There is a friend of mine that Bill has apparently
proposed to.
These are very similar to the two interpretations:
(33) It is apparent that there is a friend of mine that Bill
has proposed to.
(34) There is a friend of mine whom it is apparent that Bill
has proposed to.
of the sentence:
(35) It is apparent that Bill has proposed to a friend of
mine.
Just as for the modals, we could assume that sentences (30)
and (35), and similar pairs, have different deep structures
but much the same semantic representations. In this case,
sentences like (30) would be exceptions to the generalization
that all and only noun phrases which are in a complement clause
in deep structure have an opaque interpretation, and the
semantic component would need a special rule for mapping
these sentences onto semantic representations. Alternatively,
it could be assumed that the deep structures of sentences (30)
and (35) are essentailly identical and are both complement
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constructions. This would bring (30) under the generalization
about opaque noun phrases, would permit one and the same
semantic rule to be employed in both cases, but would require
some rule(s) to be added to the transformational component to
convert certain adjectives into adverbs and reduce the
clausal structure. Independent arguments have, I believe,
been put forward for this analysis too.
Another class of examples is the following:
(36) John wants a yacht.
(37) Bill is hoping for a birthday present.
(38) I am expecting a letter.
with verbs which do take complements but can also take simple
object noun phrases. Unlike many of the examples with modals,
or the examples with sentential adverbs, in these cases the
subject of the opaque verb is not ambiguous; it is only the
object noun phrase and other phrases which follow the verb,
if any, as in:
(39) I am expecting him one Monday.
that are open to an opaque interpretation. Exactly the same
is true of the most natural paraphrases with complement
structure, thus:
(40) John wants to have (own, get) a yacht.
(41) Bill is hoping to receive a birthday present.
(42) I am expecting a letter to arrive (come).
(43) I am expecting him to arrive (come) one Monday.
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The verbs which appear in the complements of these paraphrases
are to a large extent predictable; sentence (36), for example,
can be paraphrased as (40) but not as:
(44) John wants to sail a yacht.
be on
eat
tetc.
It is therefore conceivable that the simple sentences should
be derived from the same deep structures as their paraphrases
containing complements, and thus brought under the generaliza-
tion about opaque interpretation and complement clauses in
deep structure. In this case, however, the transformational
rule which provides the correct surface structure for a
sentence such as (36) will not just be a governed rule, as
it will for the case of the sentential adverbs, but will
actually delete a different verb from the complement depending
on the verb in the matrix clause. The cost of preserving
the generalization about the distribution of opaque noun phrases
would therefore be rather severe. However, independent
arguments have been put forward for this analysis too (Ross,
A Note on Have Deletion, 1969, unpublished), and if these
arguments are accepted, then once again the generalization
about opacity falls out at no extra cost.
At the extreme end of the scale, we have examples like:
(45) I am looking for a hammer.
(46) Ernest is hunting lions.
Here too, only noun phrases following the verb are open to an
opaque interpretation and this is also true of the most
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natural paraphrases, e.g:
(47) I am trying to find a hammer.
(48) Ernest is trying to catch lions.
There are very few examples of this kind in English, but the
paraphrases seem to be idiosyncratic and not reducible to a
general rule. Furthermore, they do not contain the verb
that actually appears in the simple sentences. To derive the
simple sentences from their paraphrases with complement struc-
ture would therefore involve not merely deletion, but either
the mapping of some lexical items into others, or else the
postponement of lexical insertion until after the operation of
the relevant transformation which reduces the clausal
structure of the deep structure.
It is for this very abstract conception of deep
structure that Bach is arguing. However, although there
are independent arguments for a syntactic analysis in terms
of complement structure for the other types of example we
have considered, there are none, as far as I know, in the
case of examples like (45) and (46). What Bach assumes is
that the preservation of the generalization about the dis-
tribution of opaque noun phrases is itself an argument for
this analysis, but in fact the alternatives that we have to
choose between seem to be as evenly balanced as it is possible
to imagine. One alternative is, as Bach proposes, to assign
to these examples deep structures containing a complement
clause, and employ a very powerful system of rules for mapping
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these deep structures onto surface structures. This move
will simplify the semantic component, since now all of the
sentences which have opaque readings will constitute a well-
defined class at the level of deep structure, and, furthermore,
their deep structures will be very close, if not identical,
to the semantic structures that have to be assigned. The
other alternative is to save in the transformational
component, by assuming that the deep structure of a sentence
like (45) contains only one clause, just like its surface
structure, and to adopt a special rule in the semantic com-
ponent to map such a deep structure onto a semantic repre-
sentation similar to that for the sentence (47). In the
absence of any further evidence, the choice between these
two treatments seems to me to be utterly undetermined;
simplicity measures are simply not refined enough to decide
between them.
The persuasiveness that Bach's argument has comes
from the parallel that he draws between his own argument and
Halle's argument against recognising the taxonomic phonemic
level. Bach maintains that opacity, like the devoicing of
obstruents in Russian, is a phenomenon that bridges a putative
level of linguistic representation, in this case the traditional
level of deep structure (at which (45) and (47) would have
distinct representations). He concludes that this level,
like the taxonomic phonemic level, is therefore an encumbrance
rather than an advantage in linguistic descriptions and should
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not be recognised. But the analogy with Halle's argument
is incomplete. In Halle's case, only the criteria of
complementary distribution and contrast divide the class of
obstruents which undergo devoicing in a given context into
two distinct sub-classes, and it is only this which, in turn,
requires the existence of two distinct devoicing rules in
a grammar containing a taxonomic phonemic level. In all
other respects the segments which undergo voicing are alike.
Therefore jettisoning the taxonomic phonemic level permits
a single obstruent devoicing rule with no loss of descriptive
adequacy. But where is the rule that applies both to the
object noun phrase of look for and to a noun phrase in a
complement clause? Bach does not cite any, and it is for
this reason that his argument is incomplete, for if there is
no such rule, then there is no rule which would have to be
duplicated, or even complicated, if the traditional level of
deep structure is recognised in the grammar.
Since all that Bach discusses is the meanings of these
sentences, it may be that what he had in mind was the saving
of a rule of the semantic component, since assigning look for
a deep structure with a complement would permit just one
and the same rule to be used for mapping deep structures onto
semantic representations of opaque readings. But, as pointed
out above, this gain in the semantic component would have to
be paid for in the form of complicating the transformational
component. The reason for this difference between the case
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of opacity and that of obstruent devoicing in Russian is
that look for and try to find are not exactly similar con-
structions. They are similar in meaning but obviously different
in their superficial syntactic structure. They could con-
sequently never be assigned completely identical derivations,
as can the obstruents which undergo devoicing in Russian.
The obstruents all begin and end their derivation as similar;
look for and try to find are similar at only one end of their
derivations, the semantic end, and their derivations there-
fore cannot be made exactly similar throughout by the dropping
of any level of representation, or indeed by any other
manoeuvre.
The question at what level (or if not at a level
then at what point) the derivations of sentences with
look for and sentences with try to find converge (or
diverge, if looked at the other way) still remains to be
answered. The only kind of fact that would force one
to assign them identical deep syntactic structures would
be the existence of some syntactic reflex of the opaque
reading of a noun phrase such that the proper set of
surface structures could be generated only if opaquely
interpreted noun phrases were recognised as a syntactic
class, that is to say, the existence of some rule applying
to the objects of look for and try to find, but not, for
example, to the object of catch or find or hit. There are
in fact very few syntactic phenomena specially associated
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with the opaque readings of noun phrases. Although phrases
like whichever... or some.. .or other are often used in
paraphrasing opaque readings informally, these items do
also occur freely in transparent contexts. Thus the
existence of sentences such as:
(49) He is looking for whichever boy failed the exam.
(50) He is looking for some pencil or other.
like:
(51) He is trying to find whichever boy failed the exam.
(52) He is trying to find some pencil or other.
do not show that look for and try to find must be repre-
sented identically at the stage at which distributional
constraints are imposed, because of transparent examples
such as:
(53) He hit whichever boy failed the exam.
(54) He hit some boy or other.
In many cases, a non-specific noun phrase can
be distinctively paraphrased by means of a there is
internal to the sentence, as in:
(55) Mary thinks there is someone in the cellar.
as contrasted with the specific:
(56) There is someone that Mary thinks is in the cellar.
With look for, however, there can be no such internal there
is marking the non-specific reading -- one cannot even imagine
where to try to insert one, thus:
(57) **He is looking there is for a pencil.
(58) **He is looking for there is a pencil.
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Also in some cases a distinctive kind of noun phrase is used
in referring back to a non-specific antecedent. Thus with a
non-specifically interpreted antecedent we have the discourse:
(59) John wants to catch a fish. The fish he catches...
while with a specifically interpreted antecedent we have the
discourse:
(60) John wants to catch a fish. The fish he wants to catch...
(See Dean, Non-specific Noun Phrases in English, 1968, for
further discussion.) But for look for, despite its possible
opaque interpretation, there is no such syntactic contrast
in cross-referring noun phrases, but only:
(61) John is looking for a fish. The fish he is looking for...
which must be taken as specific, just as for any fully
transparent verb, e.g.:
(62) John caught a fish. The fish he caught...
Similarly with pronouns coreferential with the object of
look for. The discourse:
(63) John is looking for a fish. It is in the bath.
is not ungrammatical with the it interpreted as coreferential
with a fish, though it is acceptable only on a specific
interpretation.
There therefore appear to be no distinctive surface
structures to be generated for look for which would require
it to have a deep structure like try to find and different
from that of any transparent verb. Though this is not ruled
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out, of course, the opacity of look for could quite well be
handled by appropriate rules of interpretation.
There are in fact remarkably few syntactic phenomena
which distinguish the opaque and transparent readings for
any opaque verb. Most examples are systematically ambiguous,
and there seems to be no motivation for assigning the
readings distinct deep structure representations rather
than deriving them from a single deep structure and
distinguishing them only in the semantic component. The
most striking facts relevant to this question are the
distinctive there is... paraphrases for specific and
non-specific noun phrases and I shall discuss these in
detail in the next section. I mention here briefly one or
two other cases where a deep structure difference between
specific and non-specific readings of ambiguous surface
structures might appear to be required.
The correlation between which-questions and specificity
has already been noted. The question:
(64) Which fish does John want to catch?
presupposes that John wants to catch a particular fish, i.e.
it presupposes the specific, and not merely the non-specific,
reading of the sentence:
(65) John wants to catch a fish.
It is not obvious that presuppositions should be treated
syntactically rather than in the semantic component, but
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in this case it does look at first sight as though the facts
could be explained by a structural condition on the question
formation rules. It looks, that is, as if the question-word
preposing transformation is constrained not to move a noun
phrase out of the scope of its specificity operator. This
would explain why the question (64), with preposed noun phrase,
could correspond only to the specific reading of (65), for
which the specificity operator is already at the far left
of the structure, but not to the non-specific reading of (65),
for which the specificity operator is internal to the comple-
ment.
This would be interesting if true, especially as it
would suggest a relationship between which-questions and
relative clauses. It has already been mentioned that a
noun phrase which is 'relativised' is always interpreted as
specific with respect to the whole of sentence which underlies
the relative clause, and that the sentence as a whole there-
fore presupposes the specific reading, and not merely the non-
specific, of the relative clause sentence. Relative pronoun
preposing and question-word preposing might therefore be
supposed to be the same rule, or at least subject to the
same interesting structural constraint, viz. that they must
preserve the underlying scope relationships in the sentence.
It was observed in Section 2 that the subject-raising
transformation is not constrained in this way, so this
cannot be a general constraint on the operation of
337
transformations. And, in fact, it can be shown not even to
be a constraint on the preposing of question words, for
what-questions are not restricted to specific noun phrases.
The question:
(66) What does John want to catch?
although it contains a preposed noun phrase, does not
presuppose the specific reading of the sentence:
(67) John wants to catch something.
It does presuppose that John has decided what kind of thing
he wants to catch, but not that he has decided on any thing
in particular. Either reading of the sentence:
(68) John wants to catch a fish.
therefore counts as an adequate answer to the question.
It should also be noted that which-questions which have
not undergone preposing are restricted to specific noun
phrases just like those in which the noun phrase
has been preposed. Thus the question:
(69) John wants to catch which fish?
has the same presupposition as the question (64). It therefore
cannot be the preposing of the noun phrase in (64) which
accounts for the specificity of its presupposition.
The connection between which and specificity thus
appears not to be a structural one and not, therefore, to
require a structural difference between specific and non-
specific sentences in the syntactic component. The observations
above could be handled by means of interpretive rules. Notice,
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incidentally, that if the which/what contrast is treated
as a definite/indefinite contrast as is sometimes proposed
(though it has also been regarded instead as a noun/pronoun
contrast, for example), then the semantic differences between
which- and what-questions just observed would tie up with the
observations of Chapter II, Section 5, about the relationship
between definite noun phrases and specific indefinite ones.
It should also be pointed out that the observations about
what- and which-questions above apply also to embedded questions
such as:
(70) I wonder which fish John wants to catch.
(71) I wonder what John wants to catch.
and also to cleft and pseudo-cleft sentences which, despite
the surface structure position of the noun phrases they
contain, are not unambiguously specific in meaning, for example:
(72) What John wants to catch is a fish.
(73) A fish is what John wants to catch.
and even:
(74) It is a fish that John wants to catch.
These facts suggest, incidentally, that cleft sentences are
related to questions rather than to relative clauses, if
indeed to either.
Section 4. Specificity and deep structures. 'There is...
constructions.
We have been considering two questions, (a) what
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level of representation determines which noun phrases in
sentences are ambiguous with respect to opacity? i.e. how
'deep' must the level input to the semantic component be?
(b) at what level are the different readings of opaque noun
phrases assigned different representations? In Section 2
it was shown that surface structures are not 'deep' enough
to be the optimal input to the semantic component. In
Section 3 it was maintained that there is no positive
motivation, as far as the facts about opacity are concerned,
to assume a syntactic level much 'deeper' than the traditional
level of deep structure to serve as input to the semantic
component. It was also pointed out that a number of facts
which might suggest that specific and non-specific readings
of ambiguous sentences have distinct deep structures do not
in fact require this. I shall now consider the relationship
between there is... sentences and specificity with a view
to showing first that deep structures do not need to be
supplemented by information from surface structures as
input to the semantic component, and secondly that even though
the specificity of unambiguous examples is indicated
in their deep structures, it does not follow that ambiguous
sentences have multiple derivations from unambiguous deep
structures.
Although it has been shown that a pre-cyclic level
of representation permits a more general statement of the
distribution of opaque noun phrases than a post-cyclic
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level, it does not follow that there is some pre-cyclic
level at which all the information relevant to opacity
of noun phrases is represented. Although characteristically
opaque constructions are systematically ambiguous, there
are sentences containing there is... which are unambiguous
with respect to specificity. If there is nothing in the deep
structures of these sentences from which their readings could
be predicted, then deep structures alone would not be sufficient
input to the semantic component, and the effect of a there is
on the meaning of a sentence would require the input of
some more superficial level of representation to the semantic
component.
The sentence:
(75) Mary thinks a man is in the cellar.
is ambiguous with respect to the specificity of a man. The
sentence:
(76) There is a man that Mary thinks is in the cellar.
is unambiguously specific with respect to this phrase, however,
and for many speakers the sentence:
(77) Mary thinks that there is a man in the cellar.
is unambiguously non-specific. If, therefore, there are no
syntactic grounds for deriving (76) and (77) from distinct
deep structures, then the level of deep structure will not be
sufficiently informative to serve as the input to the semantic
component. We should consider, therefore, the possibility
that both (76) and (77) are derived from the same deep
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structure as (75), by means of a transformation that freely
introduces there is in the relevant contexts. I shall argue
that, on purely syntactic grounds, this analysis of (76)
and (77) is not optimal, that the simplest and most general
analysis of there is... constructions does in fact assign
distinct deep structures to these two sentences, and, further-
more, that the nature of these deep structures actually explains
why they have the particular readings that they do.
How to analyse sentences containing there is has
always been a rather murky question, and one on which
curiously little has been written. This may in part be
due to the fact that many of syntactically simplest examples
hover on the borders of acceptability, for example:
(78) There is a boy.
(79) There are elephants.
and even:
(80) There are nine thousand and seventy three elephants.
(81) There is someone that I saw.
It is not immediately apparent what distinguishes these
examples from the more acceptable:
(82) There is a God.
(83) There are purple elephants.
(84) There are five continents.
(85) There is someone that I have to see.
(I note in passing that the observation of Section 5 of
Chapter II, that there is... is not, or not necessarily,
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to be interpreted as existential, helps to make some sense
of these differences in acceptability. If the there is...
sentence is taken to mean not that things of the kind
described really exist but simply that individual ones
have been conceived of, characterised in stories, imagined
to exist, and so on, then a sentence like (79) is bound
to be odd, because we could hardly have the word elephant
in the language unless elephants had been conceived of.
Hence the greater acceptability of (83). The non-existential
reading of there is... will also be more natural when there
is some other function for the there is... to serve, as in (85),
where it distinguishes the specific reading of I have to see
someone from the non-specific reading. Hence the greater
acceptability of (85) as compared with (81), where there is
no specific/non-specific distinction to be made.)
The most natural examples of there is... constructions
are those with locative or time modifiers, such as:
(86) There is a cat on that roof.
(87) There was a protest meeting on Sunday.
and those with relative clauses on the noun following the
there is, such as:
(88) There are elephants which are small enough to hold in
your hand.
In order to provide a uniform analysis of at least these
two types of example, it might be proposed that the modifiers
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in (86) and (87) should be derived from relative clauses
by the usual relative clause reduction rule. Thus to bring
these sentences into line with (88), they might be
derived from:
(89) There is a cat which is on that roof.
(90) There was a protest meeting which was on Sunday.
All three sentences would thus consist of just a noun phrase
following there is. Stephen Anderson has pointed out in
support of this proposal (in 'What There Is', forthcoming)
that the constraints on the modifiers that may appear in
sentences like (86) and (87) parallel to a striking degree
the constraints on relative clause reduction. For example,
relative clauses with predicate nominals do not reduce.
The sentence:
(91) I know a man who is a taxidermist.
has no corresponding reduced form:
(92) *1 know a man a taxidermist.
In conformity with this, the sentence:
(93) There is a man who is a taxidermist.
even if not entirely acceptable, is at least considerably
more so than:
(94) *There is a man a taxidermist.
Even if, for these reasons, sentences (86) and (87)
are to be assigned a derivation from structures like (89)
and (90), there are also grounds for deriving them from
simply:
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(95) A cat is on that roof.
(96) A protest meeting was on Sunday.
The modifiers in (86) and (87) are mobile, thus we have:
(97) On that roof there is a cat.
(98) On Sunday there was a protest meeting.
It is true that relative clauses can be moved around in
sentences to some extent; they can be extraposed, as in:
(99) The books have not yet arrived which were ordered
last week.
but this is possible only if they have not been reduced,
witness:
(100) *The books have not yet arrived ordered last week.
and in any case they cannot be preposed:
(101) *(Which were) ordered last week the books have not
yet arrived.
The relative clause derivation of (86) and (87) therefore
does not account for the variants (97) and (98). The
derivation from (95) and (96) does, since we also have:
(102) On that roof is a cat.
(103) ? On Sunday was a protest meeting.
The importance of the derivation of these sentences
from sources like (95) and (96) is that the verb is of the
there is is already present in (95) and (96). Only there
has to be inserted transformationally. It takes the place
of the subject noun phrase, which is repositioned after
the verb is. The claim that it is only there, and
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not there is, that is introduced by transformation is strongly
supported by the existence of sentences with there but a
verb other than is, for example:
(104) In the corner there stood a whatnot.
(105) In the crib there lay a tiny baby.
There is no way of deriving such sentences by means of a
transformation that introduces there is, (and because of
selection restrictions, if nothing else, we should not
want there stood and there lay to be introduced transforma-
tionally). The transformation just outlined which introduces
there and repositions the subject noun phrase could,
however, be quite simply broadened to apply to certain
intransitive verbs other than is, and (104) and (105) would
therefore be derivable from:
(106) A whatnot stood in the corner.
(107) A tiny baby lay in the crib.
In other cases too, the is of there is must be regarded as
present in the underlying structure rather than as introduced
transformationally. Thus the tense of the verb to be in the
sentence:
(108) There was a new theatre opened in Boston today.
suggests that this verb is in fact the passive auxiliary,
and that (108) is derived from:
(109) A new theatre was opened in Boston today.
rather than by reduction of the relative clause construction:
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(110) There was (?) a new theatre which was opened in Boston
today.
If we return now to the examples which have overt
relative clause structure, such as:
(111) There is someone whom I have to see.
the transformation which is required for the other cases
will be adequate for these relative clause constructions
too, if we suppose that their underlying structure is of the
form:
(112) NP[Someone whom I have to see] Vp[is].
To derive a sentence such as (111) from the simple sentential
source:
(113) I have to see someone.
would require a transformation quite different from that
needed for other there is... constructions. Furthermore,
this transformation would be considerably more complex than
the one that has been proposed; it would have to introduce
a verb to be as well as there, the there would have to be
able to substitute for noun phrases other than the subject
noun phrase, and the rest of the sentence would somehow
have to be converted into a relative clause modifying
this noun phrase. By comparison, the only complication
involved in the derivation of (111) from (112) is that
the there introduction rule is obligatory when the verb
to be is clause-final.
Our original interest was in pairs of sentences such as:
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(114) There is a man that Mary thinks is in the cellar.
(115) Mary thinks that there is a man in the cellar.
Although the analysis of there is. ... sentences was not developed
in connection with these examples, and in particular was not
based on a desire to ensure different deep structure
sources for such non-synonymous pairs, this is in fact
just what the analysis provides. Even if we assume
that the there of (114) and (115) is transformationally
introduced, these two sentences do not have identical
deep structures because the verb is must be assumed to
be present in their underlying forms, and it will be in
a different position in the two cases. The sources will
be respectively:
(116) NP[A man S[Mary thinks [a man is in the cellar]]]
VPI~is].
(117) Mary thinks S[ NP[a man] VP[is in the cellar]].
If sentence (115) can also be regarded as a reduction of:
(118) Mary thinks there is a man who is in the cellar.
then it will also have the source:
(119) Mary thinks S[ NP[a man S[a man is in the cellar]]
pT[is]1.
It appears, therefore, that it is not necessary
to input surface structures to the semantic component in
order that distinct semantic representations should be
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assigned to pairs of sentences such as (114) and (115) which
differ with respect to specificity, for these sentences
will have distinct deep structures. It is a strong point
in favour of the proposed analysis that the difference between
the deep structures that have been assigned actually explains
why the presence of there is in a sentence disambiguates it
with respect to specificity. It was observed in Chapter III
that noun phrases containing relative clauses presuppose
the truth of the specific reading of the sentence which
underlies the relative clause. For example, the phrase:
(120) The fish that John wants to catch
presupposes the truth of the specific reading of the
sentence:
(121) John wants to catch a fish.
and the phrase has no referent if this sentence is false
or if it is true only on its non-specific reading, i.e. if
there is no particular fish that John wants to catch. It
therefore appears that any noun phrase which is 'relativised'
must be fully specific with respect to the relative clause
sentence (see Dean, Non-specific Noun Phrases in English,
for further comment on this point). This means that in
the structure (116) the noun phrase a man inside the relative
clause must be interpreted as specific with respect to the
relative clause sentence:
(122) Mary thinks a man is in the cellar.
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This explains why sentence (114), which is derived from (116),
has the same meaning as the specific reading of (122), and
has no reading corresponding to the non-specific reading
of (122). On the other hand, sentence (115) is either to
be derived from (117), which has no relative clause, or is
to be derived from (119), in which the relative clause
sentence is:
(123) A man is in the cellar.
The phrase a man in (115) must therefore be interpreted as
specific with respect to (123), but this is consistent with
its being non-specific with respect to the larger context (122).
The deep structure position of the is of there is
serves to determine specificity and non-specificity in the
examples we have considered. It might therefore be proposed
that the scope operator for specificity simply is this is.
Furthermore it looks as if this is can be assumed to be
present in the deep structures, and not simply the semantic
representations, of ambiguous sentences such as (122), without
our needing to complicate the syntactic component in any
way. If the grammar contained a rule which deleted the is,
and the associated clausal structure, from structures of
the kind that underlie there is... sentences, then the ambiguous
sentence (122) would be derivable both from the structure
that underlies the unambiguously specific sentence (114)
and also from the structure that underlies the unambiguously
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non-specific sentence (115). The ambiguity of (122) would
thus be accounted for. The rule that is needed is, however,
very like the rule of quantifier lowering that Lakoff and
others have proposed. Thus Lakoff (On Derivational
Constraints, 1969) argues that the sentence:
(124) Many men read few books.
should be derived from an underlying structure of the form:
(125) S
NP S are many
men NP VP
NP S are few
books NP VP
I /
men read books
This structure is also supposed to underlie the surface
structure:
(126) The men who read few books are many. (Many are the
men who read few books.)
The rule of quantifier lowering, applied to are few, will
produce (126). If applied twice, i.e. to are many as well
as to are few, the result is (124). Now, comparing (125)
with (116) above, it is clear that the rule that lowers few
or many in (125) and gets rid of the are and the associated
structure, will also serve to get rid of the is and the
associated structure from (116). In fact, to bring the
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analysis of specificity even more closely into line with a
general account of quantifiers, we might propose that the
structure underlying (114) is not (116) but rather:
(127) NP S
NP S is a
man NP P
Mary V P
thinks S
NP P
man is in the cellar
with the indefinite article a (or some in the plural) as
part of the verb phrase, rather than simply the intransitive
verb is. This article, just like the few and many of (125),
would be lowered by the quantifier lowering rule. If,
optionally, the quantifier lowering rule were not applied
to (127), the there is... construction (114) would be
produced instead by the there-insertion rule. Notice,
incidentally, that because of the observations of Section 5
of Chapter II, the is of there is must not be taken to
be synonymous with exists but must be interpreted in terms
of individuation. The analysis (127), in which the is
simply serves to introduce a quantifier, is therefore
intuitively appropriate.
The proposal just outlined is that systematically
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ambiguous sentences like (122) should be assigned two
distinct deep structures, one identical with that of (114)
and one identical with that of (115). This will account
for the ambiguity of (122), and require no extra formal
machinery in the grammar since the quantifier lowering
rule will reduce the structures underlying (114) and (115)
to the surface structure (122). I shall now show that this
account of the ambiguity of a sentence like (122) suffers
from a serious disadvantage. There are differences between
sentences with there is... and the corresponding ambiguous
sentences without there is... which it will be difficult,
if not impossible, to capture if identical deep structure
sources are assigned to both.
In many cases, a there is... paraphrase of the non-
specific reading of a sentence is far from natural.
Although (115) is a reasonable paraphrase of the non-specific
reading of (122), the paraphrase:
(128) John wants there to be a fish that he catches/will catch.
for the non-specific reading of:
(129) John wants to catch a fish.
is far from elegant. There are, however, acceptable sentences
with there is... in the complement of want, for example:
(130) John wants there to be a fish in the pool.
and it may be only that tenses and modalities make for
awkwardness in infinitival complement constructions.
What is important is that there are some verbs
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which cannot have there is... in their complements at all.
Noun phrases in the complements of these verbs are neverthe-
less ambiguous with respect to specificity. In these cases,
therefore, there is no there is... paraphrase for the
non-specific reading. For example, the sentence:
(131) John forced Mary to say something.
is ambiguous with respect to the specificity of something.
Either there was something in particular that John forced
Mary to say, or else John just forced Mary to say something
or other, to break her silence. The specific reading can be
paraphrased as:
(132) There is something that John forced Mary to say.
but there is no acceptable paraphrase with there is...
for the non-specific reading, thus:
(133) *John forced Mary that there was something that she
said/say/should say.
(134) *John forced Mary into there being something that she
said.
This is not peculiar to the verb force, but is true of a
number of other verbs too, for example the verb try. The
sentence:
(135) John was trying to catch a fish.
is ambiguous. It can be taken to mean that John's efforts
were directed towards the capture of some particular fish, in
which case it can be paraphrased as:
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(136) There was a fish that John was trying to catch.
But (135) can also be taken to mean simply that John was
endeavouring not to go home fishless, and for this (non-
specific) reading, there is no paraphrase with there is....
(137) *John was trying that there was a fish that he caught/
catch/should catch.
The absence of a surface structure with there is...
corresponding to the non-specific reading of the ambiguous
sentence does not, of course, automatically prove that
there is no deep structure source for this reading. There
might, after all, be a deep structure of the appropriate
kind but no there is... surface structure derivable from
it because of facts about the distribution of complementizers,
or the selective operation of certain transformations. How-
ever, there is already available a different but quite adequate
explanation to the ungrammaticality of (133), (134) and (137),
an explanation which does lead to the conclusion that there
are no deep structures of the kind that would underlie these
ungrammatical strings. The complement of the verb force
must have, in deep structure, a subject noun phrase
identical to the direct object of the verb force, and the
verb of the complement must be non-stative. The complement
of the verb try must have, in deep structure, a subject
identical to the subject of try, and the verb of the
complement must be non-stative. It is no wonder, then, that
the complements of these verbs cannot be there is...
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constructions. The underlying subject of a there is...
construction is a noun phrase containing a relative clause,
and its main verb is the verb to be. The deep structures:
(138) John forced Mary [ NP[something [Mary say something]]
VP[is]].
(139) John was trying S[ NP[a fish S[John catch a fish]]
VP[is]].
would be ruled out by the constraints on the complements
of force and try.
I am assuming here that these constraints come into
force before the application of transformations. If this
is so, then the hypothesis that ambiguous examples are to
be derived from the same structures as underlie the
corresponding unambiguous sentences with there is...
must be rejected, for there will be no deep structure
source for the non-specific reading of sentences like (131)
and (135). If generated at all, these deep structures will
be filtered out by the selection constraints before the
quantifier lowering transformation that deletes the verb
to be is applied. Thus although all unambiguous
examples have deep structure sources from which their readings
can be predicted, the ambiguous examples cannot be assumed
to have a number of distinct deep structure sources which
predict their full range of possible readings, for then
- -
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it would be impossible to explain the existence of a non-
specific reading of a sentence for which there is no
unambiguously non-specific paraphrase with there is....
Only a grammar in which the selection constraints on verbs
like force and try to operate after the quantifier lowering
transformation would be able to account for these facts,
that is, a grammar in which the selection constraints operate
within the transformational cycle, or at some post-cyclic
level. Unless this assumption about ordering is made, it
must be concluded that sentence (122), for example, cannot
be derived from a structure like (117) or (119). There would
then be no advantage to providing it with a derivation from
a structure like (116) either. Unless, therefore, there
is some syntactic motivation for providing it with two
distinct deep structures of a different kind, i.e. identifying
the specificity operator with some element in deep structure
other than the is of there is, it must be assumed that (122)
has a single deep structure source (presumably roughly along
the lines of Rosenbaum's analysis in The Grammar of English
Predicate Complement Constructions, 1967), and that its two
readings are distinguished only in the semantic component.
The conclusion that opaque and transparent readings
of opaque constructions are not distinguished at the level
of deep structure is in fact a welcome one, since the direct
generation of structures in which the scope differences
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concerned in opacity are explicitly marked is no simple
matter. If, for example, the scope of a noun phrase which
in surface structure is the object of the verb in a comple-
ment clause were marked, for one reading of the sentence,
by letting this noun phrase appear in the matrix clause in
the underlying structure, then the statement of selection
restrictions over these structures would be extremely complex.
For example, the range of noun phrases that can appear in
the context:
(140) John wants to catch .
is determined by the verb catch, that is, by the verb of which
the noun phrase is a direct object. If, however, the specific
reading of a sentence such as:
(141) John wants to catch a fish.
is supposed to be represented in some such fashion as:
(142) (A fish) x John wants to catch x.
in order to indicate the scope of this noun phrase, then the
indexing system must be invoked in order to determine which
noun phrase is the direct object of the verb catch, and to
ensure that the selection restrictions between the verb and
its object are not violated. Since there is in principle no
limit to the number of complement clauses that may be embedded
within each other, the noun phrase may be indefinitely far
away from its verb in the underlying structure.
Furthermore, it is clear that structures such as:
(143) (A fish) (a tiger) John wants to catch x.
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(144) (A fish) John wants to catch y.
(145) (A fish) John wants to go home.
and perhaps also:
(146) (A fish) John wants y to catch x.
correspond to no possible surface structures. There must be
no more and no less of these re-positioned constituents than
there are positions that they could fill. This point holds
also for semantic representations which employ not representa-
tions of the constituents themselves, but operators
binding these constituents, in order to mark the semantic
relationships. The statement of strict subcategorization and
selectional constraints for structures of this kind will
clearly be considerably more complex than for structures
such as Rosenbaum, for example, proposed as the deep structures
for complement constructions and in which the scope relation-
ships relevant to opacity are not marked. If, for these reasons,
it is structures of the latter kind which are directly
generated by the base component, then the proper set of well-
formed structures containing scope markings can be derived
from these base structures by rules of transformational power
in the semantic component.
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